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THE ROLE OF INSTITUTIONAL AND
RETAIL INVESTORS IN CANADIAN
CAPITAL MARKETS0
By JEFFREY G. MACNTOSH *
In recent years, the growth of the institutional portfolio (i.e., funds
managed by mutual funds, insurance companies, banks, trust and loan
companies, etc.) has been truly astonishing. In this article, Professor
MacIntosh argues that this growth has important implications for the manner
in which Canadian capital markets are regulated. In particular, institutional
shareholders tend to be better monitors of corporate managers than retail
shareholders. Institutional monitoring has been impeded by a number of
features of the regulatory landscape. Professor MacIntosh makes a number of
recommendations for changes to corporate and securities laws.
Contrary to the fears expressed by some, the decline of the retail investor
and the rise of the institutional investor should be accompanied by enhanced
market liquidity and market efficiency. Regulatory policies premised on
assuring the continued market presence of retail investors lack a solid
theoretical or empirical footing.
Professor MacIntosh also notes that market institutionalization has been
and will continue to be associated with growth in the so-called "exempt"
market. This will exert a brake on the extent to which regulators can regulate
non-exempt market transactions, since higher levels of regulation will only
drive issuers and investors into exempt markets or to other locales.
Finally, Professor MacIntosh notes that the burgeoning derivatives
markets present a challenge for regulators. Properly managed, the purchase of
derivative securities can greatly reduce portfolio risk. Improperly managed,
however, derivatives can greatly increase risk. Professor Macintosh argues that
most buyers in derivatives markets are institutional, and that where such buyers
dominate, a light-handed regulatory approach is indicated.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This paper is about the changing balance between "retail" and
"institutional" investors in Canadian securities markets. Retail investors
are individuals who invest for their own account in securities markets
either through full-service or discount brokers. Institutional investors
include banks, trust companies, pension funds, insurance companies,
mutual funds, endowments, and the like. Both retail and institutional
investors trade in primary and secondary securities markets, and both
play a role in funnelling the savings of Canadians into "real" investment
opportunities-for example, the trucks, buildings, mines, patents, and
other tangible and intangible capital that form the backbone of the
economy. However, in the past four decades, there has been a dramatic
change in the balance of retail and institutional investors in Canadian
markets. In particular, the aggregate market power of institutional
investors has increased dramatically as more and more dollars saved by
Canadians have been placed with institutional investors rather than
1993]
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being invested directly in securities markets.1 The largest of these
financial intermediaries, such as the Caisse de D6p6t et Placement du
Qu6bec and the Ontario Municipal Employees Retirement Fund, invest
funds that run to the tens of billions of dollars.2 Importantly, the growth
in the institutional share of the market has been accompanied by growth
in the proportion of fund portfolios invested in equities.3 The result is
that institutional funds have become in the aggregate the largest
shareholders (or at least the largest non-controlling shareholders) in
many Canadian corporations. 4
1 The growth of the institutional portfolio has been truly staggering. In 1950, institutional
investors in the U.S. controlled assets worth $107 billion. This had grown to $2 trillion by 1980, and
$6 trillion by 1990. See W. Taylor, "Can Big Owners Make a Difference?" (1990) 5 Harv. Bus. Rev.
70. See also B.S. Black, "Shareholder Passivity Reexamined" (1990) 89 Mich. L Rev. 520 at 567-
570; J.C. Coffee, Jr., "Liquidity Versus Control: The Institutional Investor as Corporate Monitor"
(1991) 91 CoL L Rev. 1277 at 1291. The most comprehensive summaries of institutional growth in
the U.S. may be found in C.I Brancato & P.A. Gaughan, "The Growth of Institutional Investors in
U.S. Capital Markets" (Institutional Investor Project, Columbia Center for Law and Economic
Studies, 1988); and C.K. Brancato, "The Pivotal Role of Institutional Investors in Capital Markets,"
in A.W. Sametz, ed., Institutional Investing. The Challenges and Responsibilities of the 21st Century
(Homewood, Mll.: Business One Irwin, 1991) 3. Institutional growth in Canada has followed a
similar growth path. The Economic Council of Canada, for example, reported that the financial
intermediation ratio (the ratio of the assets of financial institutions to total financial assets in the
Economy) rose from less than 0.28 in 1961 to about 038 in 1987. Economic Council of Canada, A
New Frontier. Globalization and Canada's Financial Markets (Ottawa: Ministry of Supply and
Services Canada, 1989). Bossons and Todd report that Canadian public and private pension assets
under administration grew from $143A billion in 1980 to $288.2 billion in 1985. See The Ontario
Task Force on the Investment of Public Sector Pension Funds, Public SectorPension Funds and the
Capital Markets (Research Report No. 5) (1987) by J. Bossons & J. Todd. Similarly, Khoury and
Martel report that the total asset value of member funds of the Investment Funds Institute of
Canada grew from less than $2 billion in 1978 to nearly $21 billion in 1988. See N. Khoury & J.
Martel, "Choosing An Investment Fund: A Better Way" (1989) 2:2 Can. Invt. Rev. 95 at 96-97. See
also The Conference Board of Canada, The Canadian Securities Industry: A Decade of Transition
(Report No. 68-91) (Ottawa, 1991) by A.M. Andrews at 7-12; D. Kelly, "The Revolution on Bay
Street" The FinancialPost (6 January 1992) 4.
2 As of the end of 1991, the Caisse de D4pt et Placement du Qu6bec had approximately $41
billion of assets under administration, the Ontario Teachers' Pension Plan had about $25 billion,
and the Ontario Municipal Employees Retirement System (omens) had approximately $15 billion.
See Benefits Canada, 1991.
3 Between 1980 and 1989, the percentage of equity held in trusteed pension fund portfolios
increased from 20.4 per cent to 28.0 per cent (Statistics Canada, Cat. 74-201). See also E. Roseman,
"Top 40 listing holds surprises" The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (23 November 1992) B5 (reporting
average equity holdings for 1992 of 50 per cent). The pattern has been similar in the U.S.; see
Brancato, supra note 1 at 17-18 (pension funds increased the percentage of assets allocated to
equities from 6 per cent in 1950 to 40 per cent in 1989).
4 Again, the U.S. experience is similar. See Brancato, ibid. at 18-21 ("in 1989, [institutions]
held 50 per cent of the equity of Business Week's top fifty corporations ranked by stock market
value"; ibi. at 18).
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Institutional and Retail Investors
In this paper, I argue that the comparative growth of the
institutional sector has profound implications for the structure of
corporate and securities law in Canada. One way in which this will occur
is through the impact of institutionalization on market efficiency. The
degree of market efficiency or inefficiency is the most important
empirical datum for constructing a set of rules for the regulation of
corporate conduct. Corporate regulation aims at ensuring that
shareholders, and to a lesser extent creditors, are not systematically
taken advantage of when they invest in corporate securities. Where
securities markets are informationally efficient, however, all known risks
are priced and securities markets are a "fair game" in which, on average,
investors earn what they expect to earn 5 This creates a strong incentive
for corporate issuers both to disclose all cost-justified information and to
design the corporate "contract" so as to minimize the cost of capital. In
such a world, the arguments in favour of both merit regulation and
mandatory disclosure of information are much weaker than in a market
that is not informationally efficient.6 I argue in this paper that the
growing dominance of institutional traders in securities markets is likely
to enhance informational efficiency, and thus reduce the amount of
regulation that is needed.
Given that securities regulation is often geared to protecting the
relatively unsophisticated retail investor, such investors are likely to be
the primary beneficiaries of enhanced market efficiency. In an efficient
market, the market price at any given time is the best estimate of the
intrinsic worth of a particular security. An informationally efficient
market is thus the best protection for relatively unskilled retail investors,
since even a strategy of selecting securities at random (for example, by
throwing darts at a pin-up of the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSE) 300) is
likely to yield on average the "required" risk-adjusted rate of return.
7
Indeed, a major thrust of this paper is that retail investors free ride on
the self-protective efforts of institutional investors, since the latter are
the marginal investors whose buying and selling activities determine
share prices and make securities markets informationally efficient.
8
5 See R.J. Daniels & J.G. Macintosh, "Toward a Distinctive Canadian Corporate Law
Regime" (1991) 29 Osgoode Hall L J. 863.
6 bIb
7 The required rate of return is that rate of return that will induce an investor to invest in a
particular security, given its risk and the availability of alternative investments. See, for example,
S.A. Ross & R.W. Westerfield, Corporate Finance (St. Louis: Times Mirror/Mosby College
Publishing, 1988) at 302-317.
8 See Parts VIII and XI, below.
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A second way in which market institutionalization will reduce the
need for mandatory regulation of corporate capital markets is by
enhancing the efficiency of corporate monitoring. The "rational apathy"
of retail investors that results from insufficient resources and incentives
to monitor corporate managements is well known.9 The concentration
of economic power, expertise, and incentives in the hands of institutional
investors is a means of overcoming collective action problems and
ensuring that both corporate managers and controlling shareholders are
well monitored. The law, however, has interfered in a number of ways
with the role that institutional shareholders might play in corporate
monitoring. I suggest a number of recommendations for legal reform.
Throughout this paper, reference will be made to "first market"
and "second market" companies. The first market consists of large
public corporations with significant public floats and significant
institutional shareholdings. Both primary and secondary trading markets
for .the securities of these firms are closely followed by both securities
analysts and the financial press, and are likely to operate with a high
degree of efficiency! 0 The "second market" consists of smaller public
corporations, which typically have slim public floats and few or no
institutional shareholders! 1 These markets are more likely to depart
from a condition of rigorous informational efficiency.12 While the line
between first and second market companies may not always be crystal
clear, the distinction nonetheless serves a useful function in highlighting
differences that are important in formulating appropriate rules for the
governance of corporate conduct.
The paper is roughly divided into four segments. Parts II to IV
examine the role of institutional investors in corporate governance.
Parts V to VIII examine the effect of market institutionalization on
market efficiency, as well as related regulatory issues. Parts IX and X
examine some issues related to the internationalization of securities
markets, while Part XI looks at financial innovation in securities markets
and the development of new tools for managing risk.
9 See, for example, Black, supra note 1 at 526-529.
10 There is a high degree of correlation between the size of institutional holdings and the
amount of attention devoted to the company by financial analysts. See A. Arbel, S. Carvell & P.
Strebel, "Giraffes, Institutions and Neglected Firms" (1983) Fin. Analysts J. 57 at 60.
1 1 Large public corporations with slim public floats are included in the first market, since they
are likely to have institutional shareholders and a good following amongst investment analysts.
12 A higher proportion of investors in small firms will be uninformed "noise" traders. For this
reason, at least episodic divergences between price and value are more likely to occur. See Parts
V(C), V(D), below.
[VOL 31 NO. 2376
1993] Institutional and Retail Investors 377
II. THE ENLARGED ROLE OF THE INSTITUTIONAL
INVESTOR AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: REMOVING
LEGAL IMPEDIMENTS TO INSTITUTIONAL ACTIVISM
Since institutional investors have lower coordination costs than
retail shareholders, more resources at their command and, as a result of
their relatively large shareholdings,' 3 much better incentives to monitor
management, their presence greatly improves the monitoring of both
corporate managers and controlling shareholders. As a number of
recent cases illustrate, dissatisfied institutional investors are often in a
position to alter management's intended course of action by privately or
publicly expressing their dissatisfaction with management (often in
conjunction with other institutional investors), 14 voting against
management,' 5 threatening to exercise their dissent rights,16 suing to
13 See Black, supra note 1 at 587-588, arguing that the incentive of institutional shareholders
to monitor is exponentially greater than that of retail shareholders because both the monetary
reward from monitoring and likelihood of casting a pivotal vote increase with share ownership,
although see also infra note 242.
14 Institutional shareholders, for example, convinced Southam to water down shark repellent
proposals prior to the shareholder vote on the proposals. See A. Robinson, "Caisse opposes voting
power changes" The Globe and Mail (27 July 1985) Bi; and B. Jorgensen, "Southam rule set to
protect shareholders" The Globe and Mail (9 August 1985) B1. The Southam affair was a
watershed for institutional involvement in corporate governance, despite the fact that Southarn was
eventually able to forestall a rumoured takeover by negotiating a share swap with Torstar. See H.
Enchin, "Southam, Torstar agree to share swap" The Globe and Mail (27 August 1985) B1. See also
W.M. Mackenzie, "Donohue Goes Dual Class" (1993) 5:1 Corp. Gov. Rev. 2 (discussing changes in
Donohue's dual class recapitalization plan induced by institutional investor protests).
15 For example, the proposed reorganization of Crownx (involving the issuance of non-voting
shares) was abandoned after institutional investors, led by the CN Pension Fund, voted down the
proposal on a majority of the minority vote. See K. Howlett, "CN stalls Crownx reorganization"
The Globe and Mail (10 April 1986) B4; M. Mittelstaedt, "Chalk one up for CN pension fund" The
Globe and Mail (12 April 1986) B2; K. Howlett, "Crownx drops controversial share plan" The Globe
and Mail (17 April 1986) B5. A much higher percentage of institutional investors than retail
investors voted against the scheme. See D. Best, "Minority rules at Crownx" The FinancialPost (19
April 1986) 4.
16 For example, a threatened dissent by the Caisse de D6p6t et Placement du Qu6bec appears
to have been instrumental in causing Southam management to water down proposed shark repellent
amendments. See H. Enchin, "Southam vote is postponed" The Globe and Mail (3 August 1985)
B1. A similar threat by the Caisse also appears to have caused the management of Lac Minerals to
water down shark repellent proposals. See E. Simon, "The Week in Business" Canadian Press
Newstext (2 August 1985) (QL).
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enjoin the transaction, 7 or, in rare cases, by mounting or participating in
a proxy battle against management.18
A growing body of empirical literature suggests that
concentrated ownership is likely to enhance firm value.19 For example, a
number of studies have shown that firm value increases when managerial
ownership increases20 or when the firm has a controlling shareholder. 2
There is also evidence that the concentration of share ownership results
17 Institutional investors were instrumental in pushing the Canadian Tire case forward. See
Re Canadian Tire Corporation Ltd. (1987), 10 O.S.C.B. 857, affd 35 B.L.R. 117, 59 O.R. (2d) 79
(11C.), leave to appeal refused 35 B.L.R. xx (Ont.C.A.). o.mnS has also recently sued Xerox
Canada in connection with a freezeout of public shareholders. See Xerox Canada Inc. v. Ontario
Municipal Employees Retirement System 4924/90 [1991] OJ. No. 455 (QL), Ontario H.C. (per Austin
J.). The Caisse de D6p~t et Placement du Quebec the province of Quebec's public pension fund
manager, began an oppression action in connection with Inc's adoption of a poison pill, although
the suit has apparently not been pursued. Institutional shareholders also commenced an
(unsuccessful) action to upset the settlement of an action by the Director of the Candada Business
Corporations Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-44 [hereinafter CBCA], against Southam and Torstar. See
Sporingv. Southam Inc. (1988), 66 O.R. (2d) 225 (H.C.).
18 The Sheritt Gordon case appears to be the only case in Canada in which dissident
institutional shareholders were successful in unseating management. See "Sherritt" Canadian Press
Newstet (19 September 1990) (QL). Gordon Capital Corp., an investment banker, undertook a
brief proxy battle with Memotec management that ended in a settlement in which management
agreed to replace two management board nominees with independent directors. Gordon was
supported by the two largest public pension funds in Canada, the Caisse de D6p8t et Placement du
Qu6bec, which owned 12.5 per cent of Memotec, and oamns, which owned 10.8 per cent. It was also
supported by BCE Inc., which owned 31.5 per cent, although BCE was prohibited by federal law
from voting for directors other than its four nominees. See "Memotee fight" Canadian Press
Newstext (10 May 1991) (QL); "Memotec," Canadian Press Newstext (16 May 1991) (QL). With
respect to institutional engagement in proxy battles in the U.S., see, for example, K. Van Nuys,
"Corporate Governance through the Proxy Process: Evidence from the 1989 Honeywell Proxy
Solicitation" in I. Fin. Econ. [forthcoming].
1 9 An exhaustive review of the evidence may be found in B.S. Black, "The Value of
Institutional Investor Monitoring: The Empirical Evidence" (1992) 39 U.C.LA. L Rev. 895.
20 See, for example, R. Morck, A. Shleifer & R.W. Vishny, "Management Ownership and
Market Valuation" (1988) 20 . Fin. Econ. 293 (showing, however, a drop in value in the 5 per cent
to 25 per cent mid-range, apparently owing to the fact that in this range the negative effect of
managerial entrenchment outweighs the increasing alignment of manager/shareholder interests that
results from enhanced managerial ownership). See generally W. McEachern, Managerial Control
and Performance (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1975) 55; E. Herman, Corporate Contro,
Corporate Power (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981) at 111-12 and note 110; although
see JJ. McConnell & H. Servaes, "Additional Evidence on Equity Ownership and Corporate
Value" (1990) 27 J. Fin. Econ. 595 (finding a reduction in firm value for insider ownership in excess
of 40-50 per cent).
21 See, for example, C.P. Holderness & D.P. Sheehan, "The Role of Majority Shareholders in
the Publicly Held Corporation" (1988) 20 J. Fin. Econ. 317; and R. Zeckhauser & J. Pound, "Are
Large Shareholders Effective Monitors? An Investigation of Share Ownership and Corporate
Performance," in R. Hubbard, ed., Asymmetric Information, Corporate Finance, and Investment
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990) 149 at 166-71.
[VOL 31 No. 2
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in better alignment of managerial decision making with shareholder
interests.22 Leveraged and management buyouts, which tend to
concentrate ownership interests in the hands of both managers and
institutional investors, also result in increased firm value 2 3 More
directly on point, there are a growing number of studies that show that
heightened institutional ownership has a positive effect on share prices24
and corporate performance,25 and tends to lead to better corporate
decision-making.26 Indeed, it has been argued that the (allegedly)
superior performance of Japanese and German industry in recent history
is in part a product of market and legal structures that allow for more
effective oversight by institutional monitors. 27 In addition, there is
evidence that institutional investors are more likely than retail investors
to vote against wealth-reducing management initiatives such as anti-
22 Black, supra note 19 at 919.
23 See, for example, M.C. Jensen, "Active Investors, LBOs, and the Privatization of
Bankruptcy" (1989) 2 J. App. Corp. Fin. 35; S. Kaplan, "The Effect of Management Buyouts on
Operating Performance and Value" (1989) 24 J. Fin. Econ. 217; C. Smith, "Corporate Ownership
Structure and Performance: The Case of Management Buyouts" (1990) 27 J. Fin. Econ. 143.
2 4 K.11 Wruck, "Equity Ownership Concentration and Firm Value: Evidence from Private
Equity Financings" (1989) 23 J. Fin. Econ. 3 (indicating, however, that over the range of 5 to 25 per
cent ownership, firm value decreased, as in the study by Morck et at., supra note 20); S.H Szewczyk
& R. Varma, "Raising Capital with Private Placements of Debt" (1991) 14 J. Fin. Research 1;
McConnell & Servaes, supra note 20 (increasing institutional ownership associated with higher
"Tobin's Q" (the ratio of the firm's market value to the replacement cost of tangible assets). See
also J. Cable, "Capital Market Information and Industrial Market Performance: The Role of West
German Banks" (1985) 95 Econ. J. 118 (finding a significant positive relationship between bank
involvement in German corporations and financial performance).
25 McConnell & Servaes, supra note 20 (institutional ownership is positively correlated with
"Tobin's Q" and with various accounting measures of profitability).
26 See, for example, A. Agrawal & G.N. Mandelker, "Large Shareholders and the Monitoring
of Managers: The Case of Anti-takeover Charter Amendments" (1990) 25 J. Fin. & Quan. Anal.
143 (firms with high institutional ownership experienced on average no price reaction to the
adoption of anti-takeover amendments, while firms with low institutional ownership had negative
price reactions).
2 7 See Cable, supra note 24; M.C. Jensen, "Eclipse of the Public Corporation" (1989) Harv.
Bus. Rev. 61; MJ. Roe, "Legal Restraints on Ownership and Control of Public Companies" (1990)
27 J. Fin. Econ. 7 [hereinafter "Legal Restraints"]; M.J. Roe, "A Political Theory of American
Corporate Finance" (1991) 91 Colum. L Rev. 10 [hereinafter "A Political Theory"]; T. Hoshi, A.
Kashyap & D. Scharfstein, "The Role of Banks in Reducing the Costs of Financial Distress in
Japan" (1990) 27 J. Fin. Econ. 67. For a recent sceptical view, however, see R. Romano, "A
Cautionary Note on Drawing Lessons from Comparative Corporate Law" (1993) 102 Yale LJ.
2021.
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takeover provisions.2 As the recent experience with Pennsylvania's anti-
takeover statute demonstrates, the presence of institutional investors has
been pivotal in pressuring many corporate managements to opt out of
wealth-reducing legislation designed to protect managers. 29
As indicated above, the aggregate holdings of institutional
shareholders have grown steadily over the past four decades and, in the
aggregate, institutional shareholders hold the largest stakes in many
public Canadian corporations 3 0 Commensurate with this growth in
market power has been a progressive change in the attitude of
institutional investors.31 While most institutional investors would once
have sold their investments as a matter of course when dissatisfied with
management (the "Bay Street Rule"), institutions are increasingly
retaining their investments and attempting to influence management's
course of action. Although Canadian institutions have made little
attempt to influence day-to-day management, they have become actively
involved in important issues such as dual class recapitalization, takeover
28 See J.A. Brickley, R.C. Lease & C.W. Smith, Jr., "Ownership Structure and Voting on Anti-
takeover Amendments" (1988) 20 . Fin. Econ. 267 (finding that institutional investors were more
likely to vote on wealth-reducing management anti-takeover proposals, and that their presence
increased the number of "no" votes cast). This has also been the case in Canada. See W.S. Allen,
"Post Pillage" (1990) 2:5 Corp. Gov. Rev. 4. Although the latter indicates that poison pills have
been approved by shareholders in all cases in Canada, many of the votes have been extremely close,
contrary to the usual corporate experience in which shareholders routinely vote in favour of
management proposals. It may be that conflicts of interest have induced some institutional
shareholders to vote in favour of poison pills. See J.G. MacIntosh, "Poison Pills in Canada: A
Reply to Dey and Yalden" (1991) 17 Can. Bus. L . 323 at 354-355; and see Part IV, below.
29 See S.H. Szewczyk & G.P. Tsetsekos, "State Intervention in the Market for Corporate
Control: The Case of Pennsylvania Senate Bill 1310" (1992) 31 J Fin. Econ. 3; . Pound, "On the
Motives for Choosing a Corporate Governance Structure: A Study of Corporate Reaction to the
Pennsylvania Takeover Law" in J. of Law, Econ. & Org. [forthcoming] (also finding that firms
choosing not to opt out of the Pennsylvania statute had lower management ownership and worse
performance than firms that did); R. Romano, "The Genius of American Corporate Law"
(Washington, D.C.: The AEI Press, 1993) at 68-70. See also L Wayne, "Many Companies in
Pennsylvania Reject State's Takeover Protection" The New York Tunes (20 July 1990) Al; and J.B.
White & P. Ingrassia, "Behind Revolt at GM, Lawyer Ira Millstein Helped Call the Shots" The Wall
Street Journal (13 April 1992) Al (outside directors and institutional investors played key role in
recent changes to GM's leadership structure).
30 See Part I, above. The concentration of shareholdings in Canadian corporations is even
more striking than in the U.S., due in part to the "foreign property rules" applicable to pension and
mutual funds. See infia note 47 and accompanying text.
31 In the U.S., the power of institutions has been further augmented by state takeover
legislation, poison pills, and judicial decisions favouring management in takeovers, which have all
diminished the popularity of takeovers, and have revitalized the proxy contest (in which institutional
investors play a bigger role) as a means for transferring control Brancato, supra note 1 at 4-5. The
so-called "Avon Letter" issued by the Department of Labour, stating that the exercise of proxy
voting powers is a part of institutional fiduciary responsibility, has also played a role. Ibid.
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defenses (such as poison pills, the issuance of non-voting shares or
"blank cheque" preferreds, and "shark repellant" charter amendments),
related party transactions, and corporate restructuring&3 2 Institutions
have also shown increased interest in executive compensation and
corporate governance matters, with particular focus on the issue of
independent directors. 33 If the recent experience in the U.S. is any
indication, both these issues are likely to grow in importance in the near
future. Moreover, the trend towards a more activist stance is likely to
continue: in a survey of Canadian institutional investors, Kathryn
Montgomery found that institutions themselves believe not only that
institutional activism has increased substantially over the past decade,
but that it will continue to increase in the future3 4
In Canada's tightly knit financial community, much institutional
"activism" has taken the, route of quiet, behind-the-scenes diplomacy,
whereby institutions meet priiiately with management in order to make
their views known.3 5 The more diplomatic approach is reflected in part
32 Koval reports that institutional investors in Canada have directed their attention to "charter
and by-law amendments, such as staggered boards, super-majority and 'fair price' provisions,
shareholder rights, or 'poison pill' plans and other 'shark repellant' devices proposed by
management." PA. Koval, "Trends in Canadian Shareholder Activism," in The Canadian Institute,
Duties and Liabilities of Officers and Directors (19 November 1992) at 26. She also reports that "[i]n
the 1990's, the categories of technical issues have expanded, [and] corporate transactions, including
reorganizations and related party transactions, have been increasingly scrutinized." id at 26-27.
In the U.S., institutional activity has focused on anti-takeover defenses, shareholder advisory
committees, and installing outside directors. See R.S. Gilson & R. Kraakman, "Reinventing the
Outside Director. An Agenda for Institutional Investors" (1991) 43 Stan. L Rev. 863 at 868-879.
See also B.D. Fromson, "The Big Owners Roar" Fortune (30 July 1990) 66; and J.G. Macintosh,
"The Poison Pill: A Noxious Nostrum for Canadian Shareholders" (1989) 18 Can. Bus. L J. 276 at
305-311.
3 3 See, for example, R. Wilson, "A Quick Review of the TSE 300 1992 Proxy Season" (1992)
4:5 Corp. Gov. Rev. 10.
34 Montgomery's survey of Canadian institutional investors found that 83 per cent of the
institutions surveyed (mostly public and private pension funds, and investment managers) believed
that institutional activism has increased over the past decade. See K.E. Montgomery, "Survey of
Institutional Shareholders" (1992) 4:4 Corp. Gov. Rev. 5 at 7. Thirty-three per cent indicated that
their own institution had adopted a more active or substantially more active stance in the past two
years, while only 2 per cent indicated that their institution had become less active in the same
period. iUd at 9. Further, 85 per cent believed that institutional shareholders are likely to become
even more active in the future. Only 64 per cent indicated that they would sell or reduce their
holdings if they strongly disagreed with "a key direction taken by ... management." Ibid. at 8.
Twenty-eight per cent indicated that they would retain or reduce their holdings while engaging in
some form of activism. This is a substantial change from the past, when few institutional
shareholders would actively challenge management initiatives.
35 Koval, supra note 32 at 21-23 and at 43-46. Montgomery's survey of institutional
shareholders discloses that the strategies most commonly used are voting against management,
consulting with management over proposed initiatives, and acting collectively with other
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in the failure of Canadian institutions (unlike their U.S. counterparts) to
make significant use of the "shareholder proposal" mechanism to
influence corporate affairsg6 This approach is also evidenced by the
virtual absence in Canada of institutional "shareholder advisory
committees," a mechanism through which many U.S. institutional
shareholders have made their views known to management.3 7 In
addition, unlike their U.S. counterparts, Canadian institutions have not
made use of the relatively confrontational "just vote no" tactic, which
includes both abstaining from corporate votes and supporting dissident
shareholder nominees as a protest against poor management
performance 8 Nor, in the main, have Canadian institutional investors
become embroiled in proxy battles or other initiatives to replace senior
executives and/or directors,39 as has recently occurred in a number of
highly publicized cases in the U.S.40 In addition, Canadian investment
shareholders to apply pressure to management. See Montgomery, ibid. at 8. See also B. Mackenzie
& H. Cleland, "Director Independence-Who's Listening?" (1992) 4:1 Corp. Gov. Rev. 1 at 4
(withholding votes for directors is another tactic to get management's attention).
36 See, for example, CBCA, supra note 17, s. 137 and see Koval, ibid. at 34-43 (discussing
practical and legal reasons why shareholder proposals have not been frequently used in Canada).
Allenvest (now Fairvest) has sponsored a number of shareholder proposals, including proposals
made to Inco's shareholders to terminate a poison pill and to institute confidential voting. Koval,
ibid. at 37-38; W.S. Allen, "Confidential Voting" (1990) 2:4 Corp. Gov. Rev. 1. See also C. McCall
& R. Wilson, "Shareholder Proposals, Why Not in Canada?" (1993) 5:1 Corp. Gov. Rev. 12; and see
Part HI(I) below (suggesting amendments to the proposal mechanism to make shareholder proposals
more palatable to institutional investors). Shareholder proposals have been widely used in the U.S.,
particularly in relation to anti-takeover measures. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 32 at 868.
37 Shareholder advisory committees consist of representatives of the largest shareholders,
often institutions, who meet with management to discuss and review management's performance.
Gilson & Kraakman, ibid. at 868, 871-72; Koval, ibid. at 51-53 (expressing the view that such
committees will not likely become common in Canada due to potential legal liabilities and intra-
investor difficulties in agreeing on the role, objectives, and mandate of such committees); EJ.
Waitzer, "Accountability and Performance-The GM Watershed" (1992) 4:2 Corp. Gov. Rev. 12 at
13.
38 Such tactics may result in the inability to muster a shareholder quorum. Gilson &
Kraakman, ibid. at 880 and note 60; Koval, supra note 32 at 55-57. Where abstention from voting is
involved, the tactic might more appropriately be styled a "just no vote" strategy.
3 9 Koval, ibid. at 55-57. Two exceptions are briefly explored supra note 18.
40 Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 32 at 872-876. The General Motors saga is the most widely
reported such event, although there have been other U.S. cases in which institutional shareholders
have been instrumental in securing changes in board composition and/or senior management. See
Koval, supra note 32; Waltzer, supra note 37 at 12. Such interventions have tended to arise only in
crisis situations (.&, egregiously bad management performance). Moreover, Gilson and Kraakman
report that institutional participation in proxy battles has not been frequent, and has often been the
outcome of deals between management and institutional shareholders resulting in the latter
supporting management. Ibid. at 882. Van Nuys also indicates that non-institutional block
shareholders may sometimes play an instrumental role in arousing institutional investors to act. See
Van Nuys, supra note 18 (discussing a proxy challenge to management supported by many
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institutions have generally not sought to place representatives on the
boards of directors of public companies (although management will
sometimes request institutional nominations for directors). 41
Nonetheless, institutional investors expect, and usually receive,
an audience with management on issues of importance to them, and the
most important corporate initiatives will often be floated with
institutional investors before being made public.42 If institutional
support is lacking, such initiatives are frequently modified or
abandoned. 4 3 In cases where management has proceeded without
consulting institutional investors, or despite institutional opposition,
institutions have resorted to publicly ventilating their opposition to the
proposed initiative, or have simply voted against management. Although
institutions have not been successful in winning many shareholder votes,
votes on such matters as poison pills have become increasingly close.
44
Indeed, looking only at the results of shareholder votes conveys a
misleadingly pessimistic impression of institutional power; where
institutional opposition is particularly strong, it is likely that the issue will
never go to a shareholder vote at all.45
In Canada, increasing shareholder activism can be traced in part
to enhanced shareholder rights, particularly given the increasing
statutory and administrative popularity of "majority of the minority"
voting requirements that give institutional investors considerable
leverage in connection with a growing number of corporate
transactions.4 In addition, the comparatively small size of the Canadian
institutional shareholders, but funded by a non-institutional blockholder).
41 Koval, ibda at 53-55.
42 Ibid.
43 Koval, ibid; W. Riedl, "Trizee Listens" (1992) 4:2 Corp. Gov. Rev. 10; Wilson, supra note
33. This practice creates a selection bias in academic studies that look at the influence of
institutional shareholders on decision-making outcomes, since these studies typically focus on events
that go to a shareholder vote. This bias will tend to result in understating the influence of
institutional shareholders.
44 See MacIntosh, supra note 28 at 354 and note 120. The experience in the U.S. has been
similar. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 32 at 893, note 91 and accompanying text; Van Nuys,
supra note 18 at 24-25 (case study of Honeywell proxy contest in which 54.9 per cent and 46.5 per
cent of all institutional investors in sample voted with management on two anti-takeover proposals).
45 Supra notes 14, 35 and accompanying text.
46 See generally J.G. MacIntosh, "Corporations," in Law Society of Upper Canada Special
Lectures of the Law Society of Upper Canada, 1990: Fiduciary Duties (Toronto: R. DeBoo, 1991)
[hereinafter "Corporations"] 189 at 232-241, 247-254; M. Nefligan, "Proxy Contests: Some Legal
and Practical Considerations," in R.H. Rupert, ed., The Canadian Investment Banking Review
(Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1992) 337. The Crownx affair, discussed supra note 15, is an
example of a case in which the majority of the minority voting requirement enabled institutional
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equities market-particularly when combined with the effect of the
"foreign property" rules, which limit the extent to which registered
pension funds and mutual funds that are "registered investments" may
purchase foreign equities47-has left many institutional investors with
relatively few investment choices. Coupled with the relative illiquidity of
the Canadian market, the lack of available investment options may
diminish the attractiveness of selling when dissatisfied with management
performance and thus may increase the relative allure of shareholder
activism.4
Both in the U.S. and in Canada, institutional activism has
become increasingly collective in nature as institutions have learned the
value of coordinating their opposition to disfavoured management
initiatives. 49 Indeed, coordination is frequently a sine qua non of
institutional power, since few institutional shareholders hold stakes in
individual companies in excess of 10 per cent, and most holdings are
smaller than this.5 0 Direct coordination of activities has been
supplemented by indirect coordination through trade organizations, such
as the Pension Investment Association of Canada (PIAc);s' and through
institutional brokers such as the Fairvest Securities Corporation
(formerly the Allenvest Group Limited) that serve as fora for discussion
of governance issues, collect data on shareholder and institutional
shareholders to defeat a proposed dual class recapitalization. Such majority of the minority
requirements, however, are not necessarily an unambiguous good. See Macintosh, "Corporations,"
ibld
4 7 Incone TaxAct, S.C. 1970-71-72, c. 63 [hereinafter Tax Act], s. 206. The foreign property
rules, which apply to all tax exempt investors (including holders of Registered Retirement Savings
Plans, or "RsS," registered pension plans, and charities) limit the extent to which shares of non-
domestic issuers may be purchased as portfolio investments. Failure to conform to the
requirements of the TaxAct results in tax penalties. The foreign property rules affect mutual funds
that wish to sell interests to holders of RRsPs, since in order to qualify to do so a fund must become a
"registered investment" and comply with the foreign property rules. See TaxAct, ib. Part X2.
48 The small and relatively illiquid Canadian market and the foreign property rules may not,
however, be as important as commonly supposed in spurring institutional activism. See
Montgomery, supra note 34 (survey showing that many institutional investors do not think that these
factors pose a serious problem in liquidating investments).
49 Montgomery, ibid. at 8.
50 Many institutional shareholders cannot legally hold more than 10 per cent. See Part
II(K)(1), below. The institutional shareholders that tend to hold the largest stakes, both because of
their size and because of the fact that they are not legally limited to ten per cent holdings, are the
Caisse de D6p6t et Placement du Qu6bet, omans, the Ontario Teachers' Pension Plan Board, and
the Canadian Pacific and Canadian National pension funds.
51 PzAC represents about 100 funds, including both public and private sector pension plans,
endowiments, and university funds, collectively controlling about $175 billion in assets. Koval, supra
note 32 at 48.
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voting, offer institutions advice on how to vote, and generally promote
institutional interests.52 Such organizations play a useful role not only in
collectivizing institutional action, but also in protecting the identities of
the institutional investors who stand behind them. This is important in
assisting institutions like corporate pension plans, banks, and insurance
companies in opposing management free of the corrupting influence of
managerial pressure or political concerns.
5 3
Canadian institutions, institutional trade organizations, and
corporate governance consultants have also begun to systematically
review particular types of corporate initiatives (such as poison pills and
director independence) and to formalize proxy voting guidelines.5 4
Some of these parties, including the Ontario Teachers' Pension Plan
Board (OTPPB), have indicated that they will generally oppose a variety of
takeover defenses, including poison pills, "blank cheque" preferreds,
super-majority amendments, classified boards, and sales of the "crown
jewels," as well as certain types of executive remuneration.55 OTPPB has
also indicated that it will promote the role of independent directors in
corporate governance. 56
52 PIAC is an example of a Canadian trade organization whose Corporate Governance
Committee is charged with the task of formulating proxy voting guidelines for pension fund
members. On the investment advisor side, Stephen Jarislowsky (of the firm Jarislowsky Fraser) and
Fairvest Securities Corporation (formerly Allenvest Group Limited, which dispenses advice to
institutional investors and champions institutional causes through its "Corporate Governance
Review") have been the leaders in advancing institutional shareholder interests. The championing
of institutional causes by parties like Jarislowsky and Fairvest has often been funded through the
use of "soft dollar" commission arrangements, whereby representation of institutional causes is
traded for institutional brokerage business. See, for example, J. Partridge, "Fighting Southam-
Torstar settlement made Royal Insurance lose director" The Globe and Mail (29 September 1985)
B5.
There are a number of organizations that have stepped into this role in the U.S., including the
Corporate Governance Service of the Investor Responsibility Research Center (which collects
statistics on shareholder voting, and also publishes monographs on subjects of interest to
institutional investors), the Council of Institutional Investors (an institutional pension and mutual
fund collective), Institutional Shareholder Services (which sells advice to institutional investors),
The Institutional Voting Research Service Analysis Group (which also sells advice to institutions),
and Institutional Shareholder Partners (which represents institutional investors and targets
particular companies for reform). See Black, supra note 1 at 573; Koval, supra note 32 at 25-26.
53 See Black, ibid. and Part IV, below. Public sector pension funds are relatively immune to
management pressure because they do not do business with corporations. However, they are
particularly susceptible to political pressure.
54 Koval, supra note 32 at 46-48.
55 Ibid. at 46-47.
56 Ibid. ormEs has published very similar guidelines. See Proxy Voting Guidelines (January,
1993).
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Of course, most large Canadian public corporations have a non-
institutional controlling shareholder.57 Because a controlling
shareholder is likely to mbnitor effectively for breaches of the duty of
care, corporate disputes are much more likely to involve intra-
shareholder conflicts than manager/shareholder conflicts. 58 While the
role of institutions in the policing of management conduct is lessened by
the existence of a controlling shareholder, institutions still have an
important role to play in policing the conduct of controlling
shareholders 5 9 Should management or a controlling shareholder behave
in a way that is likely to reduce share values, institutions have on
occasion been able to alter management's intended course of action by
raising a public row and drawing critical attention to the proposed
initiative6" Indeed, as indicated above, institutions are not infrequently
polled by management even before intended initiatives are made public,
and, if institutional support is lacking, the initiatives are often modified
or abandoned. Finally, should market suasion fail to alter management's
intended course of action, institutional shareholders command the
financial wherewithal to enlist the aid of the courts or securities
regulators in seeking redress6 1-a threat largely absent in firms with only
retail investors.6 2 For these reasons, the presence of institutional
investors improves market monitoring of corporate management, even
where there is a controlling shareholder.
Improved market oversight has direct implications for corporate
and securities laws. Market and legal oversight mechanisms can be
thought of as substitutes. At one extreme, one can imagine a world in
which market mechanisms are completely ineffective in constraining
managerial or controlling shareholder overreaching. In such a world,
legal restraints become critical to the conduct of corporate enterprise.
5 7 Daniels & MacIntosh, supra note 5.
58]bid.
59 ndeed, since managers often act at the behest of the controlling shareholder, institutional
policing will frequently involve direct challenges to managerial as well as controlling shareholder
conduct.
60 In Montgomery's survey, institutional investors indicated that they would most likely be
active in cases involving "abuse of power by management or majority shareholder." Thus,
institutional investors view themselves as playing an active role in corporate governance even, or
perhaps particularly, in cases where there is a controlling shareholder. See Montgomery, supra note
34 at 7. See also, supra note 35 (strategies used by institutional investors to oppose management).
61 Daniels & MacIntosh, supra note 5.
62 As the recent saga of Westfield Minerals illustrates (relatively impecunious retail investors
complained loudly of abuse by the dominant shareholder, but failed to sue). See ibid. at 921-32.
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At the other extreme, one can imagine a world in which market
mechanisms never fail to align managerial and controlling shareholder
self-interest with the pursuit of overall shareholder wealth maximization.
In this world, legal controls are worse than redundant; they simply invite
expensive opportunistic suits, while producing no marginal benefit.
Hence they will actually subtract from the achievement of shareholder's
objective of achieving wealth maximization.
Of course, it is illusory to believe that the latter state will ever be
achieved. Even in well-functioning markets there are always instances of
opportunism and overreaching, whether caused by last-period problems,
asymmetric information, fraud, or other factors. Thus, it is certain that
there will always be a role for the law to play in filling the interstices left
in market disciplinary mechanisms. However, legal controls are
expensive. Most immediate are the direct expenses associated with
litigation (including the cost of courtrooms, judges, and other support
facilities) which are borne both by the litigants and by the state. There
are also opportunity costs occasioned by litigation, as profitable
transactions are held up or aborted and management attention diverted
from business matters. These costs are amplified by the danger that
opportunistic litigation will be undertaken purely to capture a larger
slice of the corporate pie.
Thus, the appropriate extent of legal rules constraining
managerial or other corporate misbehaviour can only be judged in the
context of the efficacy of market mechanisms in redressing problems of
opportunism. As market oversight improves, the benefits yielded by
legal rules decline relative to their costs. Because institutional oversight
is an important component of market monitoring and managerial
disciplinary mechanisms, the growing institutionalization and efficiency
of Canadian markets is likely to lessen the need for regulatory oversight
of capital markets.
In a variety of ways, legal restraints have interfered with
institutional activism, and hence with the monitoring and discipline of
managers and shareholders. In some cases, these legal restraints have
not yielded sufficient benefits to justify their continued existence. In
other cases, further legal intervention is warranted to enhance the role
of institutional shareholders in corporate governance. A number of
suggested regulatory reforms are briefly canvassed below.
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A. Confidential Voting
Institutional shareholders such as banks, insurance companies,
and trust companies often do business with corporations in which they
have invested. By threatening to withdraw this business, management
can often coerce institutional investors into voting in favour of
management initiatives.63 This pressure would be significantly alleviated
by requiring confidential voting supervised by independent scrutineers.64
Such a requirement would ensure that management would not be able to
determine how particular shareholders had cast their votes. 65 Similarly,
the tactic of "bundling" initiatives together for shareholder votes-for
example, as was initially done by Inco management when it put its poison
pill before shareholders66--should be prohibited, as has recently been
proposed in the U.S.
6 7
B. Proxy Rules
The proxy rules are also a deterrent to effective institutional
oversight. As currently structured, these rules discourage informal
communications between investors, since such communications might be
construed as proxy "solicitations" requiring the expensive assembly of a
63 It is for this reason that public pension funds and investment managers have been the most
active institutional investors in challenging management initiatives, and banks and insurance
companies the least active. See Brickley, Lease & Smith, Jr., supra note 28; J.E. Heard & H.D.
Sherman, Conflicts of Interest in the Proxy Voting System (Washington: Investor Responsibility
Research Center, 1987); J. Pound, "Proxy Contests and the Efficiency of Shareholder Oversight"
(1988) 20 J. Fin. Econ. 237; and Van Nuys, supra note 18.
6 4 Like auditors, such "independent" scrutineers would have to be selected by management.
However, aside from counselling fraud, it would be far more difficult for management to interfere
with the process of counting votes than it is for management to influence the audit process.
65 See generally P.S. McGurn, "Confidential Proxy Voting" (Washington: Investor
Responsibility Research Center, 1989); and Allen, supra note 36. The case in favour of imposing
mandatory confidential voting is not completely airtight, however.
See generally J.G. MacIntosh, "Should Canadian Corporate Law be Mandatory or Enabling?"
(paper prepared for Consumer and Commercial Law Workshop, Faculty of Law, McGill University,
1992). It might be better to supply a default rule which requires confidential voting, but allows firms
to contract out by a combination of a special resolution of shareholders and approval by a majority
of the minority.
66 See MacIntosh, supra note 32 at 309-310.
6 7 See sEc Release No. 34-30849; IC-18803 (24 June 1992), amending Release No. 34-29315;
IC-18201 (17 June 1991).
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"dissident's proxy circular."68 The recent amendment of Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) proxy rules to facilitate shareholder
communications 69 is to be applauded, and ought to be emulated in
Canada by appropriate amendments to corporate and securities
legislation.70 It is interesting (and perhaps telling) that the proposals to
amend the U.S. proxy legislation were initially put forward by one of the
largest U.S. institutional investors. 71
C. Seconday Distributions
Institutional oversight is also discouraged by rules relating to
secondary distributions of securities. The provisions of the Ontario
Securities Act (OSA) are illustrative. The OSA includes in the definition
of "distribution" any "trade in previously issued securities of an issuer
from the holdings of any person, company, or combination of persons or
companies holding a sufficient number of any securities of that issuer to
affect materially the control of that issuer."72 A person holding 20 per
cent or more of the securities of an issuer is deemed to have a material
affect on the control of the issuer.73 These "control persons," as they are
informally referred to by securities lawyers, can only sell securities under
6 8 See, for example, CBCA, supra note 17, ss. 147-154, esp. s. 147 (definition of "solicitation")
and s. 150(1)(b) (requirement for dissident's proxy circular to accompany any non-managerial
solicitation); Ontario Securities Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.5 [hereinafter OSA], s. 84; and see Brown v.
Duby (1980), 28 O.R. (2d) 745 (Ont. S.C.). See generally J. Pound, "Proxy Voting and the SEC:
Investor Protection Versus Market Efficiency" (1991) 29 J. Fin. Econ. 241; B.S. Black, "Disclosure,
Not Censorship: The Case for Proxy Reform" (Columbia University Law School, Law and
Economics Working Paper No. 78); and Black, supra note 1 at 537-41.
69 Supra note 67. These are summarized in C. McCall, "Shareholder Communications in the
U.S. and Canada" (1992) 4:4 Corp. Gov. Rev. 12. The proposals were adopted on 16 October 1992.
Reforming the proxy process is perhaps less urgent in Canada than in the U.S., both because
regulators have been sympathetic in permitting informal shareholder communications and because
the prevalence of corporations with controlling shareholders in Canada has made non-consensual
transfers of control less important
70mI
71 This was the California Public Employees' Retirement System (often referred to as
CalPERS). See the letter from Richard Koppes, CalPERS's General Counsel, to Linda Quinn,
Director of the sEc Division of Corporation Finance (dated 3 November 1989), (1990) 1 Practicing
Law Inst, 22ndAnnual Conference on Securities Regulation 298.
72 OSA, supra note 68, s. 1(1) (definition of "distribution").
73 .rid
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a prospectus, 74 or through the use of a specific75 or discretionary
prospectus exemption.76  Sale under the exemption specifically
applicable to control persons is conditioned on the lapse of a "hold
period" ranging from six to eighteen months, 77 the filing of an intention
to sell, a declaration that the seller has no undisclosed material
information, and an insider trading report.78 In some cases, the hold
period for all securities held by a control person runs from the date of
acquisition of the last share acquired.79 Thus, becoming a control person
can result in significant impairment of the liquidity, and hence the value
of the control person's holdings. Institutional investors will therefore be
anxious to avoid the control person designation. However, in a number
of situations canvassed below, there exists a non-trivial risk that this
status might be unwittingly acquired.80
1. Coordination problems
a) Institutional coordination
Where an institution coordinates its activities with other
institutions, it might be found to form part of a combination of persons
or companies that is able to materially affect the control of the issuer.
Since the ability to materially affect control is all that is required in order
to be deemed a control person, neither de jurel nor de facto control8 2 is
necessary; possessing a power of negative control, or in many cases
74/Ibid s. 53(l).
75 See, for example, OSA, ibid. ss. 72(1), 72(7), 73(1); and Regulation made under the Securities
Act, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 910 [hereinafter OSA Regulation], ss. 14-32, especially s. 25.
76 OSA, ibid., s. 74.
77 OSA Regulation, supra note 75, s. 25.
78 OSA, supra note 68, s. 72(7)(b).
79 OSA Regulation, supra note 75, s. 25(2). Contrast s. 25(1), ibid.
80 See generally MJ. Davidge, "Insider and Control Issues" (Toronto: Insight Information,
November 1991, conference proceedings) [hereinafter "Insider and Control Issues"]; "Control and
Insider Issues," (Toronto: Insight Information, December 1990, conference proceedings)
[hereinafter "Control and Insider Issues"].
81 Dejure control arises where the controller owns or exercises direction over 50 per cent or
more of the votes of the issuer.
82 De facto control can arise where the controller owns or exercises direction over sufficient
votes to determine the outcome of an ordinary resolution.
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simply holding a substantial block, will be sufficient. Thus institutions
that coordinate their activities in order to pressure management,
influence the outcome of a shareholder vote (by collecting proxies or by
some other means), or promote a shareholder proposal might find
themselves tagged with the control person label, regardless of whether
such activities are done publicly or through behind-the-scenes
maneuvering.8 3 The control person characterization would almost
certainly apply in any case in which institutional shareholders act singly
or jointly to place nominees on the board of directors.
The fuzziness of the "materially affecting control" standard
enhances the risk of acquiring control person status. The proximate
result is to discourage institutional shareholders from acquiring large
blocks of stock, or from coordinating their activities with other
institutions to influence corporate conduct. This is not a trivial problem,
in view of the fact that institutions have increasingly coordinated their
activities to pressure management on proposed initiatives.8 4
b) Shareholder voting agreements
A related problem arises when institutions agree, either formally
or informally, to vote together on a particular issue or to refrain from
voting absent mutual consultation. Such agreements might be construed
to have affected materially the control of the issuer.
83 Institutional investors frequently exercise only episodic influence over corporate affairs,
often through private consultations with management rather than public opposition. There is
nothing in the definition of "control person," however, that excludes the possibility that such
episodic or private influence (perhaps even limited to a single occasion) will permanently "taint" the
investor as a "control person."
84 See Montgomery, supra note 34 at 8 (coordinated efforts with other investors is the second
most commonly employed tactic to exert influence over management).
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2. Aggregation problems
a) Managers tending multiple accounts
Management companies85 and portfolio managers86 (collectively
referred to below as "managers," or "money managers") often invest
funds for more than one institutional client, and frequently exercise the
power to vote such investments. For example, many management
companies will manage a variety of otherwise unconnected pension and
mutual funds.8 7 In such cases, there is a risk that all of the holdings of
each managed account might be aggregated for the purposes of
determining that the manager is a control person. There is also a risk
that the various unaffiliated clients of a common manager will be found
to be control persons either because they represent "a combination of
persons or companies" owning 20 per cent or more of the shares of an
issuer, or because the common manager possesses the ability to affect
materially the control of the issuer.
b) Funds split between multiple managers
Many institutional funds are split between internal managers and
a number of external managers (or solely among a number of external
managers), each of whom may have discretionary authority to purchase
and vote investments. Since purchase decisions are made
independently,88 there exists a significant risk that the aggregate of
securities beneficially owned by the fund will be inadvertently pushed
across either the 20 per cent or the "affects materially" threshold by the
non-coordinated actions of different managers.
85 This term is defined in OSA, supra note 68, s. 1(1) as "a person or company who provides
investment advice, under a management contract."
8 6 This term is defined in OSA, bid. as "an advisor registered for the purpose of managing the
investment portfolio of clients through discretionary authority granted by the clients." A portfolio
manager may be employed by a management company or hired on contract to manage part of an
investment portfolio.
8 7 Firms like Jarislowsky Fraser, CIBC Investment Management Corp., Mackenzie Financial
Corp., and Royal Bank Investment Management Inc. manage billions of dollars of both pension and
mutual fund assets. See Roseman, supra note 3.
88 The increasingly common practice of marketing internationally diversified funds and
farming out management to managers in several countries is obviously likely to enhance the
independence of investment decisions.
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c) Multiple funds under common ownership
Institutions often sponsor a variety of funds under independent
management. For example, a bank might market a number of different
types of mutual funds. Despite the fact that managerial decisions are
made independently, the existence of common fund ownership again
results in a risk that the non-coordinated activities of the different
managers may unintentionally push the sponsoring institution across the
"control person" threshold.
d) Institutions owning or managing securities in different capacities
Many institutions own securities in a variety of capacities. A
trust company, for example, may beneficially own securities for its own
account and also manage discretionary trust accounts in respect of which
it possesses legal, but not beneficial, ownership. Once again, a variety of
managers will make independent purchase or sale decisions, and this
creates a risk that the control person thresholds will be inadvertently
exceeded.
e) Branch holdings of securities
Different branches of the same institution may hold securities
without the knowledge of head office or other branches. This might
happen, for example, where a branch of a bank or a trust company
forecloses on shares given as security for a loan and the resulting
shareholding is not communicated to other branches or to head office.
Once again, this magnifies the risk that an institution may inadvertently
become a control person.
It can be seen, then, that "aggregation" problems cleave into two
main groups: cases where there is common beneficial or legal ownership
but separate management, and cases where there is common
management but separate beneficial or legal ownership.
This enumeration of potential coordination and aggregation
pitfalls does not purport to be an exhaustive list of situations in which
the pertinent thresholds can accidentally be crossed; clearly, there are
further permutations and combinations that yield additional
opportunities for mishap.
From a policy perspective, it is at least clear that guidelines are
necessary to clarify when regulators will aggregate holdings in the course
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of calculating the holdings of any person, company, or combination of
persons or companies. Present uncertainties create a serious
disincentive for institutions to acquire sizeable blocks or to act jointly.
But more than regulatory clarification is in order. The secondary
distribution prospectus requirement is based on the presumption that a
control person has access to confidential corporate information. Thus,
the requirement can be safely dispensed with in any case where it is clear
that investors acting alone or in concert do not have access to privileged
information.
As a general matter, institutional investors are rarely privy to
privileged information. This conclusion is strongly supported by a large
corpus of empirical research which demonstrates that, on average,
institutional investors do not "beat the market"8 9 as they would be
expected to do if the possession of private information were common.
Even recent studies which apparently90 indicate that mutual fund
managers9l(and perhaps others) 92 can beat the market, show that the
trading advantage is very small (approximately 1 per cent per annum),
and is likely no more, and possibly less than adequate compensation for
the cost of collecting the information.93 This evidence, in my view,
justifies a complete exemption for institutional traders from the
secondary distribution requirements. Failing this, the securities
legislation should be amended to provide a safe harbour from control
person status for investors who coordinate their activities on an ad hoc
basis to influence the control or direction of the issuer. The legislation
should also be amended to provide exemptions from aggregation both
where there is common' ownership, but fractured management, and
where there is common management, but fractured ownership. These
exemptions should apply to all managers (i.e., management companies
and portfolio managers) as well as to institutional owners and clients.
It should be noted that, if other recommendations in this paper
are adopted, institutional investors could be expected to gain regular
access to confidential information. Even assuming that this is the case,
the policy of encouraging more active monitoring of corporate
89 See Part VI, below.
90 The qualification is important. See infra notes 209-213 and accompanying text.
91 1bi.
92 Including the Value Line Investment Survey and "Heard on the Street" column in the The
Wall Street Journal See E.F. Fama, "Efficient Capital Markets: I" (1991) 46 J. Fin. 1575 at 1604-
05.
93 See infra notes 209-213 and accompanying text.
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managements by institutions would still, in my view, make it desirable to
adopt an exemption from the secondary distribution requirements. Such
a policy would subject institutions only to the regime of insider trading
rules suggested in the following section.
D. Insider Trading Regulation
One strategy that might be followed by an institution that wishes
to become actively involved in corporate governance (or to have a lever
with which to police managerial conduct) is to put a representative on
the board of directors. This, however, subjects the institution to two
related disabilities: potential insider trading liability, and/or a loss of
liquidity.94
All those who are in a "special relationship" with a reporting
issuer are liable should they trade in the securities of that issuer while in
possession of material undisclosed information concerning the issuer. A
director is in a special relationship with the reporting issuer. 5 If the
nominee director communicates material information about the issuer to
the sponsoring institution, then that institution is also in a special
relationship with the reporting issuer.96
Once this characterization arises, any trading by the institution
while in possession of material information that has not been generally
disclosed will result in insider trading liability. This is the case no matter
what the source of the information. 97 The potential liability is fourfold.
Insider trading is a criminal offence under provincial securities law,98
and the fine may be as much as three times the profit made.99 Insider
trading may also result in civil liability, running both to the party on the
other side of the trade and to the reporting issuer itself.00 Finally,
insider trading may subject both the institution and its managers to
94 Liquidity will not be of coequal concern to all institutional investors. Life insurance
companies and many pension funds have lengthy average hold periods, and the cost of illiquidity
will be comparatively small. See K.A. Froot, A.F. Perold & J.C. Stein, "Shareholder Trading
Practices and Corporate Investment Horizons" (1992) 5:2 J. Applied Corp. Fin. 42.
95 See, for example, OSA, supra note 68, s. 1(1) (definition of "insider").
96 osA, iU, s. 76(5)(e).
97 Green v. Charterhouse (1976), 12 O.R. (2d) 280 (Ont. CA.).
98 OSA, supra note 68, s. 76.
99 1W s.'122(4).
100 Ibid. ss. 134(1), (4).
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administrative penalties such as a denial of trading exemptions.101 A
denial of exemptions effectively results in exclusion from Ontario's
capital markets. Obviously, institutional traders and their managers will
be anxious to avoid these potential liabilities.
One way in which insider trading liability can be avoided is by not
trading while in possession of material information that has not been
generally disclosed. This strategy, however, carries an obvious liquidity
penalty; it reduces the fund's flexibility to sell an investment, even if the
reason for selling has nothing to do with the undisclosed information
held by the fund.
How often will this be a problem? Canadian securities law
requires all reporting issuers to file a press release and a report with the
regulators on the occurrence of material events.102 Once information is
made public, there can be no liability for trading on that information.103
Nonetheless, the law also permits a reporting issuer to keep sensitive
information confidential by filing only a confidential report.104 Should
the issuer elect to follow this route, those in a special relationship with
the issuer will suffer diminished liquidity because of the necessity to
avoid trading while the report remains confidential.
In addition, there is a risk that the reporting issuer will fail to
issue a press release or material change report in relation to information
that is later found by a court or administrative tribunal to have been
material. If an institutional shareholder trades while in possession of
such information, then insider trading liability may follow. This
exacerbates the risk that an institution that puts itself in a position to
receive confidential information and then trades will later be found to
have engaged in insider trading.
A sponsoring institution might attempt to avoid these problems
by constructing a "Chinese Wall" between itself and its nominee
director.105 An abbreviated version of the Chinese Wall would forbid
the nominee director from passing any non-public information to any
person connected with the institution. Even an abbreviated Wall,
however, greatly diminishes the effectiveness with which the institution
101 Ibe. s. 128.
102 See, for example, OSA, ibid, s. 75. See also "National Policy No. 40: Timely Disclosure"
(1987), O.S.C.B. 6294 [hereinafter NP40].
103 OSA, ibid. note 68, ss. 76(4), 134(1)(a).
104 GSA, ibid, s. 75(3). See also NP40, supra note 102, Part G.
105 See OSA Regulation, supra note 75, ss. 175(1), (3), which would appear to furnish a
Chinese Wall defense to an institution that has nominated a corporate director.
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can police management through the use of nominee directors. Where
such a Wall is in place, the nominee director must be trusted to exercise
judgment about which information may be disclosed to the institution
and which information may not. There is a risk that a court or tribunal
will later disagree with the nominee director's judgment about whether a
particular item of information was or was not confidential. In addition, a
director receives a great deal of information about his or her company,
and may not always remember what information is confidential and what
is not. Thus, the only effective Chinese Wall is one that is absolute and
forbids communication between the nominee director and the
sponsoring institution. Obviously, however, an absolute Wall blunts to
an even greater degree the efficacy of using nominee directors to police
management. It is thus not terribly surprising that institutional investors
rarely place a representative on the board of directors of a public
company.10
6
Even short of board representation, an institutional investor will
be in a special relationship with a reporting issuer once it acquires 10 per
cent of the voting rights of the issuerj 07 An institution crossing the 10
per cent threshold thus has a greatly diminished incentive to acquire
information about the investee corporation, since possession of
privileged information will result in reduced liquidity and/or potential
insider trading liability. 108
Indeed, Ontario's securities legislation includes in the definition
of "special relationship" any "person or company that is engaging in or
proposes to engage in any business or professional activity with or on
behalf of the reporting issuer."1°9 Many institutional investors engage in
business relationships with reporting issuers in which they invest. For
106 Koval, supra note 23 at 53-55. It is both interesting and significant that institutional
investors wig! place representatives on boards of private companies. Koval, ibid. at 54. This suggests
that institutional reluctance to place nominees on boards has more to do with potential liabilities
associated with public companies, like insider trading, than with any institutional culture of passivity
or non-involvement in corporate affairs.
107 See, for example, OSA, supra note 68, ss. 1(1) (definition of "insider" of a reporting
issuer), 76(5)(a) (including "insider" in the definition of person in a special relationship). Note that
since ownership of 10 per cent of all voting rights (rather than simply shares) triggers the "insider"
relationship, a fund might cross the insider trading threshold by holding less than 10 per cent of the
equity of an issuer.
108 Similar problems have occurred in the U.S., but are more serious because of potential
"short-swing" trading liability under Rule 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 16, 15
U.S.C. § 78(p) (1988). Also, see Roe, "A Political Theory," supra note 27 at 26-27; Black, supra
note 1 at 546-48 (also discussing "deputization" theory).
109 OSA, supra note 68, s. 76(5)(b).
1993]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
example, banks may have made loans to, or taken deposits from, firms in
which they hold shares. Similarly, insurance companies may underwrite
some aspect of the investee issuer's business. These institutions will be
in a special relationship with the reporting issuer.
It will be apparent from the above definition that an institution
need not actually be engaging in business with an issuer to be in a special
relationship with that issuer, however. The definition extends to any
institution that "proposes to engage in any business" with the issuer.
Although the meaning of "proposes" is not clear, it would seem to
include, at a minimum, any institution that is actively seeking the
business of the issuer. While perhaps unlikely, it might even embrace
any institution that has some hope of obtaining the business of the issuer
in the future, even if not presently wooing the issuer. An institution
captured by this part of the definition of "special relationship" is as
much at risk of insider trading liability (should it come into possession of
confidential information) as an institution that has placed a nominee
director on the board.
Potential insider trading liability appears to be a problem
primarily for larger institutional investors. In a survey of public and
private pension funds and investment managers, Kathryn Montgomery
found that relatively large public sector pension funds "consider
potential insider trading conflicts to be a most important deterrent to
activism, second only to the time involved," 110 while private sector
pension funds and investment counsellors do not consider potential
insider trading liability to be a problem.111
As is the case when determining whether control person status
applies, issues of aggregation greatly cloud the determination of whether
insider status will attach to investors. The OSA includes in the definition
of an insider (and hence, special relationship):
any person or company who beneficially owns, directy or indirectly, voting securities of a
reporting issuer or who exercises control or direction over voting securities of a reporting
issuer or a combination of both carrying more than 10 per cent of the voting rights....
[emphasis added]112
Thus, insider status may be acquired either on the basis of
beneficial ownership or through the exercise of control or direction over
voting securities. Clearly, the aggregation and coordination problems
110 Montgomery, supra note 34 at 10.
111 Ibid. ("Such potential conflicts do not appear to alarm investment counsellors or private
sector pension funds, both of which classify this factor among the least important deterrents").
112 OSA, supra note 68, s. 1(1) (definition of "insider").
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canvassed in Part C above are recreated in the issue of determining who
is an insider.113 Thus, like the definition of a "control person," the
definition of "insider" requires further refinement. In particular, it
makes little sense to aggregate the ownership or control powers of funds
under common ownership when management is split among many
managers who have little or no contact with one another. In such a case,
common ownership gives an illusion of control and, hence, access to
inside information that does not mirror reality. Given the direct and
opportunity costs of compliance, the rules should make it clear that
regulators will not aggregate holdings invested by multiple managers
making independent investment decisions. Similarly, where common
managers purchase the same securities for a number of otherwise
unconnected funds, they will not typically be seeking or exercising any
measure of control, nor will they have any privileged access to
information. Without more, it is inappropriate to aggregate holdings
lacking a common owner for the purposes of determining if a group of
funds exercises control or direction over an issuer.
Coordinated but ad hoc institutional action intended to influence
management, and single issue voting agreements, are also unlikely to be
associated with privileged access to corporate information, as suggested
by the empirical evidence on institutional performance referred to
earlier.114 Because the costs of exposing institutions to potential insider
trading liability exceed the likely benefits,115 doubts about whether
coordinated action will give rise to aggregation for the purpose of
identifying insiders should be resolved by specific exemptions. 116
As with the case of secondary distribution prospectus and
disclosure requirements, however, further institutional and/or regulatory
113 Because of space limitations, much detail must be omitted from this discussion.
114 Supra notes 89-93 and accompanying text.
115 It could be argued that no harm is done by drawing institutions into the insider and hence
"special relationship" net, since they might possess confidential information and will, in fact, not be
liable for insider trading unless they do possess such information. However, this argument fails to
recognize that because of the fuzziness of the insider definition, prudent institutional fund managers
will tend to avoid purchasing large blocks or getting close to corporate affairs simply because of the
risk of insider trading liability.
116 The likelihood that multiple legal persons engaging in coordinated activity will be found to
be an insider is perhaps less than the risk of a coalition being found to be a control person, or to
have made a takeover bid, given the absence in the insider definition of wording specifically
including a combination of persons or companies, or persons or companies acting jointly or in
concert. OSA, supra note 68, s. 1(1) (definition of insider). For a more detailed discussion of the
difficulties associated with the definition of insider (with particular application to mutual funds), see
Davidge, "Insider and Control Issues," supra note 80; and Davidge, "Control and Insider Issues,"
supra note 80.
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changes may be in order. The thrust of this section is to recommend
changes to the law that will raise the likelihood of institutional activism,
and hence the likelihood that institutions will come into possession of
confidential information. The most difficult question is therefore how to
redesign insider trading laws to accommodate this more active role. One
possible means for overcoming the risk of insider trading liability while
preserving the incentive for institutions to engage in corporate
monitoring may be found in a proposal by Professors Gilson and
Kraakman. They suggest that institutional investors create a class of
professional independent directors who would function as external
monitors, without communicating inside information11 7 to their
institutional principals. 118 However, a number of potential difficulties
arise. One difficulty involves the question of what will induce highly paid
business people to abandon their careers to become professional
directors.1 19 Another is the eternal question of who will monitor the
monitors. Gilson and Kraakman argue that a central institutional
clearinghouse could both nominate directors and evaluate their
performance, perhaps by the use of performance indices. They never
address, however, the difficulty of evaluating the performance of a single
director who is part of a team of directors,120 a difficulty that is greatly
exacerbated by the fact that the evaluator can only observe "noisy"
117 Gilson and Kraakman in fact discuss only "short-swing" liability under s. 16(b) of the
Securities ErchangeAct,supra note 108, and suggest that institutions would incur no liability under
that provision for nominating and voting in a minority of the board of directors. See Gilson &
Kraakman, supra note 32 at 902-03. They do not discuss broader insider trading liability, but it
seems to be implicit in their proposal that inside information will not actually be passed to
institutional investors, particularly as they envision an institutional "clearing-house" performing the
job of nominating and monitoring the outside directors. Coffee has criticized this proposal,
however, on the grounds that it would give institutional investors access to inside information and
that it would violate s. 16(b). Coffee, supra note 1 at 1348.
118 Such directors would be paid by the corporation, but would be nominated and elected by
institutional shareholders (or an institutional shareholder clearing-house), who could deprive them
of employment by withholding their votes-hence the use of the word "principal" in the text.
1 1 9 Gilson and Kraakman argue that, although becoming a professional director would involve
a pay cut, there will be those who will seek such employment in order to reap the benefits of the
"great autonomy and clear institutional mandate" associated with being a professional director, and
because of the "intrinsic idealism of the position." Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 32 at 891 and
note 88. This, however, remains somewhat speculative. One wonders whether the institutional
mandate will in fact be any clearer than the mandate of the business manager to maximize profits,
and just how much more idealism will be implicated than in the average business career.
120 The team that the director is a part of is in fact the entire team of directors, managers, and
employees in the firm. Attributing good or bad performance to one individual is obviously a
hazardous undertaking. See generally A.A. Alchian & H. Demsetz, "Production, Information
Costs, and Economic Organization" (1972) 62 Amer. Econ. Rev. 777.
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signals of firm performance.121 It is difficult enough to evaluate an
entire managerial team, let alone a subset of directors appointed by
institutions or an individual director within that subset of directors. The
difficulty of monitoring the monitor is almost certain to create
considerable slack in the institution-director agency relationship. Hence,
it seems unlikely that the Gilson and Kraakman proposal can promise
more than marginal improvements over the institution of outside
directors as currently constituted.1 22
I offer an alternative suggestion which I call the "self-
identification" regime 2 3 Under this regime, institutional traders who
are in a special relationship with a reporting issuer and trading in
possession of confidential information could escape liability by publicly
declaring, prior to trading, an intention to trade while in possession of
confidential information. They would not, however, have to reveal the
information. Failure to make the required disclosure while trading in
possession of confidential information would result in the usual insider
trading liability.
This rule will result, on average, in the complete dissipation of
any institutional insider trading gains. Where an institution announces
that it is trading with the benefit of inside information, the market will
either discount or bid up stock prices sufficiently to ensure that, on
121 All performance evaluation schemes are noisy. Accounting-based schemes, for example,
are subject to managerial manipulation and even without manipulation may only loosely reflect
changes in the economic condition of the firm. See, for example, R.IL Watts & J.L Zimmerman,
"Towards a Positive Theory of the Determination of Accounting Standards" (1978) Acct. Rev. 11.
Schemes based on share price are also subject to inaccuracy in that share prices are noisy. See F.
Black, "Noise" (1986) 41 J. Fin. 529; L Chan & J. Lakonishok, "Are the Reports of Beta's Death
Premature?" (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1992) [Working Paper 92-0168].
Further, share price changes are a product not only of managerial effort and skill, but of exogenous
market forces. See, for example, B. Hoimstrom, "Moral Hazard and Observability" (1979) 10 Bell
J. Econ. 74. They will also be an imperfect measure of managerial performance because of the
influence of firm-specific factors unrelated to the effort and skill of the managers, such as a product
liability suit arising from products marketed by a previous managerial team. Finally (but not least
importantly), to the extent that expectations of management performance are already impounded in
share prices, changes in share price may bear little relation to management's performance. See S.
Keane, "Can a Successful Company Expect to Increase its Share Price?" (1990) 3:3 J. Applied
Corp. Fin. 82.
122 Gilson and Kraakman argue that at present outside directors are only effective in crisis
situations. Nonetheless, they also indicate that under their proposal "sustained bad corporate
management would not remain a boardroom secret forever. Dramatic business mistakes would come
to light in the business press, in which case professional directors could expect to be called upon to
explain what efforts they had made to avert disaster." Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 32 at 891
(emphasis added). It is not clear, however, in what ways a dramatic business mistake differs from a
crisis.
123 Unlike Gilson and Kraakman's proposal, this proposal clearly requires regulatory reform.
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average, the institution earns no abnormal returns. Indeed, there is
already good evidence that market makers and others dealing with
insiders adjust their bid/ask spreads in view of the risk that the insider is
trading on confidential information. 124
What are the advantages of this rule? The probability of
apprehension for insider trading is low. As Montgomery's survey shows,
however, the potential criminal, civil, administrative, and reputational
penalties associated with potential insider trading liability are
nonetheless a strong deterrent to institutional activism. This betrays
considerable risk aversion on the part of institutional money managers.
Under the self-identification regime, highly uncertain legal and
reputational penalties are replaced by a larger, but much more
predictable, price penalty when trading while in possession of inside
information-namely, the prophylactic price adjustment that occurs
when an institution announces it will trade with the benefit of inside
information. Viewed ex ante by the risk-averse manager, the latter might
easily be more appealing than the former.
The ex ante appeal of the self-identification regime is heightened
by the fact that when an institution wishes to trade while not in
possession of inside information, its liquidity will actually be improved.
The absence of an "insider trading" announcement will credibly12 5 signal
the market that the institution is not trading with inside information.
This will enable the institution to trade without the prophylactic price
adjustment which would otherwise occur were the market to suspect that
the institution was trading on confidential information.
Of course, I have already argued that institutions rarely trade
with the benefit of inside information. However, the very point of the
self-identification regime is to raise the probability that institutions.will
acquire inside information. Thus, the fact that the self-identification
regime allows institutions not possessing inside information to trade
without the prophylactic price penalty plays an important role in
encouraging institutional activism.
The self-identification regime will also improve the efficiency of
stock pricing. The rule will encourage an important class of
shareholder-institutions-to acquire inside information. It will also
124 See, for example, T.C. Copeland & D. Galai, "Information Effect on the Bid-Ask Spread"
(1983) 38 J. Fin. 1457.
125 It is credible precisely because institutional managers have revealed a risk aversion to
insider trading sanctions. The credibility of the signal is enhanced by the virtual certainity that the
criminal and civil liability that will result should the institution be found to have engaged in insider
trading will greatly exceed any potential profit from engaging in insider trading.
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encourage them to trade while in possession of inside information.
Further, under the self-identification regime, the market will know with
considerable accuracy when an institution is trading while in possession
of confidential information, and will be able to draw the appropriate
inferences. Thus, inside information is more likely than at present to be
impounded into market prices. Indeed, the rule results in more accurate
stock pricing, while enabling corporate issuers to keep the exact
character of competitively sensitive information from the public purview.
Finally, it should be noted that the prophylactic price adjustment
that will occur when an institutional trader announces that it is trading
with confidential information will destroy any incentive of institutions to
purchase block holdings for the purpose of engaging in insider trading.
By the same token "outside" traders will be no worse off than at present.
The main purpose and effect of the rule will be to encourage institutions
to purchase large holdings and carefully monitor management with a
view to improving corporate performance.1 26 Indeed, there are few
changes in the law (aside from no regulation of insider trading) that are
likely to have such a positive impact on monitoring by institutional
investors. 127
126 A common objection to the view that institutions can be effective monitors is that
institutional investors do not have the expertise to engage in active "hands-on" monitoring of
management. See, for example, Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 32 at 876-79 (rejecting proposals
that envision institutional investors directly engaging in active monitoring, because these "clash with
the existing role and basic identity of institutional investors."); Coffee, supra note 1 at 1332. The
answer to this objection, in my view, is that when legal impediments to institutional activism are
removed, there is nothing to pievent them from developing such expertise. The culture of passivity
is not purely market driven; it is also regulation driven. Cf. Roe, "Legal Restraints," supra note 27.
Another objection to the self-identification rule is that it would give institutions a coercive
ability to force concessions from management by threatening to declare themselves in possession of
insider information and then sell the stock, causing it to drop in price. Making good on such a
threat, however, will be costly to institutional investors (because of the price penalty paid to exit the
firm). This diminishes the credibility of the threat. It also suggests that institutional investors will
make such threats only when they genuinely believe that management plans to take measures that
threaten share prices more than institutional selling. Thus, the added leverage which the proposed
rule gives to institutional investors, is likely to result in better corporate governance, rather than
facilitation of institutional bribery.
127 It is noteworthy that the literature on insider trading has focused almost exclusively on the
effects of insider trading laws on managerial incentives. See, for example, D.W. Carlton & D.R.
Fischel, "The Regulation of Insider Trading" (1983) 35 Stan. L. Rev. 857; F.H. Easterbrook,
"Insider Trading as an Agency Problem," in J.W. Pratt & R.J. Zeckhauser, eds., Principals and
Agents: The Structure of Business (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1985) 81. Even in this
context, the efficiency arguments in favour of inside trading laws are on are somewhat shaky
ground.
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
E. Takeover Bid Regulation
Under provincial legislation, a "takeover bid" occurs when a
person (offeror) purchases shares that "together with the offeror's
securities, constitute in the aggregate twenty per cent or more of the
outstanding securities of that class of securities."128 The term "offeror's
securities" is defined as "securities of an offeree issuer beneficially
owned, or over which control or direction is exercised ... by an offeror or
any person or company acting jointly or in concert with the offeror."12
9
The OSA further provides that "it is a question of fact as to whether a
person or company is acting jointly or in concert with an offeror."13 0
However, any "agreement, commitment or understanding, whether
formal or informal," to exercise voting rights gives rise to a presumption
that the parties have acted jointly or in concert.1 31 Although space
limitations forbid exploration of the details, it is obvious that these
definitions recreate the coordination and aggregation problems already
canvassed in relation to "control persons" and "insiders."13 2  In
particular, since an informal agreement, commitment, or understanding
between institutions and/or money managers might result in a
characterization of having acted "jointly or in concert," institutional
investors and money managers are exposed to a significant risk that they
will inadvertently trigger the costly takeover rules which require that an
offer be extended to all shareholders if no exemption can be found.133
Even in the absence of joint action, portfolio managers purchasing the
same securities for different accounts may trigger the takeover threshold
by virtue of exercising "control or direction" over the requisite 20 per
cent of an issuer's securities. Similarly, where management of a single
fund is parcelled out to a variety of managers acting independently, the
threshold might be inadvertently crossed. Indeed, for federally
1 2 8 OSA, supra note 68, s. 89(1) (definition of "take-over bid").
1 2 9 INd (definition of "offeror's securities") (emphasis added).
130 IN s. 91(l).
13 1 IN& ss. 91(l)(2).
132 See generally Davidge, "Insider and Control Issues," and Davidge, "Control and Insider
Issues," supra note 80.
13 3 OSA, supra note 68, s. 95.1. As in the case of secondary distributions, there are both
specific and discretionary exemptions available. See OSA, ibid., ss. 93 and 104(2)(c).
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incorporated companies, the takeover bid threshold is only 10 per cent,
magnifying the risk of inadvertent transgression of the legislation.13 4
These difficulties highlight the folly of lowering the takeover
threshold to 10 per cent, as proposed by the Canadian Securities
Administrators (csA) in 1990.135 Such action would almost certainly
discourage institutional acquisition of significant stakes in Canadian
corporations and, therefore, the amount of corporate monitoring
engaged in by institutional investors.136 The CSA proposal would thus
have the effect of diminishing corporate accountability and should not
be revived. Indeed, it would be better to increase the takeover threshold
in both provincial and federal legislation to 30 per cent.
As in other cases where uncertainties surround the question of
when coordinated action, joint management, or joint ownership will be
construed to have triggered the pertinent ownership/control threshold,
clarification is required. These uncertainties heighten the risk of block
ownership, reduce institutional stakes in Canadian corporations, and
impact negatively on institutional monitoring.
There is, in fact, a very strong case for completely exempting
institutional owners, whether on an individual or an aggregated basis,
from the application of the takeover rules, unless the institution or
institutions actively make or participate in an offer to all shareholders.
Institutions rarely participate in takeover bids except as sellers; indeed,
the equity stakes of many institutional investors (such as banks, mutual
funds, and life insurance companies) are capped, making such
participation legally difficult or impossiblej 3 7 At the very least, when
ownership is common but management is split between independently
managed funds or independent managers, the rules should make it clear
13 4 CBCA, supra note 36, s. 194. Note, however, that the CBCA creates less onerous
coordination and aggregation problems.
135 "Request for Comments: Proposed Changes to Provincial Securities Legislation
Take-Over Bids" (1990), 13 O.S.C.B. 2295 (csA Proposal). For criticisms of the proposals, see M.R.
Gillen, "Proposed Changes to Provincial Takeover Bid Legislation: Deterrence Without
Protection" (1992) 25 U.B.C. L. Rev. 129; and J.G. MacIntosh, "The Canadian Securities
Administrators' Takeover Proposals: Old Wine in Old Bottles?" (1993) 22 C.B.LJ. 231.
13 6 The COCA "takeover" threshold should be increased at least to the 20 per cent level found
in provincial legislation. Accord, P. Anisman, "Submission to The Canadian Securities
Administrators Take-Over Bid Subcommittee By Allenvest Group Limited" (1990) 2:6 Corp. Gov.
Rev. 7 at 16. I also agree with Anisman's suggestion (at 17) that the securities legislation be
amended to allow investors inadvertently making a takeover bid (whether by violation of the 20 per
cent threshold, the stock exchange "normal course" rules, or otherwise) to apply for an ex post facto
exemption from the takeover bid requirements.
13 7 See Part II(K)(1), below.
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that aggregation of holdings will not occur. In such cases, the rationale
underlying the takeover rules-that all shareholders should be treated
equally on a change of control' 3 8-- does not apply since there is no joint
exercise of control. Similarly, where control or direction is common but
beneficial ownership is not (as with a portfolio manager managing a
variety of mutual funds), the likelihood that the otherwise unconnected
owners will contemplate exercising joint control is remote, and again the
aggregation rules should not apply. Nor should coordinated institutional
activity to influence management on an ad hoc basis be subject to
aggregation for purposes of determining if the takeover threshold has
been crossed. It was never contemplated that such episodic influence
over management would trigger the takeover rules, and applying the
rules to such conduct will harm all shareholders by interfering with
institutional monitoring!3 9
F. Poison Pills
Concerted institutional action has also been dealt a blow by the
recent adoption of "poison pills" by many of the large publicly traded
(and management controlled) corporations in Canada. A poison pill
consists of an issuance of rights to shareholders which, once activated,
allows all shareholders, save the acquiror, to purchase shares at some
fraction (usually one-half) of market price.140 The pill is typically
activated when an "acquiring person" acquires "beneficial ownership" of
more than a stated percentage of voting shares-usually 10 or 20 per
cent.141 For the purposes of determining beneficial ownership, most
plans aggregate holdings managed by portfolio managers for unaffiliated
138 The policies that underlie the takeover legislation are to ensure equal treatment of
shareholders on a change of control and to give shareholders adequate time and information with
which to decide whether to tender. The former is the key policy underlying the definition of a
takeover bid. See Ontario, Report of the Attorney General's Committee on Securities Legislation in
Ontario (March 1965) (Chairman: J.R. Kimber), especially para. 3.10.
139 There is again the possibility that institutions will become active bidders in the future. If
so, my preference would be to eliminate most of the existing regime of rules in any case. See
MacIntosh, supra note 135.
1 4 0 See Allenvest Group Limited, "Summary of Current Poison Pill Plans" (1990) 2:3 Corp.
Gov. Rev. 2 [hereinafter "Allenvest Summary"]; P. Anisman, "Poison Pill Rights Plans: A Checklist
of Issues" (1990) 2:3 Corp. Gov. Rev. 4 [hereinafter "Checklist"]; P. Anisman, "An Acceptable
Poison Pill Rights Plan?" (1990) 2:2 Corp. Gov. Rev. 2 [hereinafter "Acceptable Plan"]; and P.
Anisman, "Poison Pills and Corporate Governance" (1991) 3:1 Corp. Gov. Rev. 1 [hereinafter
"Corporate Governance"].
141 See, for example, Anisman, "Acceptable Plan," ibid. at 3.
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clients.142 Even those plans that have exemptions for such managers
stipulate that the manager loses the exemption upon becoming involved
in a variety of governance issues, and typically give the board discretion
to determine if the exemption has been lost in a specific case.143
Similarly, under most plans, joint institutional activity in relation to
corporate governance issues will result in aggregation for the purposes of
determining beneficial ownership, again subject to board discretion.144
Institutions participating in a shareholder proposal or proxy solicitation,
or perhaps even acting jointly to oppose management on a particular
issue, may unwittingly find that they have collectively become an
acquiring person.145 Poison pill plans thus make both large block
purchases and institutional activism extremely risky activities for
institutional investors and money managers, since inadvertently
becoming an acquiring person (and triggering the pim) will result in the
institution(s) or manager(s) (and their clients) incurring large losses.
If poison pill plans are to be permitted,146 strict regulation is
indicated. Because money managers and institutional investors are
rarely acquirors in takeover bids, the rules should mandate that the
"acquiring person" threshold exclude portfolio managers and
institutional investors from the definition of an "acquiring person" in all
circumstances except where there is participation in an offer to all
shareholders.1 47 The triggering threshold for becoming an acquiring
person should be mandated as no less than the 20 per cent threshold
contained in the definition of a "takeover bid," and the rules should
forbid pills from excluding partial bids. In addition, the common
requirement that a "permitted bid" be made only by a person holding an
even lower percentage of shares than the "acquiring person" threshold
(often 5 or 10 per cent)148 should be prohibited. Also, because some
142 bmid. at 3-4; "Corporate Governance," supra note 140 at 1-5. As a result of pressure from
Allenvest (now Fairvest) and other sources, some plans now make specific exceptions for portfolio
managers. Koval, supra note 32 at 43.
143 "Corporate Governance," ibid.
144 bid. at 2-4; Koval, supra note 32 at 42.
145 TM See Stahl v. Apple Bancorp, Inc. 1990 Fed. Sec. L Rep. (CCH) 95,412 at 97,031
(Del. Ch. Aug. 9,1990).
146 For an argument that such plans ought not to be permitted, see MacIntosh, supra note 28;
although see also J.G. MacIntosh, supra note 32.
147 Accord, "Acceptable Plar," supra note 140 at 4.
14 8 See Allenvest Group Limited, "How to Evaluate a Poison Pill" (1990) 2:3 Corp. Gov. Rev.
1 at 2-3.
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institutional shareholders may be corrupted by management pressure,149
shareholders should be required to approve poison pills by a
supermajority of at least two-thirds, rather than a simple majority. This
would put the poison pill, the most potent of all takeover defenses, on an
even footing with modifications to the articles of incorporation (whether
for the purpose of defending against a takeover bid or otherwise) and
other corporate fundamental changes. Indeed, it would be better still to
require that a pill be approved by a majority of the minority of
shareholders.
Finally, the potentially adverse impact of the poison pill on share
price requires that an appraisal right be extended to shareholders on the
adoption of a poison pill. This could be done by amendment to the
corporate legislation.
150
G. Insider Reporting Requirements
Provincial legislation typically requires that "insiders" of
reporting issuers file monthly reports of all trading activities.151 The
difficulties of determining who is an "insider," already discussed in
relation to insider trading, recur in the reporting context. Indeed,
inadvertent breaches of the reporting requirement may already be a
common occurrence. Such breaches may be more than a nuisance to
institutional investors, given that repeated breaches may provoke the ire
of regulators and result in the application of powerful discretionary
sanctions, such as a denial of trading exemptions, to either the fund or its
managers.
149 See Part IV, below.
150 It could also be done through provincial or national policy statements issued by securities
regulators. In my view, this would be an excessive use of regulatory jurisdiction. See J.G.
MacIntosh, "The Excessive Use of Policy Statements by Canadian Securities Regulators" (1993) 1
Corporate Financing 19; Ainsley Financial Corporation v. Ontario Secuities Commission (1993) 14
O.R. (3d) 280 (Gen. Div.) [hereinafterAinsley].
The Allenvest Group (now Fairvest) has been the primary mover in convincing a number of
pill-adopting firms to water down their poison pills (most notably in connection with the Transalta
pill) along the lines indicated in the text, in addition to championing other worthwhile amendments
which probably ought to be mandated by legislation (including: "sunset provisions"; limiting the
discretion of directors to decide whether securities or other laws have been complied with; not
requiring that the bidder obtain a "fairness" opinion or valuation; not requiring that the bidder
maintain an up-to-date list of holdings, etc.). See supra note 148; and see C. McCall, "An
Acceptable Poison Pill? Transalta's New 'Shareholder Bid Approval Plan'" (1992) 4:5 Corp. Gov.
Rev. 6; and MacIntosh, supra note 28. As McCall indicates, even the modified Transalta pill is
highly imperfect and more likely to deter bids than it is to increase takeover premia.
151 See, for example, OSA, supra note 68, s. 107.
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The application of insider reporting requirements to institutional
investors is of questionable utility. As indicated above, institutional
investors are rarely privy to inside information. Thus, requiring insider
reports is not likely to further the statutory policy of preventing insider
trading. At the same time, the cost of the requirement is not trivial,
particulary if institutions and money managers are forced to aggregate
their disparately held holdings in order to file a report. Thus, the
requirement is not cost effective.
While securities regulators may view market transparency as an
independent desideratum, the value of exposing institutional holdings to
public purview is questionable. The cost is more apparent; it is not
unusual for institutional investors to purchase 9.9 per cent of a firm's
shares in order to escape insider and "early warning system" disclosure
and to preserve the confidentiality of an institution's investment
portfolio. 152 Institutional traders and money managers should be
exempted from insider reporting obligations.
H. The Early Warning System
The "early warning system" (Ews) creates a related regulatory
hindrance to institutional activity. Under the OSA, for example, the
acquisition of a 10 per cent stake in any voting or equity securities of a
reporting issuer requires the immediate filing of a press release and a
report to the Commission within two business days.' 53 Each acquisition
of an additional 2 per cent triggers a similar requirement. 154 Further,
crossing either reporting threshold puts a freeze on further acquisitions
for a period of one business day.155
Like the definition of "insider," the Ews disclosure threshold
consists of a disjunctive beneficial ownership or control test. However,
the test is arguably even more prone to coordination and aggregation
risk, as the statute states that "every offeror that acquires beneficial
ownership of, or the power to exercise control or direction over" voting
152 I exclude from consideration here funds that are forbidden from owning more than 10 per
cent of the shares of any one issuer. Accord, Davidge, "Insider and Control Issues " supra note 80 at
12-13 (investment program is proprietary asset of fund; knowledge of fund purchases may affect the
market price and adversely affect the fund's owners). Confidentiality is particularly valued by
publicity-shy public pension funds. See infra notes 239-240 and accompanying text.
153 OSA, supra note 68, s. 101(1).
154 b4d s. 101(2).
155 Ibid. s. 101(3).
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securities is subject to the Ews obligations' 5 6 Since thepower to exercise
control or direction is almost certainly broader than exercising control or
direction,157 portfolio managers are even more at risk of inadvertently
violating the Ews requirements than of violating the insider trading or
reporting requirements. 58
Like the insider reporting obligation, the rationale for extending
the EWS to institutional traders is thin. The purpose of the Ews is to
inform the market at an early stage of an impending takeover bid by
requiring public disclosure of the acquisition of a "toehold" or
"springboard" block. However, institutional investors almost never
participate in takeovers except as sellers. Indeed, many institutions are
legally unable to purchase a substantial fraction of the equity of a single
issuer.159 Thus, the policy that underlies the Ews would not be defeated
by exempting institutions from its coverage. At the very least, following
the U.S. lead,16° a simplified annual reporting system that would
embrace both the Ews and insider trading reporting rules should be
instituted.1 61 However, the limitation in the U.S. exemption, that the
exempted institution must not purchase shares for the purpose of
changing or influencing control, should not be included.162 Otherwise,
156 Ibid. s. 101(1) (emphasis added).
157 A power to exercise control or direction need not be exercised to trigger the uws
requirement.
158 Managers selecting the same securities for independently owned funds are the most likely
to be drawn into the wider net.
159 See Part U(K)(1), below.
160 See Rule 13(d)-l(b)(1) under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, tit. 1, 148 Stat.
881 (codified as amended at 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-l(b)(1) (1990)). See also Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, s. 13(g) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78m(g) (1988)); and Schedule 13G, 17 C.F.R.
§240.13d-102 (1990). The simplified reporting relieves eligible institutions of most of their
reporting burden and allows them to report only yearly.
161 A similar view is expressed in Anisman, supra note 136 at 14-15.
162 The U.S. exemption requires certification that the institution has acquired securities
without "the purpose ... [or] effect of changing or influencing the control of the issuer" (whether
alone or in concert). Rule 13(d)-l(b)(i), supra note 160. After this paper was written, the osc
published for comment "Proposed-Refinement of the Early Warning, Insider Reporting and Take-
Over Bid Regimes" (1993), 16 OSCB 4539 (September 10, 1993). The proposals include an
abbreviated, quarterly reporting early warning regime for certain "passive" investors and their
advisors, in addition to relief from insider reporting requirements for certain "passive" investors and
their advisors that comply with the abbreviated early warning regime. The proposals also indicate
that "[s]taff is also considering whether any modification of the take-over bid requirements or
restrictions on distributions from 'control blocks' is required in the context of securities in managed
accounts." This proposal is clearly a step in the right direction, although in my view it does not go
far enough.
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the overarching purpose of encouraging active institutional participation
in corporate governance will be impaired.
I. The Shareholder Proposal Provisions
As indicated earlier, the shareholder proposal provisions have
not been used extensively in Canada.163 It has been suggested that a
practical reason for this non-use is that most public corporations have a
controlling shareholder and the prospects of success are typically not
great.164
While this is undeniably true, the shareholder proposal
mechanism is nonetheless important and useful. While the prospects for
success may be poor in an individual case, shareholder proposals
nonetheless serve an educational function by putting issues of concern to
institutional investors on the public (and the managerial) agendaj 65
This can have the salutary effect of creating pressure on corporate
managers not to adopt wealth-reducing measures. By generating public
debate, shareholder proposals can also cause many normally passive
shareholders to reconsider their sometimes unthinking support of
management.
In a number of ways, the law has discouraged the use of
shareholder proposals. McCall and Wilson have proposed a number of
simple and sensible amendments to the proposal mechanism, which
might well enhance the' frequency with which this device is used in
Canada.166 For example, under existing law the proposing shareholder is
entitled to have the company circulate to shareholders a statement of
only 200 words in support of the proposal.167 This could easily be
increased to 500 words (as in the U.S.) without adding more than
marginal cost to the management proxy circular.
168
Existing rules also ban resubmission of a proposal within two
years of the defeat of substantially the same proposal. 69 This ignores
the educational function of the proposal mechanism and should be
163 Supra note 36.
164 See Koval, supra note 32 at 39.
165 See McCall & Wilson, supra note 36.
166 jbi.
167 See, for example, CBCA, supra note 17, s. 137(3).
168 McCall & Wilson, supra note 36 at 14.
169 See CBCA, supra note 17, s. 137(5)(d).
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deleted from the legislation 7° Shareholders may also be discouraged
from acting jointly in discussing, making, or supporting a shareholder
proposal for fear of triggering the requirement to assemble a dissident's
proxy circular. This fear would be greatly alleviated by changing the
definition of "solicitation" in the manner proposed earlier.1 71 In a similar
vein, institutions may fear that joint action in support of a proposal will
trigger either a poison pill, the insider trading or Ews reporting
requirements, or the takeover bid requirements, or that it will give the
cooperating institutions control person status, thus reducing the liquidity
of the institutional holdings. Implementation of the reforms suggested
earlier would diminish or eliminate these dangers.
J. The Shareholder's Appraisal Right
The appraisal right, which effectively allows shareholders to
"put" their shares to the corporation on the occurrence of designated
corporate fundamental changes,172 was primarily designed to allow
dissenting shareholders a mechanism for exiting the corporation on the
undertaking of a fundamental change without suffering a loss in value,
while at the same time not impeding majority action.1 73 Although the
appraisal right is designed to facilitate "exit" rather than "voice," 174 the
appraisal right can in fact have a salutary effect in bolstering institutional
voice. This is due to the fact that it is the corporation that must buy the
dissentient's shares. A sufficient number of dissenters can create a severe
cash drain and can conceivably cause management to amend or abandon
the proposed fundamental change.l 7s The threat of dissent thus
strengthens institutional bargaining power.
170 McCall & Wilson, supra note 36 at 13.
171 See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
172 See, for example, CBCA, supra note 17, s. 190.
173 See J.G. Macintosh, "The Shareholder's Appraisal Right in Canada: A Critical
Reappraisal" (1986) 24 Osgoode Hall L. J. 201.
174 The term "exit", now commonly used in the corporate literature, is used to indicate a
strategy of selling when dissatisfied with management. See A.O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and
Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1970). In contrast, the term "voice" (also coined by Hirschman) is used to indicate the
various means by which investors actively seek to convince management to change its intended
course of action, including persuasion, voting, mounting a proxy contest, or litigating.
175 Ibid at 264.
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Unfortunately, the appraisal right has proved to be an unreliable
shareholder protection. Perhaps the main deficiency is the costliness of
exercise. Under existing adversarial procedures, both the corporation
and the dissenting shareholder typically call upon a large number of
expert appraisers to make their case, and the aggregate costs of the
dissent procedure discourage all but the bravest and largest institutional
shareholders from enlisting the right.1 76 This problem, along with other
infirmities,177 must be cured before institutional investors can effectively
use the threat of triggering the appraisal right as a tool to influence
corporate conduct.
K. Legal Constraints on Institutional Ownership
At least six different types of legal constraints limit or inhibit
institutional purchases of equity (and in some cases debt) securities of
private sector firms:
178
1. Caps on ownership of individual firms
Many institutions cannot hold more than a stated percentage of
the equity of a single company. For example, banks and other federally
chartered financial institutions are prohibited from owning more than 25
per cent of the equity or controlling more than 10 per cent of the voting
rights of a single issuer (although recently enacted regulations enable
such institutions to hold interests in "specialized financing corporations,"
which may own a controlling interest)P 9 Mutual funds (wherever
176 The risk is exacerbated by the application of the usual "costs follow the event" rule, which
can saddle a dissenting shareholder with huge costs should the shareholder's proffered valuation be
more distant than the company's from the judicially determined "fair value." MacIntosh, supra note
173; and M. Leith, "The Dissent Route, Once is Enough" (1993) 5:1 Corp. Gov. Rev. 7.
177 Other infirmities include labyrinthine procedures, the tax cost of exercise (at least for
taxable investors), the inability of non-expert judges to determine fair value reliably, and the fact
that courts award simple, rather than compound, interest. Proposals for reform may be found in
MacIntosh, ibid.; and Leith, ibid.
178 The examples that follow are illustrative only. No attempt has been made to exhaustively
review all federal and provincial regulatory requirements.
179 See, for example, BankAct, S.C. 1991, c. 46, s. 466(1); Trust and Loan CompaniesAct, S.C.
1991, c. 45 [hereinafter FTLCA], s. 451(1); Insurance Companies Act, S.C. 1991, c. 47 [hereinafter
FICA], s. 493(1). In each case, there is an exception for a "temporary" investment of up to two
years in duration, so long as the regulated institution does not control more than 50 per cent of the
aggregate votes. Bank Aci s. 471; FTLC4, s. 456; FICA, s. 498. A further exception applies to
1993]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
chartered) are similarly prohibited/8 0 and, in addition, may not
"purchase securities for the purpose of exercising control or
management of the issuer of such securities." 81 Provincial institutions,
such as those chartered in Ontario, are subject to similar limits.182
2. Limits on the proportion of portfolio assets that may be invested in
equities
Most federally chartered financial institutions cannot invest
more than 70 per cent of their regulatory capital (which is essentially
their shareholders' equity) in common shares.183 Nor may such
institutions invest more than 100 per cent of regulatory capital in
"realizations" (for example foreclosures), again with a two-year divestiture limit. See Bank Act, s.
473; FTLC4, s. 458; and FICA, s. 500. Another important exception relates to interests in
companies carrying on cognate or ancillary businesses. See BankAc4 ss. 468-469; FTLCA, ss. 495-
496; and FICA, ss. 453-454. Similar rules are expected for pension funds. With respect to
specialized financial corporations (SFC), see Specialized Financing Corporation (Trust and Loan
Companies) Regulations, SOR/92-351; Special Financing Corporation (Banks) Regulations, SOR/92-
357; Specialized Financing Corporation (Insurance Companies) Regulations, SOR/92-358 (in each
case, limiting the amount of capital the financial institution can invest in sFcs, and the size of any
single investment by an sFc).
180 "National Policy 39: Mutual Funds" (1989) 12 O.S.C.B. 52 at s. 2.04, para. (1).
181 ibid. at s. 2.04, para. (8). As the limitations on mutual fund investment policy are
contained only in a policy statement, their legal status is highly questionable, particularly after the
Ainsley decision, supra note 150.
182 Life insurance companies incorporated in Ontario may not own more than 30 per cent of
a single issuer. Ontario Insurance Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. 1.8 [hereinafter OA], s. 435(1)(d) (insurer
may not own more than "30 per cent of the common shares or 30 per cent of the total issued shares
of any one corporation"). Companies subject to the Ontario Loan and Trust Corporations Act,
R.S.O. 1990, c. L25 [hereinafter OLTCA] may not "hold more than 10 per cent of the issued and
outstanding shares of a class of voting shares of any one body corporate." Ibid. s. 168(1). The
Ontario Pension Benefits Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.8 [hereinafter OPBA], s. 72(1) provides that "[a]
pension fund shall not own more than 30 per cent of the voting shares of any corporation." Under
the OA and the OLTCA, there are exceptions for cognate or ancillary businesses broadly similar to
those in the federal legislation. See OIA, s. 433(8); OLTCA, s. 169. It should also be noted that
under Ontario's "equals approach," institutions chartered in other jurisdictions but doing business
in Ontario must comply both with the Ontario rules and the rules of their incorporating statute.
183 See, for example, Bank Act, supra note 179, s. 478; FICA, supra note 179, s. 508(e) (life
insurers); FTLCA, supra note 179, s. 466. In addition, the aggregate of all real estate holdings and
equities may not exceed 100 per cent of regulatory capital. Bank Act, s. 479; FICA, s. 509(e);
LCA, s. 467. Other federal financial institutions are subject to broadly similar restrictions. See,
for example, FCA, ss. 508(f), 509(f)-(g) (no property and casualty insurer may invest more than 25
per cent of the assets of the company in equities, or 30 per cent [in some cases 35 per cent] in real
estate holdings plus equities).
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common shares plus real estate.18 4 Provincial financial institution
legislation, such as that in Ontario, contains similar limitations.
185
3. Limits on the proportion of portfolio assets that may be invested in a
single security or corporation
Some institutions, such as Ontario insurance companies, cannot
invest in a single security or corporation where such investment would
exceed a threshold amount (in the case of Ontario insurance companies,
10 per cent of the book value of the total assets of the insurer).1 6
4. "Legal for life" restrictions
"Legal for life" investment restrictions, which are still found in
much of the provincial legislation, prohibit investments in non-qualifying
issuers18 7 with the exception in some cases of investments undertaken
through the "basket clause," which permits investment of a stated
percentage of the portfolio in otherwise prohibited assets l88 The effect
of these rules is to limit institutional investments in smaller firms without
substantial track records or in firms experiencing financial distress.
184 See, for example, BankAct, ibid., s. 479; FICA, ibid., s. 509(e); FTLC,4 ibid, s. 467.
185 Under the O!L, supra, note 182, "the total book value of the investments of an insurer in
common shares ... shall not exceed 25 per cent of the book value of the total assets of the insurer,"
OIA, s.435(e). Similarly, no loan or trust corporation may have more 10 per cent of total assets
invested in common shares, or more than 25 per cent of total assets invested in securities of any
kind. See OLTCA, supra, note 182, s.167(4).
186 OIA, ibid, s. 435(1)(c). A similar limit may be found in the OPBA, supra note 182, s. 70.
187 See, for example, CIA, ibid., s. 433(1)(n); OLTCA, supra note 182, s. 162(1)(c). See
generally Stikeman, Elliott, Legal for Life: Institutional Investment Rules in Canada, 4th ed.
(Scarborough: Carswell, 1992) at xiii-xxiv. As the authors explain (at xiii):
Generally, under the legal Hst approach, investments are restricted on the basis of the
status of the issuer of the debt or equity, security or collateral offered to support the debt,
or historical solvency or earnings of the issuer. In addition, in many cases, because a
category of institution has access to more capital than sources of investments meeting
legislated standards, the institution is permitted to invest a set percentage of its assets in
areas not otherwise provided for. The institution may also lend on the security of the
assets it is authorized to invest in.
Legal for life tests have recently been stripped out of the federal legislation, although similar
rules apply to some institutional investors by virtue of the Income Tax Act, supra note 47, s. 207.1
(applying tax penalties to RRSPs and other tax exempt investors that fail to invest in specified
"qualified investments").
188 See, for example, OLTCA, ibid., s. 166(1).
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5. Capital adequacy rules
Federal capital adequacy rules require that federally chartered
financial institutions maintain a minimum ratio of capital to risk-
weighted assets.189 The theory that underlies the test is that holdings of
riskier assets should be supported by a larger capital base than less risky
assets in order to provide an adequate cushion against insolvency. Thus,
various types of investments are risk weighted in determining their
contribution to assets. Consequently, asset categories with the highest
risk weightings require the largest amount of capital in support. The
least risky assets, like cash and claims on OECD governments, receive a 0
per cent risk weighting and, hence, need not be counted in assets at all.
The most risky assets, including all holdings of equity and debt securities
in private sector corporations, receive a 100 per cent risk weighting. The
result is that holdings of either equity or debt securities of private sector
firms are comparatively expensive for financial institutions because of
the opportunity cost associated with maintaining a larger capital base.
This operates as an additional disincentive for a federally chartered
financial institution to invest in corporate equity or debt securities. 190
6. The doctrine of equitable subordination
Another legal constraint that may inhibit institutional purchase
of equity stakes is the doctrine of equitable subordination, under which a
lender exercising some measure of control over an issuer-for example,
through a concurrent holding of equity securities-may find its debt
claim subordinated in insolvency proceedings to the interests of other
creditors.
189 See, for example, BankAct, supra note 179, s. 485, and Office of the Superintendent of
Financial Institutions, "Subject: Capital Adequacy Requirements" (26 June 1992); FTLCA, supra
note 179, s. 473; and FICA, supra note 179, s. 515 (life insurance companies), s. 516 (property and
casualty insurers). The risk-weighted approach reflects the standards adopted by the Bank for
International Settlements.
190 By comparison, the provinces (including Ontario) use a borrowing multiple approach,
under which the size of deposits held must not exceed a stated multiple of capital. See OLTCA,
supra note 182, s. 157. Such an approach does not attach a penalty to equity ownership.
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7. Evaluation
Aside from the doctrine of equitable subordination, a common
thread of risk reduction and protection against insolvency runs through
these limitations on equity purchases. Many of these restrictions,
however, no longer make good sense, if indeed they ever did. By
limiting ownership in individual firms, equity caps reduce the incentive
for institutions to engage in monitoring of corporate managements. So
long as an institution diversifies adequately, limitations on the
acquisition of control serve no added prudential function. Legal for life
restrictions greatly reduce institutional investment in second market
companies and thus reduce their liquidity and pricing efficiency, as well
as the efficacy with which managers of such companies are monitored.
Legal for life restrictions also result in institutional investors
constructing inefficient investment portfolios; efficient diversification is
achieved when the fund holds a combination of assets of all risk
classes.191
Equity caps and legal for life restrictions are based on the
erroneous view that each investment in an institutional portfolio must be
prudent by itself, without reference to other holdings in the portfolio. It
is portfolio risk that matters, and holding large and/or risky stakes in
some corporations is consistent with prudent investment managementP92
The new "prudent person" standard that has been introduced in the
federal and some of the provincial legislation would appear to reflect
this view,193 although without definitive judicial interpretation there is
still room for doubt! 94
191 See, for example, Ross & Westerfield, supra note 7 at 144-180.
192 See, for example, J.N. Gordon, "The Puzzling Persistence of the Constrained Prudent
Man Rule" (1987) 62 N.Y.U. L. R. 52. Coffee argues that some institutional buyers, and
particularly banks, might choose not to purchase large equity stakes even if the rules were altered.
See Coffee, supra note 1 at 1314-15. While not denying the existence of the market forces identified
by Coffee, the institutional culture of passivity is in my view at least as much a product of legal
regulation as it is of market factors. Thus, changing the rules applicable to institutional investors
will, over time, lead to larger institutional stakes and more active institutional monitoring.
193 See, for example, FICA, supra note 179, s. 492; FTLCA, supra note 179, s. 450; Bank Act,
supra note 179, s. 465; OPBA, supra note 182, s. 22; and Regulation made under the Pension Benefits
Act, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 909, s. 67(2). Some statutes combine the legal for life and prudent person
approaches. See, for example, OLTCA, supra note 182, ss. 154, 162(1)(c), 166(1). All of these
statutes (and/or amplifying regulations) specifically indicate that prudence is to be judged in the
context of the portfolio as a whole.
194 The statutes and/or regulations referred to, ibid. all indicate that the fund's managers
must avoid "undue risk of loss," possibly supplying the means by which a court could reintroduce a
single investment prudence standard in addition to a portfolio prudence standard. The American
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Limits on the proportion of assets that may be invested in
equities and risk-weighted capital adequacy rules both serve a useful
prudential function and are not objectionable in principle. However,
these protections are unnecessarily duplicative. In my opinion, the latter
rules are sufficient by themselves to advance the goal of prudential
management. At the least, the federal limits on the proportion of assets
that may be invested in equities are too low and should be raised.
Obviously, however, a stronger case exists for retaining the aggregate
equity limits in provincial statutes that do not have risk-weighted capital
adequacy tests.
Limitations on the proportion of total assets that may be invested
in a single issuer probably do little harm, but add little to the
requirement to act prudently by adequately diversifying. Provincial
enactments that contain such requirements would do well to delete them
(as well as the legal lists) in favour of a "prudent person" investment
standard.
It is unclear at present if the doctrine of equitable subordination
actually exists in Canada.195 In my view, two measures are in order. The
first is legislative clarification of the circumstances in which equitable
subordination will be applied. Clarification is necessary in order to
quantify a presently unknown risk that may operate to discourage equity
purchases by institutions or attempts to influence control of an issuer,
where the institution holds both equity and debt claims or debt claims
alone, and exercises some measure of control over the issuer. Second,
such legislative clarification should make it clear that simply influencing
control of the issuer, or even exercising control, should not by itself be
sufficient to trigger application of the doctrine. Rather, a showing of
conduct specifically prejudicial to other creditors (and unfairly so)
should be required.
experience with similar wording suggests that this is a real possibility. See Black, supra note 1 at
553-56; Roe, "A Political Theory," supra note 27 at 18-19, 24; and MJ. Roe, "The Modem
Corporation and Private Pensions: ERISA's Errors" (Law and Economics Workshop, Faculty of
Law, University of Toronto, WS 1992-93-(4)), at 17-22 [hereinafter "Modem Corporation"].
195 Aevo Co. v. D &A MacLeod Co. (1991), 4 O.R. (3d) 368 at 370-72 (Gen. Div.), suggests
that it does not. In Canada Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Canadian Cornnercial Bank, [1992] 2 S.C.R.
3, the Supreme Court of Canada declined to rule on the existence of equitable subordination in
Canada, holding that even if such a doctrine existed, it would not have applied to the facts at bar.
See generally I,. Crozier, "Equitable Subordination of Claims in Canadian Bankruptcy Law"
(1992) 7 Can. Bar Rev. (3d) 40. The doctrine has been extensively used in the United States. See
A. DeNatale & P.B. Abram, "The Doctrine of Equitable Subordination as Applied to
Nonmanagement Creditors" (1985) 40 Bus. Law. 417.
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L. Limitations on the Ownership of Institutions
Whether institutional shareholders will engage in monitoring
depends in part on the motivation of institutional managers.
Institutional managers who have strong incentives to engage in profit
maximizing behaviour are likely to be more aggressive corporate
monitors. Conversely, if there is considerable slack in the incentives of
institutional managers, it can be expected that corporate monitoring will
also be slack.
Restrictions on the ownership of Canadian financial institutions
are likely to adversely affect the incentives of institutional managers.
For example, no person may own more than 10 per cent of a federally
chartered financial institution.196 Both federal and provincial legislation
forbid foreign ownership from exceeding, in the aggregate, 25 per cent of
a Canadian financial institution. 197 There is no single inspiration for
these rules, and discussion of the multiple rationales is beyond the scope
of this paper. Nonetheless, it is worth pointing out that this type of
ownership restriction impairs direct shareholder oversight, and
effectively removes affected institutions from the market for corporate
control. Since both direct oversight and the control market are
important sources of managerial discipline,198 such restrictions are
bound to increase managerial agency costs. These increased agency
costs will in turn adversely affect institutional incentives to actively
monitor enterprises in which they have invested.
Although not mandated by law, much of the insurance industry is
held in "mutual" form under which the policy holders are effectively the
shareholders. Under federal law, insurance companies may "de-
mutualize," but are then subject to a 10 per cent ownership restriction
196 See Bank Act, supra note 179, s. 372; FICA,supra note 170, s. 407; and FTLCA, supra
note 179, s. 375. There are some exceptions to this rule. See, for example, BankAct, ss. 374-380;
FTLCA, ss. 376-78; FICA, ss. 408-411. See also BankAct, s. 381; FTLCA, s. 379; and FICA, s. 411
(public holding requirements).
197 See, for example, BankAct, ibid., s. 399; FICA, ibid., s. 429; FTLCA, ibid., s. 397; OLTCA,
ibi, s. 60.
198 As indicated above, there is good evidence that concentrated ownership is associated with
increased operating efficiencies (subject, however, to the caveat that the relationship between
ownership concentration and firm value does not appear to be monotonic). See supra notes 19-29
and accompanying text. With respect to the value of the market for corporate control, see, for
example, M.C. Jensen, "The Takeover Controversy: Analysis and Evidence," in J.C. Coffee, Jr., et
al., eds., Knights, Raiders and Targets: The Impact of the Hostile Takeover (New York. Oxford
University Press, 1988) at 314.
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like that applied to banks.199 Mutualization is probably the best way to
insulate management from any external control,200 and thought should
be directed to the issue of forcing demutualization of mutualized
insurance companies.201
III. INSTITUTIONAL INDEXATION AND MONITORING
Aside from legal impediments to institutional activism, some
have raised concerns that the growing practice of "indexing" institutional
funds, rather than trying to "beat the market" by selecting undervalued
securities or promising performers, will compromise institutional
activism.202 A related concern, explored in Part X, below, is whether
indexation will impair market efficiency.
In the discussion that follows, I will distinguish between
"indexing," "passive," and "active" investment strategies. An indexing
strategy is one in which the fund manager constructs a fund portfolio
that closely replicates a common market index, such as the Toronto
Stock Exchange (TSE) 35. A passive strategy is one in which a fund
manager selects investments on some basis other than replication of a
market index, but will sell the investment when dissatisfied with
management. Investments are individually selected in an active strategy
as well, but, in addition, the dissatisfied fund manager will attempt to
alter corporate management's intended course of action by attempting
to persuade management of the folly of their undertaking, by voting
against management, by participating in a proxy battle or takeover
contest, or by other means? 03 I will refer to passive and active strategies
199 FICA, supra note 179, s. 237.
200 There is effectively no Lirect oversight by unorganized, free-riding policy holders with
atomized interests and deficient incentives to monitor management, and there is no control market.
See generally H. Hansmann, "The Organization of Insurance Companies: Mutual versus Stock"
(1985) 1 J. Law Econ. & Org. 125.
201 The case for demutualization is not clear cut, and merits further study. Cf. R.W. Masulis,
"Changes in Ownership Structure: Conversions of Mutual Savings and Loans to Stock Charter"
(1987) 18 J. Fin. Econ. 29 (finding that conversions of mutual S & Ls to stock ownership result in
efficiency enhancements); D. Mayers & C.W. Smith, Jr., "Ownership Structure and Control: The
Mutualization of Stock Life Insurance Companies" (1986) 16 J. Fin. Econ. 73 (finding that
mutualization of life insurance companies is on average efficiency enhancing).
2 02 See generally Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 32.
203 In almost all cases, an active strategy will involve no more than voting against
management, collective action with other shareholders to persuade management, and/or private
consultations with management. See Montgomery, supra note 34 at 8. Given that these tactics
involve far less commitment of resources than participating in a proxy contest or a takeover bid, it
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as "selection" strategies, since in each case the manager selects the
individual investments that make up the portfolio on some basis other
than their participation in a market index. It will become apparent that
these strategies do not form watertight compartments; for example,
managers who elect to index their fund can still engage in active
measures to persuade or discipline corporate managements.
It is no great surprise that indexing strategies have gained
increasing popularity with institutional investors. 204 As a first
approximation, it is reasonable to assume that the utility of fund
managers is negatively correlated with the effort expended in managing
the portfolio. Obviously, the strategy of indexing a fund considerably
reduces managerial effort. But the adoption of an indexing strategy is
also likely to generate costs for the manager. For one thing, managerial
fees are typically based on asset size and successful fund management
can have a strong, positive impact on the fees paid to the managers. 20 5
But even where managerial remuneration is divorced from fund
performance, manager utility is likely to be positively correlated with
fund performance given that a successful fund is likely to attract more
investors and thus increase the probability that the manager will retain
her job or acquire a better one. Moreover, good performance is a source
of pride and prestige; successful managers frequently find their names
and faces splashed across the front pages of business sections of
newspapers with admiring accounts of their financial finesse. Clearly, an
indexing strategy will never lead to this kind of superior performance.
might be preferable to categorize participation in a proxy contest or takeover bid as a "super-active"
strategy. However, for the purposes of this paper, nothing turns on this over-inclusiveness; the main
purpose in view is to contrast "selection" strategies (passive and active strategies) with indexing
strategies.
204 About one-third of equity investments held by U.S. institutions are indexed. See D.M.
Walker, "The Increasing Role of Pension Plans in the Capital Markets and in Corporate
Governance Matters," in Sametz, supra note 1, 34 at 36. Because of their size, indexing appears to
be particularly popular with public pension plans. For example, approximately 60 per cent of the
$58 billion California Public Employees' Retirement System fund was indexed in 1990, with an
increase to 85 per cent projected for 1991. See S. Clark, "Why Dale Hanson Won't Go Away"
(April 1990) Institutional Investor 79 at 80.
Indexing is much less prevalent in Canada. For example, while the Canadian pension fund
market consists of about $275 billion in assets, only about $12 billion of this is indexed. See E.
Roseman, supra note 3. However, indexation strategies are growing rapidly in popularity, as
evidenced by the 100 per cent increase in pension fund indexation between 1991 and 1992. &id
205 See M.K. Berkowitz & Y. Kotowitz, "Incentives and Efficiency in the Market for
Management Services: A Study of Canadian Mutual Funds" (University of Toronto, August 1992)
(finding a strong positive correlation between the performance of Canadian mutual funds and
management fees paid, resulting from the fact that small differences in performance can translate
into large differences in assets under administration). This suggests that Coffee's assumption that
asset-based remuneration schemes are inefficient is wrong. See Coffee, supra note 1 at 1326.
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There is evidence, however, that selection strategies do no better,
on average, than a market index. 206 Such evidence is consistent with
semi-strong form market efficiency (although recent evidence to the
contrary is canvassed subsequently in this paper)207 Indeed, because of
the transaction costs associated with selection strategies, such strategies
may result in performance that lags behind the market index. 208 In
particular, selection strategies typically involve active trading in the
attempt to identify overvalued and undervalued securities, a process that
generates large brokerage costs.. Since institutional investors tend to
hold large blocks of securities, trading costs may be amplified by the fact
that the sale (or purchase) of a large block can result in temporary
downward (or upward) pressure on market price, thus generating an
implicit trading tax.209 The larger the size of a holding and the smaller
the public float, the larger the implicit tax.210 In net, managers who elect
to pursue a selection strategy may well anticipate that the fund will do no
better, and quite possibly worse, on average, than indexed funds.
206 See, for example, J. McLaughlin & N. Bossen, "The Historical Performance of Canadian
Investment Managers: Predictor of Future Performance?" (1990) 3:1 Can. Invt. Rev. 87; J.P.
Williamson, "Performance of Canadian Mutual Funds, 1961-70" (1971) 36:3 Bus. Q. 94; D. Grant,
"Investment Performance of Canadian Mutual Funds: 1960-74" (1976) 8 J. Bus. Admin. 1; A.L.
Calvert & 3. Lefoll, "The CArM Under Inflation and the Performance of Canadian Mutual Funds"
(1980) 12 J. Bus. Admin. 107; AL. Calvert & 3. Lefoll, "Performance and Systematic Risk Stability
of Canadian Mutual Funds Under Inflation" (1981) 8 L Bus. Admin. 279; and W.M. Lawson,
"Market Efficiency: The Trading of Professionals on the Toronto Stock Exchange" (1980) 12 . Bus.
Admin. 41. According to S. Wiseman, "[t]he median equity fund manager under-performed the
Toronto Stock Exchange 300 (TsE 300) index by an average of 20 basis points in 17 of 27 years
between 1960 and 1987, and by as much as 6.5 per cent in 1979 alone. After the cost of fees, the
median manager under-performed the index by 50 basis points for the period." S. Wiseman,
"Making the Case for Index Funds" (1989) Benefits Canada 11 at 12. See also Roseman, supra note
3 (indexing becoming increasingly popular because institutional investors are finding that they
cannot outperform the index). See generally Fama, supra note 92 at 1606-07; Ross & Westerfield,
supra note 7 at 310-12.
One deficiency in these studies is that they do not distinguish between funds that have adopted
indexing, passive, and active strategies. It would be useful to know if there is any difference in the
average returns of funds adopting different strategies.
207 Infra notes 216-220 and accompanying text.
208 Supra note 206.
209 U.S. studies that show some market movement in response to large trades include LY.
Dann, D. Mayers & RJ. Raab, Jr., "Trading Rules, Large Blocks and the Speed of Price
Adjustment" (1977) 4 J. Fin. Econ. 3; M.S. Scholes, "The Market for Securities: Substitution versus
Price Pressure and the Effects of Information on Share Prices" (1972) 45 J. Bus. 179. A Canadian
study on point is N. Close, "Price Reaction to Large Transactions in the Canadian Equity Markets"
(1975) 31 Fin. Anal. J. 50. For further discussion of this issue, see infra notes 273-275 and
accompanying text.
210 1id
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Therefore, an indexing strategy that lowers the managers' efforts but not
their prospective reward appears to be the more rational choice. This
would seem to be particularly true given the rapidly increasing size of the
average institutional fund and the concomitantly larger expenditure of
effort necessary to review carefully all fund investments. 211
As indicated above, some commentators have expressed the
concern that the widespread adoption of indexing strategies will greatly
reduce institutional monitoring of corporate managers.212 Securities will
no longer be selected on the basis of their promise as investments, but
rather on whether they form part of the index that the fund manager
seeks to replicate. Additionally, the goal of replicating a market index
reduces the freedom of managers to sell fund investments when
dissatisfied with performance 2 13 Finally, indexed funds tend to be
widely diversified, and it is argued that the fund manager will have far
too many investments to pay much attention to individual firms in the
portfolio.
One response to these concerns is that it is highly improbable
that all, or even most, investment fund managers will elect to adopt an
indexing strategy. One disincentive for fund managers to adopt an
indexing strategy is that the reduced trading and market research
necessary to fund an indexed fund will almost certainly mean that the
fund will require fewer investment managers. Thus, adoption of an
indexing strategy may jeopardize the managers' jobs, leading them to
prefer more labour-intensive strategies2 14
But more fundamentally, it is no more likely that all investment
clienteles will prefer indexing strategies than it is that the market will run
out of investors who think that they can "beat the market." Many clients
will prefer a selection strategy, and will either instruct the managers to
proceed on that basis (if the client is the plan sponsor) or will invest in a
fund that advertises itself as employing such a strategy.215 Indeed, a
211 In addition, to the extent that larger funds purchase larger blocks of securities, the implicit
trading tax will be greater.
2 12 See generally Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 32.
2 13 A fund that advertises itself as an indexed fund must, for obvious legal reasons, continue to
replicate the index. Funds that are only partly indexed or that have not held themselves out as
having such a policy will have more freedom to change investments. Most funds are in fact only
parily indexed. See supra note 196.
214 On this view, managerial rejection of an indexing strategy is a cost paid by the beneficial
owners. Of course, in some cases, the fund strategy will simply be dictated by the fund's sponsor.
215 In some cases, however, beneficial owners may have a strategy selected for them. This is
likely to be true in the case of pension funds and life insurance companies, for example.
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commonly heard complaint is that institutional investors are forced into
adopting selection strategies that focus on short-term results, since fund
managers are evaluated by fund sponsors or their superiors on a
quarterly basis
21 6
While the great majority of studies on point suggest that
professional managers cannot earn abnormal trading returns, 217 there is
some recent evidence which suggests that at least some mutual fund
managers can "beat the market" and earn abnormal returns at least
sufficient to compensate investors for fund expenses, management fees,
and investment "loads." 218 Indeed, there is Canadian evidence that
some mutual fund managers earn abnormal returns that more than
compensate investors for management and load fees.219 Some of the
studies showing abnormal returns to mutual fund managers are suspect,
as the apparent abnormal return may be a product of misspecification of
the "normal" bench-mark return,220 although not all studies on point are
equally susceptible to bench-mark misspecification.221 If there are
indeed managers, however, who are able to "beat the market" by
exploiting private information, this obviously bolsters the argument that
the use of selection strategies is likely to persist. Indeed, at present, only
a small fraction of the Canadian institutional portfolio is indexed.2M
216 See, for example, M. ipton & S.A. Rosenblum, "A New System of Corporate
Governance: The Quinquennial Election of Directors" (1991) 58 U. Chli. L Rev. 187; R.H. Hayes &
WJ. Abernathy, "Managing Our Way to Economic Decline" (1980) Harv. Bus. Rev. 67; and M.E.
Porter, "Capital Choices: Changing the Way America Invests in Industry" (1992) 5:2 J. Applied
Corp. Fin. 4.
2 1 7 See supra note 206.
218 The American evidence includes R.T. Henriksson, "Market Timing and Mutual Fund
Performance: An Empirical Investigation" (1984) 57 J. Bus. 73; D. Hendricks, J. Patel & R.
Zeckhauser, "Hot Hands in Mutual Funds: The Persistence of Performance, 1974-87" (1990), [NBER
Working Paper 3389]; R.A. Ippolito, "Efficiency With Costly Information: A Study of Mutual Fund
Performance, 1965-1984" (1989) 104 Q. 3. Econ. 1; and W.N. Goetzman & R.G. Ibbotson, "Do
Winners Repeat? Patterns in Mutual Fund Behaviour" (Yale University, 1991) [Working Paper].
See also Fama, supra note 92 at 1605-07. For Canadian evidence, see Berkowitz & Kototowitz,
supra note 205. This evidence appears to be consistent with Grossman and Stiglitz's suggestion that
markets are characterized by an equilibrium amount of disequilibrium, yielding informed investors a
"normal" return on the acquisition of costly information. See SJ. Grossman & J.E. Stiglitz, "On the
Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Markets" (1980) 70 Am. Econ. Rev. 393; and see infra
notes 304-305.
219 Berkowitz & Kotowitz, ibid.
220 See G.P. Brinson, L.R. Hood & G.L. Beebower, "Determinants of Portfolio Performance"
(1986) 43 Fin. Anal. J. 39; and Fama, supra note 92 at 1605-1607.
221 See Berkowitz & Kotowitz, supra note 205.
2 2 2 Supra note 204.
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Further, where indexation is used, the norm in both Canada and the
United States is partial indexation, with selection strategies
complementing indexation.
Even supposing for the purposes of argument that many, or even
most, institutional funds will ultimately adopt an indexing strategy, it
does not follow that fund managers will routinely take less interest in the
quality of management. It is undoubtedly true that no manager of an
indexed fund can follow all of the investments in the fund.2m
Nonetheless, it is a mistake to believe that just because all fund
investments cannot be monitored, none will be monitored. Because an
indexing strategy removes the "exit" or sale option, the only way in which
the manager can improve fund performance, aside from attempting to
improve the efficiency of the system as a whole,224 is to engage in active
monitoring of some of the firms in the portfolio. In other words, fund
indexation is not inconsistent with, and may even enhance the likelihood
of, "targeting" strategies in which institutions single out particular firms
for special attention or active hands-on monitoring.225
223 Ile smaller the institution's holding, the greater the "free rider" problem associated with
institutional oversight. Montgomery's survey of Canadian institutional investors found that the
largest deterrents to shareholder activism, in rank order, were that activism was "too time
consuming," "too expensive," and the managers had "insufficient knowledge of company and
industry." Supra note 34 at 7.
224 Systemic improvements are the focus of the Gilson and Kraakman proposal. See Gilson &
Kraakman, supra note 32 (development of a class of professional directors). Gilson and Kraakman
argue (at 867) that, since increased performance of one firm in the indexed portfolio will only come
at the expense of other firms in the portfolio, the only way for an indexed investor to improve fund
performance "is by improving the corporate governance system rather than by attempting to
improve the management of particular companies." In my view, this overstates the case because it
assumes that improvements in single firm efficiency are always zero sum gains from a systemic point
of view. While clearly part of the gain may come at the expense of other firms in the index,
reductions in agency costs at particular firms, leading to enhanced profitability, are not likely to be
fully matched by commensurate reductions in profitability at other index firms. Moreover, the firms
that lose as a result of efficiency enhancements at other firms may be firms that are not in the index,
such as private or foreign firms.
225 Montgomery's survey of public and private pension funds and investment managers found
that "90 per cent of the large institutions [which are more likely to index at least part of their
portfolio] believe that institutional shareholders are likely to become more active in the future."
Montgomery, supra note 34 at 11. Montgomery also found that:
[t]he large institutions assigned the lowest mean score (2.4) to factors deterring activism,
followed by the small institutions (2.6) and finally medium institutions (2.8). This
suggests that deterrents to activism are viewed less importantly by large institutions....
Ibid. Moreover, 47 per cent of large institutions indicated a willingness to challenge
management initiatives with which they strongly disagreed, compared to only 25 per cent of medium
sized institutions and 20 per cent of small institutions. These statistics tend to refute the notion that
large institutional investors will either index or adopt a passive investment strategy and not engage
in active monitoring of management.
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The overall economic dividend of the adoption of targeting
strategies by a non-trivial number of institutional shareholders will be
significant, even assuming partial correlation of targeting decisions by
institutional investors. So long as there is a non-trivial random element
in institutional decisions to target particular firms, targeting strategies
will result in the monitoring of a large number of firms. 226
Coffee has forcefully argued that many institutions-including
banks, insurance companies, and mutual funds-cannot afford to
purchase large, illiquid blocks of securities because of a need to maintain
liquidity against the event of widespread withdrawals by investors or
policy holders. 227 This argument seems overdrawn. Unless it is likely
that withdrawals will force the wholesale, short-term liquidation of an
institutional fund, adequate liquidity can be supplied by keeping part of
the portfolio in liquid assets and devoting a part (perhaps even a
substantial part) to less liquid block holdings. Wholesale short-term
liquidation does not seem to be a realistic scenario for most institutional
investors for at least two reasons: (1) the low probability that market
performance will be so poor as to cause a run on the institution; and (2)
the existence of regulatory safeguards against institutional collapse,
including ex ante monitoring of institutional investors by regulatory
authorities, the intervention of bankruptcy, insolvency, and
reorganization laws designed to give the debtor breathing room to
reorganize and avoid collapse, and the likelihood of government bail-
outs expost 2 28
In addition, the existence of deposit insurance for deposit-taking
institutions greatly mitigates the cost of disastrous performance for
depositors and lessens the likelihood of a "run on the bank," thus
diminishing the need for liquidity. Thus, many institutional investors can
afford to purchase a substantial number of block interests without
risking economic ruin. Indeed, the comparatively small size of the
226 Indeed, it may well be that institutional investors will find that they can profit the most by
targeting firms that other institutional investors have avoided buying, both because the marginal
benefits of monitoring may be greatestin such cases and because the relative increase in the fund's
performance resulting from efficiency improvements will be the greatest. Black suggests that
institutional investors already divide the field, improving the efficacy of targeting. See Black, supra
note 1 at 579. For evidence that institutional investors adopt a heterogeneous variety of investment
strategies, see J. Lakonishok, A. Shleifer & R.W. Vishny, "The Impact of Institutional Trading on
Stock Prices" (1992) 32 J. Fin. Econ. 23.
2 2 7 Coffee, supra note 1 at 318-320.
228 The collapse of a number of Canadian trust companies in the past decade offers
confirming evidence. While heightened withdrawals preceded collapse, no serious "runs" have
occurred and liquidations have been effected in an orderly fashion by regulatory authorities.
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Canadian market has effectively forced all large institutions to purchase
substantial interests in many different companies2 29
The need for liquidity is roughly commensurate with the portion
of the institution's assets in obligations that will or may become due in
the short term. On this score, open-end mutual funds have the highest
need for liquidity. Life' insurance companies, however, hold mainly
stable and predictable long-term obligations,23 0 as do pension funds.
Closed-end mutual funds, which do not face demand withdrawals, do not
have any substantial need to maintain liquidity.23 1 This emphasizes that
the need for liquidity is not always compelling. 23 2
A further reason for believing that indexing is not incompatible
with institutional activism is that some management initiatives, like
poison pills, are likely to have a similar effect on share price for a wide
range of companies. Thus, a keen knowledge of the internal affairs of a
company proposing such an initiative is not necessary for the fund
manager to vote the fund's shares effectively. In fact, institutions in
both the U.S. and Canada have directed much of their attention to
specific types of governance issues, such as anti-takeover defenses and
dual class recapitalizations. 233
That indexing can, and does, coexist with passive or active
strategies (whether on a targeting basis or simply by dividing the
portfolio between indexing and selection strategies) is indicated by the
experience of the California Public Employees Retirement System
229 Although see Part II(K)(1), above (regulatory caps on equity interests of some
institutional investors).
230 A common explanation for the overrepresentation of life insurance companies in the
purchase of relatively illiquid private placements is the absence of a need for liquidity. See, for
example, Wruck, supra note 24. See also G.A. Jarrell, "The Economic Effects of Federal
Regulation of the Market for New Security Issues" (1981) 24 J. L. & Econ. 613 at 661 (life
insurance companies are the largest purchasers of private placements).
231 The argument that the need for liquidity does not exclude the holding of some sizeable
blocks is strengthened by American evidence that mutual funds, with the highest turnover rate of all
U.S. institutional investors, hold equity interests for an average of one year, "active" pension funds
hold investments on average for 1.9 years, and insurance companies for 2.5 years. See Froot, Perold
& Stein, supra note 100 at 52. Although the turnover rate is a somewhat loose proxy for liquidity
needs, it does supply some indication that holding some large blocks for long periods of time would
not be detrimental to institutional interests.
232 Some Canadian statutes have specific requirements to maintain part of the investment
portfolio in liquid assets. See, for example, OLTCA, supra note 182, s. 160, and R.R.O. 1990, Reg.
733, ss. 85-87.
233 See, for example, Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 32 at 868-876; and Koval, supra note 32.
There are exceptions to this rule, like the use of shareholder advisory committees and targeted
criticism of specific issuers. See text below.
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(CalPERS), one of the largest U.S. institutional investors.23 4 Because of
its size, a large percentage of the fund is indexed.23 5 Despite this,
CalPERS has been amongst the most active of all U.S. shareholders in
policing corporate managements.23 6 CalPERS in fact divides its
portfolio between indexing and selection strategies and also engages in
targeting.23 7 Most recently, CalPERS has begun a practice of publicly
announcing the names of companies it regards as "underperformers"
and targeting these for specific reforms.23 8
In Canada, the adoption of an active strategy is made all the
more likely by the ever-widening sphere of minority shareholder rights,
as well as the increasingly common requirement that a "majority of the
minority" be taken in connection with various types of corporate
transactions.P 9 Both of these developments give institutional
investors-not excluding those managing indexed funds-a good deal
more bargaining power vis-d-vis corporate management than was once
the case.240
Even assuming that funds that adopt an indexing strategy engage
neither in selecting investments on the basis of merit nor in monitoring
corporate managements, 241 an equilibrium will develop in which
indexing, passive, and active strategies coexist. Institutional investors are
the marginal investors whose research activities make securities markets
efficient. Thus, if no funds engage in selection strategies, this will create
massive pricing inefficiency. Institutions willing to adopt selection
strategies (i.e., engage in fundamental analysis) will then earn abnormal
trading returns. Similarly, if no funds engage in active monitoring of
management, funds that are willing to change their strategy and actively
2 34 CaIPERS has approximately $68 billion in assets under adminstration. See Koval, ibid. at
24.
235 As much as 85 per cent. See Clark, supra note 176 at 79-80. CaIPERS' average holding
period for shares is from six to ten years. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 32 at 863.
236 See Clark, ibid. See also Walker, supra note 204, indicating that many institutions divide
their portfolios between indexing and active strategies.
237 Black, supra note 1 at 568-69, 579, and at 582. Many other U.S. institutional investors
engage in targeting. TI
2 38 Waitzer, supra note 37 at 13.
239 See also supra note 45 and accompanying text (the influence of institutional investors is
often felt before the issue in question goes to a shareholder vote).
240 I do not mean to suggest that these requirements are an unambiguous good. 'See
Macintosh, supra note 65. Nonetheless, to the extent that they facilitate institutional oversight, this
must be added to the positive side of the ledger.
2 41 This is the view taken by Coffee, supra note 1 at 1341.
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monitor managements can earn abnormal returns.242 It is thus unlikely
in the extreme that all institutions will prefer indexation over passive and
active strategies. Indeed, the move towards indexation has prompted the
creation of at least one fund whose purpose is to identify "rotten apples"
in institutions' indexed holdings, and to improve their performance by
purchasing large stakes and seeking board representation or otherwise
improving performance. 243
This is not to say that institutional oversight is perfect? 44 There
are many defects. Aside from the fact that in a large portfolio, managers
cannot follow all investments closely, management sometimes has
leverage to exert commercial pressure on institutional investors to vote
with management. 245 Through agenda setting, bundling of shareholder
votes, and other techniques, management can sometimes derail
shareholder opposition. 46 Moreover, compensation schemes for fund
managers may not always create the appropriate incentives to engage in
active monitoring.247 Many have also raised concerns that the short-
term focus of institutional investors creates deficient incentives to
monitor for the long term.248 Others have raised the issue of whether
the interests of institutional investors and other investors might
sometimes diverge249 and have questioned whether institutions have the
appropriate expertise to assume an active managerial role.250 Further,
2 4 2 This is subject to Black and Coffee's caveat that an incentive to monitor will exist only for
institutions that are "overweight" in a particular stock, that is, that hold a higher percentage of the
stock than the average of their institutional rivals. See B.S. Black & J.C. Coffee, Jr., "Hail
Britannia?: Institutional Investor Behaviour Under Limited Regulation" (paper presented at the
conference on Relational Investing, 6-7 May 1993) [unpublished] (organized by The Institutional
Investor Project, Centre for Law and Economic Studies, Columbia University School of Law) at 85.
This idea is developed further, infra note 296 and accompanying text.
243 See Waitzer, supra note 45 at 14 (regarding the Lens Fund).
2 4 4 See generally Coffee, supra note 1.
245 See Part IV, below.
246 See, for example, J. Gordon, "Ties That Bond: Dual Class Common Stock and the
Problem of Shareholder Choice" (1988) 76 Cal. L. Rev. 1; and Black, supra note 1 at 560-562.
247See Coffee, supra note I at 1341-42 although see supra note 205.
248 See, for example, Coffee, ibil at 1324-25; and Porter, supra note 216 at 6.
249 See Coffee, ibid. at 1312 and at 1334-35. In my view this concern is not a serious one; in
most cases institutions and other minority interests will share the same goal-increasing the share
price.
2 5 0 It is a mistake, in my view, to believe that monitoring is only effective when it consists of
day-to-day monitoring of corporate affairs. Institutions can play an important role in scrutinizing
major corporate decisions (like the adoption of poison pills), even though the managers know little
or nothing about the day-to-day operation of the business. And, it is in relation to more important
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some funds, particularly public pension funds, are publicity shy and
prefer to avoid open confrontation with management 5 1 Money
managers may also fear a loss of access to "soft information" if they
oppose management, 252 or a political backlash for "excessive"
activism.S3s Many money managers may also have become captive to a
"culture of passivity."254 ' At least some of these factors undoubtedly
detract from the ability of institutions to play an active role in
monitoring corporate managements. Nonetheless, in my view, gloomy
scenarios that paint indexing strategies as the end of corporate
monitoring are simply overwrought. While institutional oversight is not
perfect, institutional investors, whether indexed or not, are more capable
monitors than retail investors.
IV. INSTITUTIONAL AGENCY COSTS AND CONFLICTS OF
INTEREST
An issue of great importance for further research is that of
agency problems internal to institutional investors. 255 The question is
whether the web of market and legal mechanisms that play a role in
disciplining fund managers is sufficient to align manager and owner
interests or whether it leaves fund managers room to act self-
interestedly, either by diverting fund assets for their own benefit or by
failing to manage diligently. Although a full discussion must await
another day, the potential for abuse is clear. For example, employee
stock ownership plans have occasionally been used in the U.S. as vehicles
for propping up incumbent management, rather than as a means for
decisions (or extremely poor corporate results) that institutional monitors have tended to get
involved. Thus, in my view, the concern about lack of institutional expertise tends to be much
overplayed. See Roe, "Legal Restraints," supra note 27 at 56.
251 This style is perhaps best exemplified in Canada by the Ontario Municipal Employee's
Retirement Fund. Other public pension funds, particularly the Caisse de Drp8t et Placement du
Quebec, have been much more openly active. This is not to say that oMnRS has not been effective
in monitoring corporate managements, however, only that they have adopted a more "backroom"
style of intervention.
252 "Soft" information is impressionistic information communicated to analysts through
conversations with senior managers, tours of company facilities, etc.
253 Black, supra note 1 at 565; and Coffee, supra note 1 at 1323.
254 Black, ibid. at 562-64.
255 See generally J. Heard & H. Sherman, Conflicts of Interest in the Proxy Voting System
(Investor Responsibility Research Center, 1987); Coffee, supra note 1 at 1321-22; and Black, ibid. at
595-608.
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securing the best interests of employee beneficial owners 25 6 Pension
fund purchases of own-firm shares may be used for the same purpose.
25 7
The same dangers exist in Canada. For example, the manager of the
pension fund of a large Canadian corporation recently pled guilty to
charges of misusing pension fund assets in an attempt to influence the
outcome of a battle for corporate control.25 8 In general, however, the
greatest danger may not be that managers will steal or otherwise misuse
fund assets, but that they will simply fail to exert maximum efforts to
secure good performance.25 9
In examining the potential agency problems arising within
institutional investors, the entire kaleidoscope of market and legal
controls, including possibilities for opportunistic misuse of funds and the
formation of self-interested coalitions between fund and corporate
managements, must be examined for each type of institutional investor.
Private pension funds appear to create the greatest possibilities for
abuse. 260 Employee beneficiaries do not typically have the power either
to direct investment strategy or to replace ineffective managers; thus one
potential source of oversight is non-existent. Nor, because of collective
action problems, do employee beneficiaries have incentives to monitor.
Further, since private pension funds are not subject to hostile takeovers
(unless, of course, the entire company is taken over and the trustees
replaced), the discipline exerted by control markets is removed 61
Finally, employees do not have the option of withdrawing their
investments and placing them with another fund, thereby removing
another important source of market discipline. On the conflicts side of
the ledger, pension money managers are frequently pressured by
management to take a pro-management stance, and will often do so for
256 See, for example, Shamrock Holdings, Inc. v. Polaroid Corp. (1989), 559 A.2d 278 (Del.
Ch.); and see Black, ibid. at 562.
25 7 See generally "Modem Corporation," supra note 193.
258 See R. v. Blair (1992), 7 O.R. (3d) 693 (Prov. Div.); "Enfield-Blair" Canadian Press (30
September 1991) No. 1643553 (QL); and "Enfield" (17 September 1991) No. 1638656 (QL).
2 5 9 See JA. Grundfest, "Subordination of American Capital" (1990) 27 J. Fin. Econ. 89 at 108
(arguing that institutional agency problems are more likely to arise in the form of a failure to act
diligently than in the form of a failure to act honestly, because fund managers have fewer
opportunities than corporate managers to divert fund assets for their own benefit).
260 See generally Roe, "Legal Restraints," supra note 27.
261 Although, of course, the trustees may be replaced other than in a hostile control battle
(ie., managerial markets are not inoperative).
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fear of losing pension management business2 62 Both because market
controls over manager performance leave some slack, and because of the
danger that pension fund assets will be misused, legal controls become
particularly important. For this reason, standards of fiduciary conduct
should be rigorously applied to pension fund managers 263 Legal rules
should also put as much'distance between corporate management and
pension fund managers as possible.264
Mutual funds present a very different case. Although it is not
likely that shareholders will displace management, mutual fund investors
are quick to vote with their feet in response to poor performance. This
renders legal controls less important.
Other institutional investors, like public pension funds, banks,
credit unions, and trust companies each present a unique combination
and potency of market controls and opportunities for self-favouring
behaviour by managers; thus each has differing needs for legal controls.
For example, public pension funds are generally immune to the sort of
management pressure that can be brought to bear by management on
banks and insurance companies by threats to withdraw current or future
business,265 but are vulnerable to political interference in investment
selectionm26
262 Black, supra note 1 at 596-598. Offsetting this danger is the incentive of corporate
management to maximize pension fund performance either to secure labour peace or (in defined
benefit plans) to minimize the probability that future corporate top-ups will be required (or, in
some jurisdictions, to maximize the size of the fund surplus that can be reappropriated to corporate
uses).
263 Allowing the corporation to reallocate pension fund surpluses of defined benefit plans to
corporate purposes as a matter of course will tend to reduce the dangers of managerial misdirection
of fund assets since it gives the corporation a more substantial stake in the performance of the fund.
264 To some extent, this has been done in the U.S. by rules that require pension funds to vote
their holdings and to vote in the best interests of fund beneficiaries. See Black, supra note 1 at 554
and at 607.
265 Public pension funds like the Ontario Municipal Employees' Retirement Fund and the
Caisse de D6p~t have been particularly active for this reason. Montgomery's survey found that 45
per cent of public pension funds indicated that they "will engage in some form of activism when they
strongly disagree with a key direction taken by management," whereas only 21 per cent of the
private sector pension funds surveyed indicated that they would do so. See Montgomery, supra note
34 at 11. Public pension funds appear to have been the most active institutional investors in the
U.S. as well. See Coffee, supra note 1 at 1288.
26 6 It is commonly suggested that the Caisse de D6p6t has bowed to political pressure and has
invested funds with aview not only to profit, but to fostering entrepreneurship in Quebec. It is clear
that this has sometimes been true. See, for example, P. Arbour, Quebec Inc. and the Temptation of
State Capitalism (Montreal: Robert Davies, 1993); "Caisse-Criticism," Canadian Press (26 July
1993) No. 1868371 (QL) (interference in Univa takeover bid in order to maintain Quebec
ownership of supermarket chains). Nonetheless, the Caisse's 11.7 per cent average annual return
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A discussion of the full legal ramifications of this interesting
problem are beyond the scope of this paper; nonetheless, it is clearly an
issue to which legislators and securities regulators will need to pay close
attention in the future.
V. THE DECLINING ROLE OF THE RETAIL INVESTOR,
MARKET LIQUIDITY, AND MARKET EFFICIENCY
As already indicated, one of the most important trends in
securities markets over the past four decades has been the relative
decline of the retail sector and the growing institutionalization of
securities markets 2 67 More than ownership is affected; a steadily higher
proportion of securities trading has been accounted for by institutional
investors,268 although the share of agency equity business transacted over
the TSE by retail investors has been stable since 1989.269
The question I wish to explore in this section is whether the
decline in retail participation will in any way be detrimental to securities
markets. I stfart out with the observation that there is no inherent value
over the past decade (versus 11.9 per cent for private pension funds) suggests that profit has
remained the primary investment objective. See "Caisse-Criticism," Canada Press (27 August 1993)
No. 1879103 (QL).
Montgomery's survey of institutional investors disclosed, however, that public sector pension
funds viewed publicity as a significant deterrent to investor activism, likely owing to the political
pressures that are sometimes brought to bear and the need to "uphold a positive public image." See
Montgomery, supra note 34 at 10. See also K.P. Ambachtsheer, "Transforming Pension Funds
From Cookie Jars to Cornucopia" (1991) 4:2 Can. Invt. Rev. 5.
267 See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text.
268 The growth in the proportion of trading accounted for by institutional investors is
indicated by the increasing percentage of agency equity business derived from institutional trading
between 1981 and 1992 for members of the Toronto Stock Exchange:
1981 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92(2ndQ)
Institutional 52 57 55 60 59 58 57 65 68 69 69 68
Retail 48 43 45 40 41 42 43 35 32 31 31 32
Source: Source ofAgency Equity Business, compiled by E. Fritz, Corporate Communications
Div., Toronto Stock Exchange.
Curiously, between 1983 and 1989, the percentage of Canadians investing directly in stock
market equities increased from 9 per cent to 16 per cent of the population. See The Toronto Stock
Exchange, Canadian Shareowners: Their Profile and Attitudes (Toronto: The Toronto Stock
Exchange, 1989) [hereinafter Canadian Shareowners] at 8. This suggests either that the decline of
the retail sector has been relative, rather than absolute, or that the average retail stake invested in
the stock market has dramatically declined. Unfortunately, the TSE report does not indicate (nor
will the TSE make public) the dollar volume of retail and institutional trading done by member firms,
making it difficult to identify which of these two hypotheses is correct
269 Fritz, ibid.
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in having retail investors in the marketplace. Rather, the argument in
favour of preserving a retail sector must be that retail investors play an
instrumental role in improving the allocative or transactional efficiency
of securities markets. They might do this by expanding the pool of
savings that is directed into real investment, by enhancing the efficiency
with which capital is allocated to competing investment projects, by
augmenting the accuracy of the price discovery mechanism, or by
supplementing the liquidity of secondary financial markets. I will argue
in this section that the decline of the retail sector has in fact neither
diminished the pool of savings available for investment nor imperilled
the allocative efficiency of primary markets. Nor has it adversely
affected market liquidity or had a negative impact on the efficiency of
the price discovery mechanism. Indeed, in recent history, liquidity and
pricing efficiency appear to have improved.
A. The Pool of Savings Available for Investment
The withdrawal of the retail investor from the market does not
mean that the pool of savings represented by such investors will no
longer be available for real investment. Withdrawing investors do not
hide their cash under a mattress; rather, they continue to invest their
savings in mutual funds, pension funds, bank accounts, life insurance
policies, trust funds, and the like. In other words, the withdrawal of the
retail investor has been, and will continue to be, associated with
increased intermediation rather than disinvestment.270 The financial
intermediaries that are the beneficiaries of this increased intermediation
will continue to direct the pool of savings into real investment.2 71
270 See generally R. Clark, "The Four Stages of Capitalism" (1981) 94 Harv. L. Rev. 961
(noting a long-run trend towards increasing financial intermediation of savings). See also D. Kelly,
supra note 1 at 4-5 (retail investors have shifted into mutual funds, pension funds, and insurance);
D. Kelly, "Bay Street discounters riding high: No-frills brokers win fifteen per cent of market" The
Financial Post (20 January, 1992) 10; and L Grogan, "Private financing to dominate in the '90s:
study" The Financial Post (26 July 1990) 13. The increasing intermediation through life insurance
companies, one of the largest institutional investors, arises from the fact that as Canada's
population ages, an increasing share of the population is buying life insurance. See J. McNish,
"Private placements threaten capital markets" The Globe and Mail (23 October 1989) Bi at B5.
The aging of the population is also a factor in the growing size of pension funds.
271 There is some danger that limits on institutional investing may result in some inefficiency
in the mix of economic activities funded (directly and indirectly) by savings (for example, by biasing
investment decisions towards government securities, mortgages, etc.). This is an added reason to
constrain institutional selection of investments as little as possible. See above, Part II(K)(7).
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While institutional investors are active purchasers of initial
public offerings (npo), the very smallest nos depend mainly or exclusively
on retail purchasers. Thus, the argument that disinvestment will occur
appears to be strongest in relation to small firm ipos. However, there is
ample reason to believe that retail investors will not desert small
business n'os. Although institutional investors have trading advantages
over retail investors in relatively liquid public markets, the advantage is
reversed in the case of smaller firms with relatively illiquid trading. In
part, this is because the opportunity costs of becoming informed about
small capitalization (small cap) issuers are less for retail than for
institutional investors.272 It is also because the very act of trading large
institutional blocks may temporarily affect the price of the securities
bought or sold, resulting in an implicit trading tax. This tax is more
severe for comparatively illiquid small cap issuers,273 and it is for this
272 There is less publicly available information concerning smaller firms than large, and such
information is more costly to obtain. See, for example, Arbel, Carvell & Strebel, supra note 10; and
S.E. Stickel, "The Effect of Value Line Investment Survey Rank Changes on Common Stock
Prices" (1985) 14 J. Fin. Econ. 121. while this equally affects both retail and institutional buyers, it
is likely to have a particular impact on institutions. Given that the average institutional investment
in a large firm will exceed that in a small firm-a condition that probably does not hold for retail
investors--the relative costliness of acquiring information in a small firm is likely to be greater per
dollar of investment for institutional traders.
In addition, the implicit institutional entry and exit tax, referred to in the text below, will be
greater for smaller issuers. Thus, investments in information concerning small firms will yield a
comparatively low expected return for institutional traders.
273 A number of factors pertinent to small capitalization issuers will widen bid/ask spreads,
and hence diminish liquidity. These include a small number of shareholders (H. Demsetz, "The
Cost of Transacting" (1968) 82 Q. J. Econ. 33); small transaction volume (K.D. Garbade, Securities
Markets (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1982); and a comparatively poorly developed information record
concerning the issuer (T.C. Copeland & D. Galai, "Information Effect on the Bid-Ask Spread"
(1983) 38 J. Fin. Econ. 1457; and IR. Glosten & P.R. Milgrom, "Bid, Ask and Transaction Prices in
a Specialist Market with Heterogeneously Informed Traders" (1985) 14 J. Fin. Econ 71). For all
these reasons, small capitalization issuers are likely to be relatively illiquid, and illiquidity is a cost to
all investors. See Y. Amihud & H. Mendelson, "Asset Pricing and the Bid-Ask Spread" (1986) 15 J.
Fin. Econ. 223 [hereinafter "Asset Pricing"]; and Y. Amihud & H. Mendelson, "The Effects of
Beta, Bid-Ask Spread, Residual Risk, and Size on Stock Returns" (1989) 44 . Fin. 479 [hereinafter
"Effects of Beta"]. However, illiquidity has a more pronounced impact on institutional (or other
large block) traders for two reasons. First, the larger the block being traded, the greater will be the
difficulty of finding traders on the other side of the market to absorb the block. This will lead to an
enhanced probability that price concessions will be necessary to induce other investors (or market
making dealers) to trade. Second, large block traders are more likely than other traders to have
privileged access to inside information, and a purchase (or a sale) thus has a higher probability of
being construed as a signal of inside information that results in price change. The second factor is
not as likely to be as important as the first, however. See Parts 11(3), 11(4), and 11(7) above,
especially notes 89-93 and accompanying text (institutional traders not likely to have inside
information).
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reason that most institutional investors tend not to invest in such firms 274
(although some institutions have attempted to capitalize on the
apparently superior risk-adjusted returns of smaller issuers2 75 by
marketing funds that invest in small cap issuers). The relative illiquidity
of small cap issuers has a much more modest impact on small lot retail
traders. Finally, many retail investors undoubtedly derive utility from
investigating and investing in small businesses, a benefit not shared by
institutional investors2 76 Thus, my guess is that retail investors will
274 The magnitude of the entry/exit tax for large issuers can easily be overstated. In his
Canadian study, Close concluded that "Canadian institutional investors trade a large value of stock
with little adverse price effect." Close, supra note 209 at 56. Likewise, Montgomery found that:
large institutions ... accorded considerable importance to the ready availability of
alternative investments as a deterrent to activism. This would indicate that contrary to an
opinion held by many, the Canadian equity markets are liquid, and despite the high
degree of corporate concentration, there are other Canadian equity investment
alternatives available to a large institutional shareholder.
Montgomery, supra note 34 at 11. She also found that "difficulty in selling holdings" was
ranked only sixth by the institutional investors in the survey as a reason for becoming involved in the
direction of a company. /id, at 7.
There is evidence, however, that the entry/exit tax is larger for small capitalization issuers
without substantial public floats. Close, ib i Indeed, empirical evidence on market price reaction
to institutional block trades almost certainly understates the magnitude of the entry/exit tax for
smaller issuers. Since institutional investors will avoid purchasing the smallest issuers, block trades
in these issuers will not be observed, biasing block trade samples away from firms with the highest
cost of block trading. Montgomery's survey of institutional investors suffers from a similar selection
bias.
It is clear that institutional investors tend to avoid small issuers. For example, Lakonishok, et
aL, found that 97 per cent of the institutional purchasing in their sample was confined to the largest
two quintiles of NYSE, AmEx, and OTC firms by market value. See Lakonishok, et aL, supra note 226.
Similarly, using discriminant analysis, Hessel and Norman found that institutional investors avoid
small capitalization issuers. See CA. Hessel & M. Norman, "Financial Characteristics of Neglected
and Institutionally Held Stocks" (1992) 7 J. Acct. Aud. & Fin. 313. Canadian evidence that
institutional investors purchasing private placement securities prefer the securities of larger issuers
may be found in MJ. Gordon & A.K. Srivastava, The Structure of Price Discounts on Private Equity
Placements (16 December 1991) [unpublished].
The difference in the severity of the entry/exit tax between holdings in small and large firms
suggests that Coffee somewhat overstates the case in positing a systematic trade-off between
liquidity and control See Coffee, iupra note 1. There does not appear to be a serious trade-off for
holdings in large firms.
275 See infra note 305 and accompanying text.
276 Fischer Black was perhaps the first to suggest the somewhat iconoclastic notion that one
argument of the investor's utility function is securities trading itself. See F. Black, "Noise" (1986) 41
J. Fin. 529 at 534. This argument seems to make most sense for retail investors, and particularly so
in the context of initial public offerings, where the excitement and promise of a new issue are likely
to yield the highest trading utility.
Although small capitalization funds can offer retail investors superior diversification, they
cannot replicate the utility associated with individual stock-picking. Moreover, because of the
comparatively large size of the holdings of small cap funds, they pay a higher liquidity tax. See supra
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continue to dominate the small business IPo market for the foreseeable
future.2 7
7
Even supposing that small cap issuers will encounter increasing
difficulty raising capital from the retail sector, the extent to which this is
likely to affect small business financings can easily be overstated. So
long as small business investments promise an adequate risk-adjusted
return, the withdrawal of the retail investor will be met by the entrance
of other investors. Indeed, since the withdrawal of retail investors is
likely to be associated with increased financial intermediation,
institutional investors like pension funds, mutual funds, and life
insurance companies will have even larger pools of capital to invest.
Because of this, they will almost certainly be forced to commit funds to
smaller issuers.278 This will increase the liquidity of investments in small
cap issuers, which will induce yet other institutional investors to invest in
such firms.279 Thus, any withdrawal of the retail investor from the small
business sector will likely be met, at least to some extent, by an enhanced
role for institutional investors.
In net, it therefore seems unlikely that a withdrawal of direct
investment by retail investors will diminish the aggregate pool of savings
ultimately available for real investment, either for small businesses, or
generally.
notes 273-274 and accompanying text.
277 To the extent that the explosion in investment funds has enhanced the ability of retail
investors to diversify their investment portfolios, they can arguably afford to put more money in
small cap new issues and still realize an acceptable portfolio risk/return trade-off. See Khoury &
Martel, supra note 1 (indicating that in 1978 there were seventy-seven xic investment funds worth
about $2 billion; by 1988 this had grown to over 500 funds worth over $20 billion).
278 The preferred instrument by which institutions supply capital to small issuers is the private
placement. In the short term, both the recession and the fallout from the U.S. savings and loan
debacle have tended to drive institutional investors back to so-called investment grade securities.
See S. Bavaria, "Private Placement Investors Tiptoeing Back to High-Yield" (1992) 58:7 Investment
Dealers Digest 18; D. Robinson, "Europe to the Rescue" (1991) Euromoney 73; S. Bavaria,
"Hidden Treasure in Private Placements" (1991) 57:47 Investment Dealers Digest 18. However, in
the long run, both these factors are likely to diminish in importance. See AJ. Sherman, "Private
Placements" (1991) 39:4 Dunn & Bradstreet Rep. 46.
279 By increasing liquidity, trading begets further trading, which further increases liquidity,
which further increases trading, etc. In order to get this chain reaction, however, it would appear
that there must be a critical mass of trading. See E. Kirzner, "The Unfolding Derivatives Story:
Abroad and in Canada" (1988) 1:1 Can. Invt. Rev. 73 at 77.
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B. The Efficiency with which Funds are Directed to Real Investment
Projects
As indicated above, the decline of the retail sector has been
associated with commensurate growth in the institutional sector.
Assuming that this trend continues, this means that more and more of
the pool of savings will be controlled and directed by professional
managers, who almost certainly have an advantage over retail investors
in distinguishing good investment projects from bad.28 0 For example,
assuming that institutional investors gradually replace retail investors in
funding small business r'os, professional money managers will bring to
bear higher levels of expertise, experience, and business acumen in
pricing and selecting attractive investment opportunities. Thus, it is
likely that market institutionalization will improve the efficiency with
which savings are directed to competing investment projects.
C. The Efficiency of the Price Discovery Mechanism
Will the decline of the retail sector impair the price discovery
mechanism? Because of a number of factors working in contrary
directions, theoretical predictions are difficult. However, evidence
presented below suggests that the increasing role of the institutional
investor has in fact enhanced market efficiency.
Increasing institutionalization of the market will tend to increase
the size of the average shareholding. Prima facie, this will tend to result
in the execution of fewer trades, an increase in the average time between
trades, and an increasing "lumpiness" to public market order flow. If so,
there is a danger that the posted market price will reflect stale
information, rather than the best information currently available. If this
is indeed the case, then some impairment of market efficiency might
result.
However, there are two mitigating factors. One is that actual
trading is not necessary for publicly available information to be
impounded in bid and ask prices posted by market makers and other
280 Although the bulk of the evidence indicates that professional traders do not on average
"beat the market" (see supra notes 216-220 and accompanying text), it is nonetheless the profit-
seeking efforts of professional and institutional traders that render securities markets efficient. This
is the paradox of market efficiency. See supra note 278 and accompanying text.
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traders.28 1 The second is that all classes of institutional investors in the
U.S., save passively managed pension funds and foundations, engage in
more frequent trading than retail investors?2 Canadian institutional
investors appear to have lower turnover rates than their American
counterparts,28 3 but also likely engage in more frequent trading than
retail investors. Other things being equal, more frequent trading will
enhance market efficiency (as well as market liquidity).
28 4
The danger to market efficiency, however, is supplemented to an
uncertain extent by the fact that market institutionalization may affect
the balance between "informed" and "noise" traders in securities
markets. Informed traders trade on real information-information not
already impounded in securities prices-while noise traders trade on
spurious information, or information that is already reflected in market
pricesP 5 The role of noise traders in securities markets is not
completely understood. The presence of noise traders offers informed
traders profit opportunities and hence induces them to acquire
information and to trade on it s86 This enhances market efficiency.
However, excessive noise trading may move securities prices away from
fundamental values for short or even long periods of time. 7 Noise
trading may also increase market volatility.8  The trade-off between
factors that enhance and factors that diminish market efficiency suggests
281 See, for example, N. Hakansson, G. Kunkel & J. Ohlson, "Sufficient and Necessary
Conditions for Information to have Social Value in Pure Exchange" (1982) 37 J. Fin. 1169.
282 See Froot, Perold & Stein, supra note 94 at 52. The fact that institutional investors
account for a much higher percentage of trading volume than market ownership is also indicative of
the higher average turnover rate of institutional portfolios. See, for example, Hessel & Norman,
supra note 274 at 313 (U.S. institutions account for 40 per cent of market ownership, but 70 per cent
of trading).
283 Froot, Perold & Stein, ibic at 49.
284 The enhanced liquidity may unevenly affect institutional and retail traders. Infra notes
293-296 and accompanying text.
285 For a discussion of the role of noise traders in modern markets, see Black, supra note 276
at 531; and Froot, Perold & Stein, supra note 94 at 44.
286 Black, ibid. at 531.
2 87 The view that excessive noise trading drives stock prices away from fundamentals is
consistent with the view that securities markets are driven by "fads," "fashions," or "bubbles." See,
for example, RJ. Shinler, Market Volatility (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1990).
2 88 Shiller, ibid.; and Black, supra note 276 at 533-34. See, however, K.R1 French & R. Roll,
"Stock Return Variances: The Arrival of Information and the Reaction of Traders" (1986) 17 L Fin.
Econ. 5, which presents evidence that noise trading has a relatively minor impact on securities
prices.
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that there is an optimal balance between noise and informed traders in
securities markets.
Our incomplete understanding of the role of noise trading
creates two problems in analyzing the effect of institutionalization on
market efficiency. First, it is not entirely clear if institutional investors
are more or less likely than retail investors to be noise traders. Some
have suggested that institutional investors are prone to "herding" and/or
"positive feedback" trading strategies that are divorced from investment
fundamentals, thereby destabilizing stock prices and increasing market
volatility.289 On the other hand, professional money managers likely
have greater and more timely access to fundamental information,
suggesting that they are more likely to be informed traders.
Second, because the optimum balance between noise and
informed traders is unclear, it is difficult to know whether a particular
change in the balance will result inmovement towards, or away from, the
optimum.
These ambiguities suggest that only empirics can answer the
question of whether market efficiency is helped or hindered by market
institutionalization. Figures presented in the following section show that
throughout the 1980s, while retail trading declined relative to
institutional trading, TSE liquidity and price continuity increased
markedly. This is consistent with U.S. evidence (also discussed below)29°
that suggests that market institutionalization has been associated with
enhanced, rather than diminished, market efficiency.
D. Market Liquidity and the Cost of Capital
A concern that is closely related to a loss of market efficiency is
that the withdrawal of retail investors will result in impairment of
secondary market liquidity, given that institutional trading tends to result
in a smaller number of larger trades, adding lumpiness (and hence
289 "Herding" behaviour occurs when investors engage in parallel trading in the same stocks.
"Positive feedback" trading occurs when investors purchase kecurities which have performed well in
the past, or sell those that have performed poorly. Models of herding and/or positive feedback
behaviour are presented (inter alia) by K.A. Froot, D.S. Scharfstein & J.C. Stein, "Herd on the
Street: Informational Inefficiencies in a Market with Short-Term Speculation" (1992) 47 J. Fin.
1461; and D.M. Cutler, J.M. Poterba & L.H. Summers, "Speculative Dynamics and the Role of
Feedback Traders" (1990) 80 Amer. Econ. Rev. 63.
290 See Part V(D), below.
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illiquidity) to the order flow. Illiquidity is costly to investors,291 since the
inability to liquidate securities to satisfy an immediate need for cash
creates an opportunity cost 92 In addition, illiquidity is associated with
larger bid/ask spreads, since market-making dealers must anticipate
holding securities for a longer period of time before resale.293 Because
illiquidity is costly to investors, it lowers the expected return to holding
illiquid securities. This, in turn, increases the average cost of capital
faced by the issuers of such securities, impairing the process by which
savings are converted into real investment. 294
However, it should be kept in mind that many large institutions,
such as insurance companies and pension funds, trade mainly or
exclusively with other institutions, not only because it is expensive and
time consuming to break large institutional blocks into smaller packages
for the retail trade, but because throwing large blocks on the public
market may depress the market price.295 Thus for institutional investors,
the withdrawal of the retail investor will have comparatively little effect
on market liquidity. Any reduction in liquidity will mainly affect retail
investors, investment advisors, and institutions like trust companies that
manage relatively small portfolios and that engage in crossover trading
with retail investors. Further, as indicated above, institutional investors
trade more frequently than retail investors. 96 This offsetting factor may
mean that market institutionalization will result in increased market
liquidity for institutional traders.
The evidence indeed suggests that market institutionalization has
been associated both with enhanced liquidity and pricing efficiency.
Although the relative size of the retail sector shrunk during the 1980s,
Table 1 indicates that both the liquidity and price continuity of the ISE
improved over this period. This is consistent with evidence from the
United States. For example, Jones, et al., found that a higher volume of
institutional trading was associated with lower bid/ask spreads, as well as
291 See generally Amihud & Mendelson, "Asset Pricing" and "The Effects of Beta" supra
note 273; K.H. Wruck, "Equity Ownership Concentration and Firm Value" (1988) 23 J. Fin. Econ.
3. For Canadian evidence on the value of liquidity, see Gordon & Srivastava, supra note 274.
292 See Amihud & Mendelson, ibid.
293 The longer the period during which the dealer holds a given security, the greater the risk
that the market price will change adversely, resulting in trading loses. Ibid
294 In a nutshell, increased illiquidity lowers transactional efficiency, which in turn impairs the
achievement of allocative efficiency.
2 95 Supra note 209, and notes 273-274 and accompanying text.
296 Supra notes 282-283 and accompanying text.
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lower market volatility (both over time and cross-sectionally)
297
Similarly, a study by Lakonishok, et al., found little evidence to support
the hypothesis that institutional traders engage in herding or positive
feedback trading, even in smaller stocks 98 Indeed, the Lakonishok
study suggests that, at least in larger stocks, institutions tend to stabilize
the market by engaging in negative-feedback trading,299 and also appear
to adopt a heterogeneous variety of trading strategies. This evidence
suggests that institutional traders are informed traders whose trading
activities improve market efficiency and liquidity. Thus, by improving
transactional efficiency, market institutionalization is likely to have a
favourable effect on the cost of capital and to enhance allocative
efficiency.3s In the end, the decline of the retail investor may threaten
the liquidity of investment bankers' bank accounts more than that of
securities markets 301 Regulatory intervention is not indicated.302
297j. Jones, K. Lehn & J.H. Mulherin, "Institutional Ownership of Equity: Effects on Stock
Market Liquidity and Corporate Long-Term Investments," in Sametz, ed., supra note 1 at 115, For
a contrary view, see LI. Summers, "The Case for a Securities Transactions Excise Tax," in Sametz,
ed., ibid.at 128. See also "Three Comments on Economic Implications of Alternative Portfolio
Policies of Institutional Investors," in Sametz, ed., ibid. at 159.
298 Lakonishok, Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 226.
299 Negative-feedback trading occurs when an investor buys losers and sells winners, trading
contrary to prevailing trends. This is also sometimes referred to as "contrarian" trading.
300 A further benefit associated with market institutionalization is the economies of scale that
result from trading larger blocks, leading to lower aggregate trading costs. These economies of
scale are reflected in the lower unit trading costs experienced by institutional investors.
301 Retail trading has been a-fertile source of both employment and profits for the investment
banking industry. Kelly, supra note 1 at 5. While those in the industry tend to dispute the greater
profitability of retail brokerage, it makes sense to believe that brokers would prefer a large number
of small trades with retail investors to a small number of large trades with institutional investors;
this will result in more trades, and hence more work for brokers. Moreover, institutions have
sufficient market power to negotiate commissions aggressively, and conventional wisdom suggests
that institutional commissions are low margin transactions. Finally, international competition for
securities business in Canada has mainly by-passed the retail brokerage business, thus reducing
competitive pressures (and likely increasing margins) relative to other aspects of the securities
industry. See Andrews, supra note 1 at 1, and at 12-14.
Indeed, in the past ten years or so, as retail investors have been withdrawing from the market,
international competition for securities business has intensified, and as bought deals with
institutional investors have become common, commissions have accounted for a steadily smaller
share of industry revenue. Kelly, ibid. at 4.
302 The case against regulatory intervention (even assuming that institutionalization impairs
retail market liquidity) is strengthened by the availability of a self-help strategy for retail investors,
namely, the purchase of highly liquid market indices, mutual funds, and similar vehicles offered by
financial intermediaries.
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TABLE 1
Year Market Deptha Price Continuityb Market Spreadsc
1980 87.01 79.66 .514
1981 88.60 80.67 .469
1982 89.92 83.33 .412
1983 90.78 83.83 .357
1984 96.62 94.32 .327
1985 96.62 94.43 .288
1986 96.25 94.14 .295
1987 94.69 92.88 .308
1988 97.88 96.75 .297
1989 98.58 97.67 .248
1990 98.43 97.34 .280
1991 98.49 97.64 .270
Notes: (a) per cent of volume that occurs within $0.125, or one-eighth of a
point from the previous sale.
(b) per cent of transactions that occur within $0.125, or one-eighth of
a point from the previous order.
(c) the average price difference between the best bid and ask over a
given period of time.
Source: Figures furnished by Michael Ackers, Toronto Stock Exchange.
VI. INSTITUTIONAL INDEXATION AND MARKET
EFFICIENCY
In Part III, above, the effect of institutional indexation on
corporate monitoring was considered. In this section, the related issue
of whether institutional indexing will impair market efficiency is
explored.
As a general matter, it is only by means of the profit-seeking
activities of institutional traders and other sophisticated investors and
analysts that securities prices are made efficient. These investors and
analysts attempt to identify overvalued and undervalued securities and,
in the process of doing so, increase the extent to which fundamental
information is uncovered and impounded in securities prices. Because
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indexed traders do not choose stocks on the basis of fundamentals but
on the basis of their participation in a market index, indexation might
pose some threat to market efficiency. Similarly, indexed investing may
negatively affect market liquidity to the extent that it results in reduced
trading. Arguably, the threat to both pricing efficiency and liquidity will
be greatest in relation to small capitalization issuers, since institutional
investors adopting an indexing strategy will tend to focus their interest
on large companies such as those that make up the TSE 35.303 Other
things being equal, this may tend to increase the size of the second
market relative to the first.
If the adoption of indexing strategies initially results in less
fundamental research, however, and reduced market efficiency, there is
a self-correcting mechanism. This mechanism is reflected in Grossman
and Stiglitz' solution to the paradox of market efficiency.3 04 The
paradox is this: it is only through the activities of traders seeking
arbitrage opportunities that markets are made efficient. However, once
markets are completely efficient, no trader has an incentive to expend
effort to identify overvalued and undervalued securities, since all
securities are correctly priced. Thus, the very activity that makes
securities markets efficient destroys the incentive to make securities
markets efficient.
The "solution" to the paradox is that securities markets can
never be completely efficient. Rather, an "efficient" market is
characterized by an equilibrium amount of disequilibrium, in which
those engaged in costly efforts to identify overvalued and undervalued
securities earn a "normal" rate of return.
Thus, assuming that more and more institutions adopt indexing
strategies (and do little or no fundamental research), any impairment of
market efficiency will be only short-run in nature. Diminished efficiency
will enhance the arbitrage opportunities available to traders engaging in
fundamental research. This will in turn induce these traders to devote
more resources to identifying over- and undervalued securities.
This initially suggests that increases in institutional indexation
will result in a higher degree of separation between those pursuing
indexing and selection strategies. Some institutional investors will index
and, because the index is weighted towards larger firms, these funds will
purchase mostly large capitalization issuers. To the extent that this
creates arbitrage opportunities, others will exploit these opportunities by
303 Supra notes 273 and 274 and accompanying text.
304 Grossman & Stiglitz, supra note 218.
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adopting selection strategies. Because the arbitrage opportunities will
be greatest for smaller firms, these funds will pay particular attention to
small cap issuers.
In fact, as indicated earlier, few institutions are fully indexed, and
it is not unlikely that many institutions will pursue a bifurcated strategy
in which part of the portfolio is indexed and part is selected on the basis
of fundamentals. Thus, the separation of trading strategies may occur as
much within institutions as between institutions. Overall, there seems
little reason to believe that the trend towards indexation will impair
market efficiency even for small cap issuers.
In fact, there is evidence that even as indexing strategies have
grown in popularity, many institutions have focused more, rather than
less attention on small cap and "neglected" firms.305 This increased
attention augments market efficiency and increases the liquidity of such
companies.
And, perhaps most importantly, evidence presented earlier
suggests that the pricing efficiency and liquidity of both Canadian and
American securities markets increased through the 1980s, a period
during which indexing strategies greatly increased in popularity30 6 Thus,
it seems unlikely that institutional indexing will jeopardize either
efficiency or liquidity.
It is important that the courts recognize that indexing, passive,
and active strategies may all form part of a prudent institutional
investment strategy. In particular, prudence must be judged in the
context of the portfolio as a whole, and not on an investment-by-
investment basis. Moreover, while fund diversification is obviously an
important component of a prudent investment strategy, dedicating part
of an institutional portfolio to the purchase of risky or large stakes is not
by itself incompatible with the achievement of adequate diversification
305' Brancato, supra note I at 21. Evidence showing that small or neglected firms on average
earn higher risk-adjusted returns has no doubt supplied a potent stimulus to investigate small or
neglected firms. See, for example, R. Banz, "The Relationship Between Return and Market Value
of Common Stocks" (1981) J. Fin. Econ. 3; M.R. Reinganum, "A Revival of the Small-Firm Effect"
(1992) 18 J. of Port. Man. 55; Arbel, Carvell & Strebel, supra note 10; and L.S. Speidell,
"Embarrassment and Riches: The Discomfort of Alternative Investment Strategies," in Sametz, ed.,
supra note 1 at 78.
Indeed, increasing institutional interest in small firms has apparently tended to dissipate the
superior risk-adjusted returns earned by these firms. See Fama, supra note 92 at 1587-88; and
Speidell, ibid. This is consistent with the hypothesis that the higher expected returns of smaller
firms are at least partly "exploitable" and not simply artifacts of trading costs or mismeasurement of
risk.
306 See supra notes 297-300 and accompanying text, and Table 1.
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or the construction of a safe portfolio3 07 The larger the fund, the
greater the leeway that must be accorded the investor to hold risky
and/or large stakes in some firms. The courts must also recognize that
making shareholder proposals, nominating directors, participating in
proxy contests, and generally engaging in active efforts to influence
management can also form part of a prudent management policy.
Finally, the courts should avoid placing inordinate reliance on past
investment practices in deciding the content of the prudent portfolio
standard. Such practice has been coloured by restrictive legal for life
rules308 and for this reason investment managers tended to focus on the
safety of individual investments, rather than on the portfolio as a
whole.3 09
In the end, indexing, passive, and active investment strategies all
play an important role in securities markets, and it must be the market,
rather than the law, which decides which strategy a particular fund
adopts.
As a final observation, attempts to force institutional investors to
"pass through" votes to beneficial owners should be staunchly resisted,
since this will destroy the advantage of concentrated share ownership
(and increased monitoring) brought about by market
institutionalization.31 0
307 See supra notes 192-193 and accompanying text.
308 See Part II(K)(4), above.
309 bid.
310 On U.S. efforts in this direction, see D.M. Walker, "The Increasing Role of Pension Plans
in the Capital Markets and in Corporate Governance Matters," in Sametz, ed., supra note 1, 34 at
42. Note that "National Policy Statement 41: Shareholder Communications" (1987), 10 O.S.C.B.
6306 requires intermediaries to passthrough proxy materials to beneficial owners. When beneficial
owners fail to return voting instructions, the intermediary may not vote the shares. This has the
effect of completely sterilizing the votes attached to shares of unresponsive shareholders. This may
not be inappropriate, if, as some have suggested, the tendency of intermediaries is to vote with
management because of a desire to secure business (for example, underwriting contracts) from
corporate issuers. See Black, supra note 1 at 560-61 and 603-04. However, if confidential voting is
instituted (as recommended in the text), it would be far better to allow intermediaries to vote the
shares of unresponsive shareholders. This would concentrate voting power in the hands of
knowledgeable parties with an ability to add to corporate monitoring, rather than sterilizing the
votes of unresponsive shareholders. Indeed, it would be better yet to remove the obligation to pass
through proxy materials, and to allow an intermediary to vote shares absent specific instructions
from the owner.
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VII. RETAIL INVESTORS AND THE FEDERAL PROPOSALS TO
AMEND THE INSIDER TRADING LEGISLATION
Concerns about the declining retail sector were one of the
inspirations behind the federal government's recent proposals to amend
the insider trading provisions of the Canada Business Corporations Act.
Citing a IsE study, the proposal states that:
[flor those people who do not own stocks, a major factor behind their decision was their
growing concern about insider trading. The survey results may suggest that many non-
shareowners believe investors need inside information to make money in stocks. 311
As argued above, one objection to this view is that the withdrawal of
retail investors is not necessarily a development to be lamented. But
more fundamentally, the connection between retail participation in
securities markets and insider trading is tenuous at best. The TSE study
cited by the proposal in fact draws a rather weak connection between
retail participation and insider trading 1 2 Further, it is simply wrong to
assert that it is necessary to have inside information in order to make an
attractive return in the stock market 3 13 There is recent evidence that
311 See Insider Trading and the Canada Business CorporationsAct (Ottawa: Ministry of Supply
and Services Canada, 1991) at 3-4.
312 In the part of the TSE survey cited by the federal proposal, non-shareholders were asked to
agree or disagree with a variety of statements about why they owned no stock. Fifty-four per cent of
the respondents agreed with the statement that one needs inside information to make money in
stocks. However, because respondents were asked to agree or disagree with a variety of statements,
there is a channelling of responses towards the proffered categories; one does not know how many
people, left to their own devices, would have offered "insider trading" as a reason for not owning
stock. More importantly, there were thirteen possible reasons for not investing in the stock market
with which respondents could agree or disagree. Agreement with any one of these does not indicate
whether the respondent had a weak or a strong belief in the accuracy of the statement, or how an
individual would rank-order the reasons for not trading. In fact, there is some indication that other
factors are more important, insofar as this can be judged from the percentage of those surveyed who
responded affirmatively to particular items. Seventy-six per cent agreed with the statement that
they did not invest in the stock market because they did not have enough money at the present time;
64 per cent indicated that they did not have enough information, and 59 per cent indicated that
they did not know how the stock market works. See Canadian Shareowners, supra note 268 at 24-25.
This last datum confirms the obvious: that the surveyed group, non-shareholders, are the least likely
to have any familiarity with the stock market. For reasons that have nothing to do with insider
trading (and much to do with household income: see ibid. at 10), few are likely to participate in
financial markets in the future. In my view, it is rather odd to construct securities/corporate law
policy on the basis of mistaken beliefs (see infra note 313 and accompanying text) held by those who
are not participants in securities markets.
313 This is not to say that insiders do not make superior trading profits; they clearly do. See,
for example, J.F. Jaffe, "Special Information and Insider Trading" (1974) 47 J. Bus. 410; H.N.
Seyhun, "Insiders' Profits, Costs of Trading, and Market Efficiency" (1986) 16 J. Fin. Econ. 189.
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suggests that some mutual fund managers, and perhaps a small number
of other traders, possess private information, and hence an advantage
over retail investors.314 However, the size of the abnormal trading
profits, and hence the institutional advantage, are at best small.3 15
There are better explanations for why retail investors have
increasingly preferred to place their funds with financial intermediaries,
the chief ones being superior diversification and superior management
skills. Another advantage is that institutional traders have lower unit
trading costs than retail investors3 16 As new technologies of risk
management are developed and exploited, institutional investors are
likely to have a further advantage, since many of these techniques will, as
a practical matter, be open only to institutional investors 3 17
Moreover, even if professional money managers sometimes have
informational or other advantages not shared by retail investors, a self-
help strategy is available: any investor can participate in the resulting
benefits simply by investing through a financial intermediary, such as a
mutual fund.18
It is worth pointing out that the historic policy tilt in favour of
retail investors is as much a product of "fairness" or distributional
arguments as it is of efficiency arguments. That is, institutional investors
have been perceived as representing monied interests, while retail
investors have been seen to represent ordinary Canadians. In the main,
this perception is false. Institutional investors such as pension funds (in
aggregate, representing the largest institutional pool of funds), life
insurance companies, banks, and trust companies invest the pooled
However, the presence of insider trading is consistent with markets being a "fair game" in which
average realized returns equal expected returns. Empirical studies have shown that, in the main,
markets in the U.S. and Canada are indeed a fair game. See Daniels & Macintosh, supra note 5 at
872-74. Of course, this will not mean much if the game (in this case, investing in the public markets)
does not yield attractive returns. But historical data indicates that stock market investing has been
an extremely remunerative activity for non-insiders. See Ross & Westerfield, supra note 7 at 112-
141. Moreover, the perception that insider trading is more prevalent now than in times past is
questionable. Seyhun found that, although insider trading increased between 1975 and 1989, the
increase did not outpace the aggregate increase in trading volume over this period. H.N. Seyhun,
"The Effectiveness of the nsider-Trading Sanctions" (1992) 35 J. Law & Econ. 149 at 167-71.
It may be that retail investors mistakenly believe that it is necessary to possess inside
information in order to profit in the stock market. If so, it would seem to make more sense to
correct this misapprehension than to regulate securities markets based on a falsehood.
314 See supra note 92 and 297-300 and accompanying text.
315 ]bid.
316 Ross & Westerfield, supra note 7 at 311.
317 See Part XI, below.
3 18 Supra note 218.
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savings of a deep cross-section of low- and middle-income Canadians9 19
The lion's share of any abnormal trading returns realized by institutional
investors are passed on to the beneficial owners and other stakeholders,
such as employees.3 20 Retail investors, on the other hand, are much
more likely to be drawn from a privileged stratum of society321 Thus, if
distributional considerations are to play any role in the debate about
corporate and securities law policy, they tend to favour the interests of
institutional, rather than retail, investors.
The irony is that excessive regulation has contributed to the
decline of the retail investor in the primary market. A key factor
underlying increased issuer reliance on exempt markets for raising
funds 22 is the increasingly onerous burden of disclosure requirements
associated both with primary market offerings and public company
status. Given the current structure of securities laws, these regulatory
requirements can be bypassed only by eliminating retail buyers. If
regulators are seriously concerned about preserving retail involvement in
primary market business, then their best hope of accomplishing this goal
is to reduce the burden and costliness of assembling a prospectus so that
fewer new issues are driven into the exempt market9 23 Similarly,
continuous disclosure obligations should be made less, not more,
onerous, contrary to recent Canadian experience.3 24 These issues are
further pursued in the following section.
319 Mutual funds, however, are more likely to represent more affluent investors. See
Canadian Shareowners, supra note 268 at 10 (shareownership increases with income).
320 For example, virtually the entire benefit of any abnormal trading profit realized by a
defined contribution pension fund is realized by the employees who are its beneficial owners.
Investment profits realized by banks, trust companies, and insurance companies help to ensure the
solvency of these institutions, protecting client capital as well as enhancing share values.
321 Canadian Shareownenr, supra note 268.
322 Andrews, supra note 1 at 11. Of course, some of the increase in the use of exempt markets
must be attributed to the fact that institutional investors, which form an ever larger share of the
market, have historically been the primary buyers of private placements. bid,
The growth of the U.S. exempt market in the 1980s is chronicled in The Economist, "The
Public World Of Private Placements" (22 September 1990) at 86. See also M.S. Smith, "Continued
Growth Is Likely for Private Placement Mart" (1991) 57:29 Investment Dealers Digest 24.
323 See Parts XIII and IX below.
324 See, for example, NP40, supra note 102; "OSC Policy Statement No. 5:10: Annual
Information Form and Management's Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results
of Operations" (1989), 12 O.S.C.B. 4221 [hereinafter "Annual Information Form"]; and "OSC
Policy Statement 5:10: Amendments and Additional Items-Notice" (1990), 13 O.S.C.B. 902.
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VIII. RETAIL INVESTORS AS FREE RIDERS: THE
PRECARIOUS CASE IN FAVOUR OF MANDATORY
DISCLOSURE
Securities law mandates the disclosure of information to
investors in primary markets through the vehicle of the prospectus. The
form of prospectus that is mandated by securities legislation is based on
the presumption that buyers of new issues are unable to look after their
own interests and are likely to be duped by false or exaggerated claims
made by corporate issuers and promoters. As a result, the prospectus
must contain copious amounts of information, at least some of which
would not be produced in an unregulated market, or would not be
produced in the form currently required by law.3 25
It is important to realize that it is the retail investor who lies at
the heart of these mandatory disclosure requirements. This is clear from
the structure of the legislation; where the sole purchasers of a primary
market issue are relatively sophisticated institutional buyers, prospectus
exemptions are available 326 Such investors, unlike retail investors, are
assumed to have the sophistication, bargaining power, and experience to
protect their own interests. Thus, there are two primary markets. In the
"non-exempt" market, where securities are sold to the public, including
the supposedly gullible retail investor, a prospectus is required.3 27 In the
325 The fact that issuers, by themselves, will not produce information in the amount or form
thought to be essential by regulators is evidenced by the steadily mounting burden of mandated
disclosure. If issuers were producing information sufficient to satisfy the regulators, then it would
be unnecessary to extend mandated disclosure requirements. The history of mandated disclosure,
however, is not one of fewer, but of steadily increasing layers of required disclosure. Most recently,
see "Annual Information Form," ibi; and NP40, supra note 102.
To an extent, the seemingly inexhaustible regulatory appetite for further mandated disclosure
may be a product of misperception about the quantity and quality of information that finds its way
into securities markets through private channels. Much information is impounded in securities
prices through the mechanism of private information networks. See RJ. Gilson & R.H. Kraakman,
"The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency" (1984) 70 Va. L Rev. 549.
326 Although not all prospectus exemptions are based on purchaser sophistication, the most
important ones are. See, for example, OSA,supra note 68, ss. 72(1)(a), (c), (d), (p).
327 1 use the term "public" loosely here, since under the OSA and other "closed system"
statutes the prospectus requirement is no longer triggered by a "distribution to the public." Rather,
any "distribution" (which essentially means a sale by the issuer or by a shareholder exercising some
measure of control) requires a prospectus, unless an exemption is available. See, for example, OSA,
ibid. ss. 1(1), 53, and 72. Nonetheless, the effect of the closed system is not dissimilar from a regime
of rules based on a distribution to the public.
450
Institutional and Retail Investors
"exempt" market, where securities are sold to institutional investors,
much more limited disclosure is required.3 28
In this section, I argue that the distinction between exempt and
non-exempt markets is increasingly artificial. For this purpose, it is
necessary to subdivide the non-exempt market into two parts. In the
first segment, there are both retail and institutional buyers. In the
second, which is effectively restricted to small business financings
(particularly small firm nos), new issues are sold primarily or exclusively
to retail buyers.
In the first segment, it can no longer be seriously asserted-if
ever it could be-that retail investors read or rely on the prospectus in
making investment decisions. Most consign the prospectus to the waste
bin.329 Rather, the chief protections for retail buyers of new issues are
those supplied by the market. First, it is institutional investors who are
pivotal in pricing new issues. Institutional investors will be canvassed by
the underwriter throughout the process leading up to the issuance of the
securities in order to gauge institutional interest and set a market
clearing price. Thus the price that is set will be a product of the
knowledge, acumen, and investigative efforts of institutional investors.
However, because retail buyers purchase at the same price as
institutional buyers, this means that retail investors free-ride on the
investigative efforts of institutional investors.330 In this manner,
institutional investors protect not only their own interests, but those of
retail investors as well; relatively unsophisticated retail buyers can
purchase new issues with reasonable confidence that the issue will not be
overpriced.
Second, neither the underwriters nor the auditors of the issue
will be eager to acquire a reputation for participating in the sale of
328 See, for example, Regulation made under the Securities Act, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 1015
[hereinafter Reg. 1015], s. 32.
329 See, for example, H. Kripke, The SEC and Corporate Disclosure" Regulation in Search of a
Purpose (New York: Law and Business Inc., 1979) at 14-15.
330 See, for example, A. Arbel, "Generic Stocks: The Key to Market Anomalies" (1985) J.
Port. Man. 4 at 5. Institutional buyers purchase about 80 per cent of new debt issues and 65-70 per
cent of new equity issues. See C.S. Perry, "Private Placements," in Rupert, ed., supra note 46 at 104.
This is suggestive of the frequency with which retail investors will be able to rely on the investigative
efforts of institutional investors to ensure that the offering is fairly priced. Indeed, it is likely that
there need be only a thin margin of institutional buyers to ensure fair pricing of a particular issue.
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overvalued securities and will endeavour, therefore, to price the issue
fairly.331
Third, brokers offering advice to retail clients also have an
incentive, in order to acquire or maintain a good reputation, to ensure
the quality of their investment advice and typically draw on the activities
of well-funded research departments in providing such advice.
In the second segment of the non-exempt primary market in
which new issues are sold primarily or exclusively to retail investors,
clearly there is no free ride on the activities of institutional investors. At
first sight, mandatory prospectus disclosure seems to play a more useful
role. However, even in this segment of the market, the value of
mandatory disclosure can be seriously questioned. While a higher
proportion of retail investors read the prospectus, anecdotal evidence
suggests that this proportion is still small; most will rely on the advice of
a broker in making a purchase decision. As in the first segment of the
market, these brokers will not be eager to develop a reputation for
selling or recommending purchases of overvalued securities. And again,
auditors and underwriters will have their reputations to protect.
The growing institutionalization of the market is likely to
diminish the number of new issues that are sold exclusively to retail
investors. If market protections for retail investors operate less
effectively in the second segment of the new issues market, over time this
segment is likely to diminish greatly in importance.
Further, even if the benefits of mandatory disclosure are greater
in the second segment of the market, the proportional costs to issuers
may be greater still. Small firms are typically young, start-up enterprises
in a critical stage of their development, and the costs of making an issue
by prospectus may be crippling. Indeed, the legal and accounting costs
of making a primary market offering are proportionately greater for
small offerings. 32 Thus, the burden of mandatory disclosure falls
disproportionately on small firms, putting such firms at a competitive
disadvantage and creating a barrier to entrepreneurial activity. The sEc
331 S. Titman & B. Trueman, "Information Quality and the Value of New Issues" (1986) 8 J.
Acct. & Econ. 159; and R.P. Beatty & J.R. Ritter, "Investment Banking Reputations and the
Underpricing of Initial Public Offerings" (1986) 17 J. Fm. Econ. 213. See generally W. Rotenberg,
"Pricing Initial Public Equity Offerings: Who Wins, Who Loses And Why?" (1990) 3:1 Can. Invt.
Rev. 17 at 18-19.
332 See J.G. MacIntosh, "Financing the Small, High Technology Firm in Canada" (27 July
1993) (Government and Competitiveness Project, School of Policy Studies, Queen's University).
This is true even aside from the fact that larger issuers can use the short-form prospectus system to
issue securities. Even for long-form offerings, the cost of floating a new issue increases less rapidly
than the size of the offering.
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has recognized this disproportionate burden and has responded with a
number of recent amendments to SEC rules designed to ameliorate the
burden of mandated disclosure for small firms33 Many Canadian small
issuers may take advantage of the U.S. rules, with the result that many
smaller firms now choose to raise money in the U.S. rather than in
Canada.3 34 Canadian regulators should reduce the regulatory burden on
small issuers at least to the extent of matching the U.S. rules.
There is empirical evidence suggesting that the market
protections referred to above would be sufficient to protect investors in
primary markets even absent mandated disclosure. On average, new
offerings are underpriced to compensate buyers for the risks associated
with new issues.335 The degree of underpricing is inversely related to the
quantity and quality of information produced by the issuer336 and to the
quality of intermediation (i.e., audit and underwriter) services provided
by the issuer.337 The studies provide evidence that these attributes are
priced by the market. This, in turn, supports the view that mandatory
disclosure of information is unnecessary, since the issuer has an incentive
to produce whatever information (and intermediation services) will
minimize its cost of capital. It also supports the view that the distinction
between exempt and non-exempt markets is artificial.
333 The package of changes, dubbed the "Small Business Initiatives," consists of amendments
to the "small issues" and "seed capital" exemptions from the Securhies Act of 1933 registration
requirement, as well as to Regulations A and D. The changes became effective 13 August 1992.
See Securities and Exchange Commission Release No. 33-6949 (Aug. 13, 1992); and Release No.
33-6950 (13 August 1992), reproduced in 24 BNA Federal Securities Regulation & Law Report
1315. Further amendments have been proposed. See 24 BNA Federal Securities Regulation &
Law Report 1375.
3 3 4 See R. Ellis, "U.S. capital can aid expansion" The Globe and Mail (4 January 1993) B6.
335 With respect to U.S. data, see J. Ritter, "The Hot Issue Market of 1980" (1984) 57 J. Bus.
215; R. Ibbotson, "Price Performance of Common Stock New Issues" (1975) 2 J. Fin. 235; and R.G.
Ibbotson & J. Jaffe, "Hot Issue Markets" (1975) 30 J. Fin. 1097. With respect to Canadian data, see
V. Jog & A. Riding, "Underpricing in Canadian nos" (1987) 43 Fin. Anal. J. 48. See generally
Rotenberg, supra note 331, offering a compendious summary of the evidence.
There is evidence that institutional investors are systematically better informed than retail
investors about which new offerings are most likely to be underpriced, and hence more likely to
scoop up the "best" new issues. The systematic underpricing of new issues may be a response to this
information asymmetry in the sense that it is designed to keep uninformed investors in the market
despite the fact that they cannot always participate in the best offerings. See R. Beatty, "Auditor
Reputation and the Pricing of Initial Public Offerings" (1989) 64 Acct. Rev. 693.
3 3 6 Beatty, ibid.; and J. Ritter, "Signalling and the Valuation of New Issues: A Comment"
(1984) 39 J. Fin. 1231.
337 With regard to the U.S. evidence, see Beatty & Ritter and Titman & Trueman, supra note
331. With regard to the Canadian evidence, see L Krinsky & W. Rotenberg, "The Valuation of
Initial Public offerings" (1989) 5 Contemp. Acct. Research 501.
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The results of empirical tests conducted even before the
explosive growth of the institutional sector in the 1980s cast grave doubt
on the wisdom of mandated disclosure in primary markets. For example,
a comprehensive study by Jarrell compared the returns and risk of
primary market common equity and rights issues both before and after
the introduction of the Securities Act of 1933 in the United States.
338
Jarrell found that the introduction of the Act did nothing to improve the
average return of new issues. In fact, primary market issues made before
the Act offered better five-year returns than new issues made
afterwards. 339 Perhaps most surprisingly, new issues made in 1929,
supposedly the height of the "speculative fever" to which the Act was
addressed, did better than those of any other year in the study.3 40
Jarrell also compared the riskiness of new issues before and after
the Act. Although the average systematic risk of new issues (beta) was
almost the same for the two periods, the post-Act period was
characterized by relatively few high beta issues 341 There was a clear
lowering of unsystematic risk in the post-Act period.3 42
The findings with respect to risk, however, provide a very shaky
base upon which to build a case in favour of mandated disclosure. For
one thing, a reduction in unsystematic risk is of little or no benefit to
investors. One of the most important teachings of modem portfolio
theory is that the proper perspective from which to evaluate the riskiness
of a security is its contribution to the riskiness of the portfolio as a
whole. Unsystematic (diversifiable) risk does not contribute to the
riskiness of a diversified portfolio. This lesson often seems to have been
forgotten by securities regulators whose ambition frequently seems to be
338 Jarrell, supra note 230. But see also Ci. Simon, "The Effect of the 1933 SecuritiesAct on
Investor Information and the Performance of New Issues" (1989) 79 Amer. Econ. Rev. 295 (finding
evidence that n'os on regional exchanges were over-priced before but not after the passage of the
Act). These studies followed an earlier, similar study by George Stigler. See GJ. Stigler, "Public
Regulation of the Securities Market" (1964) 37 L Bus. 117 (criticized in L Friend & E.S. Herman,
"The SEC Through a Glass Darkly" (1964) 37 J. Bus. 382). Although Stigler arrived at much the
same conclusion as Jarrell and Simon (excepting Simon's finding regarding nos on regional
exchanges), the latter were able to take advantage of sophisticated market models and statistical
tools that were developed only subsequent to the Stigler study. See also D.W. Diamond, "Optimal
Release of Information by Firms" (1985) 40 . Fin. 1071.
339 Jarrell, ibid. at 637-646. The study compared the fate of new issues in the 1926-33 period
(preceding theAct) with those in 1934-39 and 1949-55 (following the introduction of theAct).
340 Ibid. at 640.
341 The mean beta of the new issues was almost identical, but the pre-Act distribution of betas
was skewed towards the right tail of the distribution. Ibid at 649.
342 Ibid.
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to force disclosure of any item of information that might conceivably
have some relevance to investors, regardless of the information's
ultimate utility in constructing an investment portfolio or to the cost of
producing it.343
Moreover, while one interpretation of the reduction in
unsystematic risk and the diminishing proportion of high beta stocks is
that the Act eliminated fraudulent issues, this explanation is less
consistent with the data than the hypothesis that the Act has merely
prevented relatively high risk firms from going to market. When the
highest risk issues were eliminated from the pre-Act sample, the average
performance of the sample worsened.344 Thus, the highest risk issues in
the pre-Act period appeared to be the best performers, rather than
fraudulent issues.
Indeed, Jarrell also found a. dramatic increase in private
placements in 1934 and after, despite the fact that life insurers, the
primary buyers of privately placed bonds, did not grow at more than a
normal rate through the 1930s.345 Further, before the passage of the
Securities Act of 1933, private placements tended to be of lower risk
bonds, while afterwards they tended to be of comparatively higher risk
bonds. Added to this is the fact that there were fewer public issues of
common shares and comparatively more public issues of bonds and
preferred shares after 193346 All of this evidence is consistent with the
view that the Act drove higher-risk, new issues out of the public market
and into the exempt market.
The fact that the Act appears to have eliminated risky but
profitable public issues is unsettling. The riskiest new issues are likely to
be those sold by relatively small firms without public track records,
particularly those sold in initial public offerings. In a dynamic economic
343 This cost can be considerable. See S. Phillips & R. Zecher, The SEC and the Public
Interest (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1981) at 51 (estimating issuer costs of producing mandated
information but not estimating the administrative cost of mandated disclosure). A recent Canadian
example of excessive mandated disclosure arises in connection with "OSC Policy Statement 9.1:
Disclosure, Valuation, and Approval for Insider Bids, Issuer Bids, Going Private Transactions,
Significant Asset Transactions and Other Related Party Transactions" (1990), 13 O.S.C.B. 2075,
which recent experience suggests has greatly burdened smaller issuers in a manner which exceeds
the advantages.
344 Supra note 230 at 648-49.
345 This includes 1934, the year of the fastest growth in private placements. As Jarrell
indicates, the fact that the buyers grew at a normal rate through this period suggests that the
substitution towards private markets was induced by supply-side, rather than demand-side
considerations. Ibida at 660-662.
346 This was true in all industries examined in the study. b at 663-64.
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environment in which entrepreneurship and innovation is critical, these
firms constitute an increasingly vital sector of the economy, and
excluding them from the public market is likely to result in diminished
entrepreneurial activity and less competition for established firms. U,
indeed, this is a primary effect of mandated disclosure, the conclusion
that it has caused more social harm than good is compelling.
It is a mistake to believe that the end of mandated disclosure for
primary market issuers would mean the end of disclosure. As in the
regulation-free Euromarkets, private placement markets, and domestic
securities markets prior to the advent of mandatory disclosure, issuers
making public offerings would be compelled as a matter of business to
make disclosures to prospective buyers. 347 It may well be that the most
important information currently mandated for inclusion in prospectuses
would be replicated in the selling document. However, it is almost
certain that some of the chaff would be eliminated.3'4
The case in favour of mandated secondary market disclosure is
also a fragile one. Two studies by Benston are noteworthy 49 If
mandatory disclosures contain valuable information (i.e., information
that the market does not already have), then public release of mandated
347 Where information is not disclosed, the market will exact a discount for information risk.
Ibid. Thus, the prospective cost of non-disclosure is passed back to the issuer. The extent of
disclosure that could be anticipated in an unregulated market would depend on the financial and
business risk of the issue and its planned use of proceeds. It seems likely that the greater the
business and financial risk, the greater will be the information risk and associated price discount
accompanying non-disclosure. Thus, one would expect riskier ventures to make fuller disclosure.
In general, it would be expected that issuers will engage in disclosure to the point where the
issuer's cost of capital is minimized. This would be expected to occur when the marginal cost to the
issuer of "information risk" associated with non-disclosure is balanced against the cost of making
additional disclosure. Ibid
Because there is value in maintaining ease of comparability between prospectuses of different
issuers, it may make some sense to continue to mandate a format for the presentation of various
forms of information, while leaving it up to the issuer to decide whether or not to include a
particular type of information. See R.R. King & D. Wallin, "Market-induced information
disclosures: An experimental markets investigation" (1991) 8 Contemp. Acct. Research 170.
It is noteworthy that the Euromarkets have developed industry trade associations in order to
police the conduct of market participants and to maintain investor confidence. See R. Edge, "The
Euromarkets and the Canadian Issuer," in Rupert, ed., supra note 46, 135 at 148. It may well be
that the devolution of more and more regulatory power to both national and trans-national self-
regulatory organizations is the wave of the future.
348 mIb
349 GJ. Benston, "Published Corporate Accounting Data and Stock Prices" (1967) 5 J. Acct.
Research 1; and G.J. Benston, "Required Disclosure and the Stock Market: An Evaluation of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934" (1973) 63 Amer. Econ. Rev. 132 [hereinafter "Required
Disclosure"].
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information should have an effect on market price.350 However,
Benston found that, in general, the effect of mandatory disclosures on
share prices was trivial351
The most compelling explanation for this result is not that
information about matters like corporate earnings is not economically
significant, but that most information of value finds its way into both
public and private information networks, and from there, into publicly
posted prices prior to the time when mandatory disclosures must be
made.352 Institutional investors play a key role in this process, since
institutional money managers and other sophisticated traders play a
leading role in gathering information and (by trading) causing this
information to be reflected in public prices.353 As in primary markets,
retail investors free-ride on the investigative efforts of institutional
investors, since these efforts bring information into the markets and help
to ensure that securities markets are a fair game for retail investors.
Of course, as in the case of the primary market, there is a
segment of the secondary market that is not populated by institutional
investors3 54 The value of continuous disclosure requirements may be
greater in this market segment. Once again, however, as markets further
institutionalize and institutional investors expand their investment
horizons to smaller and previously neglected firms,355 the institutionally
neglected segment of the secondary market will shrink, diminishing the
need for mandatory continuous disclosure requirements. 5 6
In the end, the case in favour of mandatory disclosure in either
primary or secondary markets is far more tenuous than commonly
supposed. In particular, as institutional investors increasingly dominate
350 Obviously, the effect could be positive or negative. The question is whether there is any
effect, either positive or negative.
351 For example, Benston reports that "[o]n the average, a 100 percent unexpected increase
(or decrease) in the [reported] rate of change of income is associated with a 2 percent increase (or
decrease) in the rate of change of stock prices in the month of announcement." Only sales data had
a non-trivial effect on share prices. "Required Disclosure," supra note 349 at 139.
352 Gilson and Kraakman indicate the channels through which corporate information finds its
way into the public markets. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 325.
353 biN
354 See this Part, above.
355 Supra note 305 and accompanying text.
356 Adoption of the proposals made in Part 11(D) with regard to insider trading would likely
contribute to the decline of the institutionally neglected market.
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both primary and secondary trading markets, the extent of mandated
disclosure must surely shrink, if not ultimately disappear.
35 7
In the following section, this theme is taken one step further. I
argue that the institutionalization and internationalization of securities
markets will tend to force the deregulation of securities markets.
IX. DEREGULATORY PRESSURES CREATED BY
INTERNATIONALIZATION, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS,
AND THE GROWTH OF THE EXEMPT MARKET
Institutionalization, the internationalization of securities
markets, and deregulation are all closely linked. Professional managers
of institutional funds are more likely than retail investors to monitor
international developments and to have the knowledge, contacts, and
resources to move funds between jurisdictions in search of the best
risk/return trade-off.3 58 Since the regulatory regime is part of the
"product" that institutional investors buy when they decide to do
business in a particular jurisdiction, this creates a market penalty for
jurisdictions engaging in excessive or inefficient regulation.
The lowering of capital market barriers and developments in
information technology have also enabled corporate issuers to tap a
variety of different markets in raising capital. Increasingly, issuers are
avoiding jurisdictions in which the regulatory burden is comparatively
severe. The pressure created by increasing capital mobility has resulted
in a number of deregulatory initiatives in Canada. These include the
357 A similar view is expressed in R.C. Merton, "Financial Innovation and Economic
Performance" (1992) 4:4 J. Applied Corp. Fin. 12 at 19. See also Part XI (institutionalization of
market and superior ability of institutional investors to manage risk facilitates lower levels of
mandated disclosure).
Unfortunately, space limitations forbid a full canvassing of all arguments in favour of and
against mandatory disclosure. See generally F.H. Easterbrook & D.R. Fischel, "Mandatory
Disclosure and the Protection of Investors" (1984) 70 Va. L Rev. 669; J.C. Coffee, Jr., "Market
Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory Disclosure System" (1984) 70 Va. L Rev. 717.
358 Retail investors seeking international diversification are likely to do so, for obvious
reasons, through the medium of a professionally managed fund.
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short-form or "Pop" prospectus system,359 the shelf prospectus.360 and
the multi-jurisdictional disclosure system.3 61
The institutionalization of the market has also greatly facilitated
the dramatic growth in the exempt market in which primary market
offerings may be sold without a prospectus3 62 Aside from reduced
regulatory burden, exempt market sales to institutional buyers are
cheaper for issuers in a number of ways. The issuer's selling effort is
confined to a much smaller group of prospective purchasers, reducing
the transaction costs of lining up purchasers and selling the issue.
Further, the terms of the securities can be tailored to a specific buyer or
group of buyers, which results in a better fit between seller and buyer.3 63
The relative sophistication of institutional buyers also facilitates the use
of complex or novel covenants that might be a difficult sell in a public
issue. Moreover, the confidentiality of a private placement and the small
number and sophistication of the buyers allow the issuer to communicate
more and better information to the buyers, addressing problems of
information asymmetry that normally plague public market offerings,
and allowing the issuer to receive a better price for its securities. 364
Institutional buyers may also exert less pressure than public security
35 9 See "National Policy Statement No. 47: Prompt Offering Qualification System" (1993), 16
O.S.C.B. 765. The origins of Pop are discussed in R. Steen & IL Mckee, "The Prompt Offering
Qualification System" (1986), 9 O.S.C.B. 1625.
360 "National Policy Statement No. 44: Rules for Shelf Prospectus Offerings After the Final
Prospectus is Recepited" (1991), 14 O.S.C.B. 1844.
361 "National Policy Statement No. 45: Multijurisditional Disclosure System" (1991), 14
O.S.CB. 2889.
362 See Andrews, supra note 1 at 11.
363 See, for example, "Pan-European Market Concept Garners Wide Support in Survey"
(1991) 4:6 Intl. Sec. Reg. Rep. 2; and Sherman, supra note 278.
364 In a normal public offering, particularly of equity securities, there is usually some
"settling" of the market price following the public announcement of the issue, due to the fact that
the market rationally anticipates that an issuer will choose to issue securities when its securities are
overvalued by the public markets. See, for example, P. Asquith & D.W. Mullins, Jr., "Equity issues
and Stock Price Dilution" (1986) 15 . Fin. Econ. 61; and ILW. Masulis & A.N. Korwar, "Seasoned
Equity Offerings: An Empirical Investigation" (1986) 15 . Fin. Econ. 91. By contrast, Szewczyk
and Varma found that private placements of debt securities by public utilities were accompanied by
significant positive abnormal returns in share prices. See Szewczyk & Varma, supra note 24. While.
part of the price increase may be due to the better monitoring of corporate management that results
from concentrating share ownership, this evidence is also consistent with the hypothesis that private
placements reduce information asymmetries. See also V. Lewis, "Private Placements: A Capital
Idea" (1990) 107"5 Bankers Mo. 73 (cost of private placement is normally about ten to fifteen basis
points lower than a public offering).
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holders for payment of dividends and may also be willing to wait longer
to see a return on their investment.3 65
The fact that the regulatory burden is much less for exempt
market issues than for public offerings gives an additional inducement
for issuers to raise money in exempt markets. The diminished regulatory
burden allows a private placement to be effected with great speed,
allowing issuers to take advantage of investment projects with narrow
windows of opportunity. Raising funds through a private placement also
enables issuers to keep competitively sensitive information from
becoming public, particularly if the firm is not already a reporting
issuer.366 It will also typically require less expenditure of effort by
executives. Since issuers will naturally favour the method of raising
capital that creates the least cost to regulatory compliance (including
direct costs, opportunity costs, and competitive costs), the ever-widening
difference in regulatory burden between exempt and non-exempt
markets greatly enhances the tendency towards the "privatization" of
primary securities markets.367
The growing dominance of the exempt market exerts a potent
brake on the degree to which securities regulators are able to enhance
their control of securities market activity. The more restrictive the rules
imposed on public offerings, the greater the pressure for issuers to opt
into the exempt market. By this means, regulatory attempts to
consolidate control of the non-exempt market may ultimately diminish,
rather than enhance the dominion of the regulators.368
365 P.E. Roth, "The Private Placement Market for Start-Up Banks" (1989) 172 Bankers Mag.
56. This is not uncontroversial, as many have claimed that the short-term focus of institutional
investors distorts management incentives and detracts from the efficiency of North American
enterprise. See supra note 248 and accompanying text.
366 See 0. Yosha, Disclosure Regulations and the Decision to Issue Securities on the Stock
Market (Harvard University, 1992) [unpublished].
367 The advantage of the private placement iiarket is particularly acute for smaller issuers,
given the relatively prohibitive cost of a public offering. See K.H. Wruck, "Equity Ownership
Concentration and Firm Value" (1988) 23 J. Fin. Econ. 3 at 6 (finding that NYSE and AmEx firms
tapping the private placement market were smaller than the average public firm on the cRsp data
tape). See also P.S. Wilson, Jr., "Private Placements for Small Business" (1989) 59 CPA Journal
12; and Lewis, supra note 364; although see also supra note 278 (the recession and U.S. savings and
loan debacle have caused a temporary drying up of private placement capital for smaller firms).
368 Overregulation of this character will prove increasingly costly to Canada's financial
markets as international capital becomes more mobile. See J.G. MacIntosh, "Current Trends and
Future Paths in Domestic and International Securities Regulation" (Faculty of Law, University of
Toronto, 1992) [unpublished].
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At first sight, regulators could check this tendency by the simple
expedient of regulating the exempt market.3 69 However, this is likely to
backfire. Given the increasing international mobility of capital, such a
course is likely only to drive domestic issuers to seek out other, less
costly venues for raising capital3 70
Although the increasing size and importance of the exempt
market has greatly alarmed securities regulators, it is not cause for
concern. As indicated earlier, the core of primary market regulation is
the protection of the presumably gullible retail investor. The most
important exemptions to the prospectus requirements are premised on
the understanding that there are investors, particularly institutional
buyers, who are able to protect themselves without the assistance of the
state. 71 Such investors are able to defend their own interests because of
their size and bargaining power (which enables them to insist on relevant
disclosures of information), and because of their relative sophistication
in interpreting corporate data. The expansion of the exempt market
should therefore be cause not for regulatory angst, but for regulatory
celebration, since it signals a correspondingly shrinking sphere of
potential advantage-taking by issuers.
The adoption of Rule 144A3 72 by the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission is a direct product of market internationalization
and the growth of the exempt market. Rule 144A provides a "safe
harbour" from the registration and prospectus delivery requirements of
the Securities Act of 1933 for private resales of certain securities to
qualified institutional buyers (QiBs). The rule is based squarely on the
presumption that QmS are able to protect their own interests without the
assistance of the regulators, and was motivated by the desire to ensure
that corporate issuers and institutional buyers not by-pass U.S. private
placement markets in favour of overseas markets973 For similar
reasons, American regulators have recently allowed foreign firms to sell
369 The inauguration of the universal registration system appears to have been at least in part
a product of the desire to staunch the flow of business to exempt markets. See infra notes 374-377
and accompanying text.
370 Supra note 368.
371 Supra notes 326-328 and accompanying text.
372 17 CF.R. § 230 (1990).
373 See S. Hanks, "Developments in the Regulation of Cross-Border Financings: Rule 144A
and the Multijurisdictional Disclosure System," in Rupert, ed., supra note 46 at 79-80; and "SEC
Proposes Safe Harbour For Foreign Equities" (1989) 2:16 Intl. Sec. Reg. Rep. 6. The presumption
that institutional buyers can protect themselves underlies many of the most widely used prospectus
exemptions both in the U.S. and in Canada. See supra note 326 and accompanying text.
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rights to U.S. institutional investors without the need for registration,
and have also created an exemption from the application of anti-
manipulation rules to facilitate such rights offerings3 74
In Ontario, however, the growth of the exempt market has
apparently been greeted more with a sense of consternation than
jubilation. 375 Without feeling compelled to demonstrate any abuse of
the exempt market, the Ontario Securities Commission (osc) introduced
a system of universal registration (uR) in 1987 under which all securities
market professionals engaging in exempt market activity were required
to register with the Commission97 6 The uR system appears to have had
much more to do with regulatory discomfiture associated with loss of
turf than any genuine need to control questionable activity. In fact, UR
has operated mainly as a hindrance to exempt market activity, both
because of the glacial pace at which registrations have been processed
and the uncertainties that the new system introduced. In 1990, in
recognition of the difficulties spawned by UR and the minimal regulatory
payoff, the osc floated a proposal to abandon uR9 7 For reasons which
374 See "SEC Plans To Encourage Foreign Rights Offerings" (1991) 4:8 Intl. Sec. Reg. Rep. 5;
"SEC Approves Conditional Exemptive Relief For Non-U.S. Offerings, Rights Offers" (1991) 4:11
Intl. Sec. Reg. Rep. 1.
3 75 A welcome exception is the so-called "privatization exemptioA," under which the osc has
in certain circumstances granted discretionary exemptions from the requirement that an offering
memorandum contain a contractual right of action for rescission or damages. See Re Secretary of
State for Energy of Her Majesty's Government of the United Kingdom and the Regional Electricity
Companies of England and Wales-S. 73(1) (1990), 13 O.S.C.B. 5106. See generally J.A. Connidis,
"Emerging Issues in Securities Regulation," in Rupert, ed., supra note 46 at 66-68.
376 0. Reg. 345/87, ss. 176-183. A comprehensive account of the origins of tu may be found
in J.D. Scarlett, "Universal Registration Under the Securities Act (Ontario): History and
Implementation," in Special Lectures of the Law Society of Upper Canada 1989: Securities Law in the
Modem Financial Marketplace (Toronto: DeBoo, 1989) at 145. The ostensible rationales for the
system include the "credit ring" theory, which holds that the collapse of one player in the system
might jeopardize the solvency of others, and the "level playing field" theory, under which exempt
market players are said to have an unfair advantage in conducting exempt market business over
their regulated counterparts. The application of "credit ring" theory to exempt market players is
supported on the collapse of a single U.S. player and is questionable. The "level playing field"
concern can be met by allowing non-exempt market players to place their exempt market activities
in a separate, unregulated subsidiary-something the osc has declined to do.
3 77 See "Proposed Changes to Registration Exemptions and Registration Processes" (1990),
13 O.S.C.B. 5396 [hereinafter "Proposed Changes"]; and "Remarks of Robert J. Wright-The 11th
Annual Conference of the Canadian Comprehensive Auditing Foundation-November 5, 1990"
(1990), 13 O.S.C.B. 4787.
The authors of the "Proposed Changes" laconically observe that "there have been some
industry concerns that the present system contains elements of unnecessary regulation." Ibid. at
5396. They also indicate that
[g]enerally, the Commission will not impose registration where it believes that either
there is minimal risk to investors or the investors are capable of protecting themselves. In
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are unclear (but which almost certainly include a desire not to foresake
the revenue generated by uR), this proposal has apparently been
abandoned 78
Given the almost inevitable tendency of regulators to abhor a
regulatory vacuum, there is no guarantee that the overweening
regulatory zeal that spawned the uR system will not be repeated in the
future. However, the increasing internationalization and
institutionalization of securities markets means that the cost of such
regulatory errors will increase over time as securities market players
respond to excessive regulation by doing business in other jurisdictions.
In the long run, it can be expected that increasing market
institutionalization will cause further growth in the exempt market sector
and will further add to the international mobility of capital. Thus, the
deregulatory pressure created by these developments will intensify.
X. THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF CORPORATE
CONTROL MARKETS
Corporate control markets are important in ensuring that
managers act in the best interests of shareholders.379 Increasingly,
corporate control markets have become international in scope. This is
the result of developments in communications technology and
information management that have allowed acquirors to obtain better
information both about potential target companies in other jurisdictions
and about foreign legal regimes. The trend towards international
harmonization of takeover laws and the adoption of mutual recognition
schemes (under which a bidder may extend a bid to foreign shareholders
by complying with domestic takeover law) will only accelerate the
internationalization of control markets3 80 The consequences are clear:
more vital control markets mean invigorated discipline of corporate
managers, helping to ensure that managers act in the interests of
shareholders and not themselves.
such circumstances, the Commission is of the view that the costs of maintaining the full
registration and information gathering systems do not justify the limited benefit that
would be derived from such regulation.
378 An added reason may be that domestic players are quite happy to support uR, given that it
tends to exclude foreign competitors.
379 Supra note 197 and accompanying text.
380 See Macintosh, supra note 368.
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Although most transfers of control in Canada are effected
consensually rather than by means of hostile takeovers,381 the
internationalization of control markets will greatly expand the range of
potential acquirors. Since control will tend to gravitate (whether
through consensual or non-consensual control transactions) towards
those controlling shareholders who are the most efficient monitors,38 2
the efficiency with which Canadian managers are monitored will be
improved.
X. FINANCIAL INNOVATION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF
NEW TOOLS FOR MANAGING RISK
The past twenty years have witnessed an explosive amount of
financial innovation in the form of myriad new securities and exotic
hybrid combinations of securities983 ,These innovations have included a
plethora of futures, options, and swaps on a variety of underlying
interests including foreign exchange rates, interest rates, commodities,
and market indices. Recent innovations have also included mortgage
and asset-backed securities 84 and, in the U.S., junk bonds.3 85
A considerable amount of financial innovation has been inspired
by regulatory or tax arbitrage (i.e., the desire to circumvent or reduce
regulatory or tax burden) 38 6 While tax arbitrage is normally of
381 In Canada, comparatively few control transfers are effected by way of hostile takeover.
See Daniels & Macintosh, supra note 5.
382 MJ. Barclay & C.G. Holderness, "The Law and Large-Block Trades" (1992) 35 J. Law &
Econ. 265, especially at 278 ("the evidence shows that block premiums facilitate the transfer of
voting control to those who are more effective monitors and managers, a result that increases
wealth for all shareholders").
383 Some Canadian innovations and their originators are briefly reviewed in BA. Kalymon,
Global Innovation & the Impact on Canada's Financial Markets (Toronto: John Wiley & Sons, 1989)
at 18-19.
384 See F.D. Tounthwaite & S.D. Sadler, "Securitization in Canada: The Legal Issues," in
Rupert, ed., supra note 46 at 180; Nesbitt, etaL, "Asset Securitization," in Rupert, ibid. at 200; and
LS. Wahl, "Mortgage-Backed Securities: A Canadian Perspective," in Rupert, ibid, at 232.
385 The development of a market for junk bonds, or premium yield bonds issued by
comparatively high-risk issuers, has been primarily an American phenomenon. Although the
market temporarily collapsed with the fall of Drexel Burnham and the most recent recession, it is
now making an aggressive resurgence.
386 It may be the case, for example, that to some extent Canadian institutions have
circumvented the "foreign property" rules by purchasing futures and options. See generally M.H.
Miller, "Financial Innovation: The Last Twenty Years and the Next" (1986) 21 J. Fin. & Quan.
Anal. 459; R.C. Merton, "Financial Innovation and Economic Performance" (1992) 4:4 J. Applied
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questionable social benefit,387 regulatory arbitrage has often been a
means for circumventing inefficient regulation. 88 Some financial
innovation has also been stimulated by a desire to "complete the
market" for financial claims. A new form of claim will facilitate market
completion when it affords investors the opportunity to hedge, share, or
pool risks in novel ways or, more generally, to create contingent payoff
structures previously unavailable to investors3 Much financial
innovation has also been directed at allowing investors to accomplish
familiar financial goals, but with lower transaction costs or greater
liquidity 390 Yet other forms of productive financial innovations have
arisen in the form of novel contractual mechanisms for reducing agency
costs. Examples include new types of managerial payoff structures
designed to align managerial and shareholder interests and "event risk"
Corp. Fin. 12; EJ. Kane, "Good Intentions and Unintended Evil: The Case Against Selective Credit
Allocation" (1977) 9 J. Money, Credit & Banking 55; and EJ. Kane, "Technological and Regulatory
Forces in the Developing Fusion of Financial-Services Competition" (1984) 39 . Fin. 759.
387 Tax arbitrage is generally the least socially productive form of financial innovation. While
it consumes resources to conceive and to market tax avoidance instruments, the benefits are
primarily redistributional in character, ie., the purpose and effect of tax arbitrage is to transfer
wealth from the public purse to private interests. Occasionally, however, even tax arbitrage can
fortuitously result in social benefit. See Miller, ibid. at 462 (tax arbitrage responsible for creation of
the Eurobond market).
388 Indeed, this is a central theme of this Part. Of course, whether or not regulatory arbitrage
is socially productive depends on the efficiency of the regulation being skirted. Bypassing inefficient
regulation is socially productive, while bypassing efficient regulation is not. In the main, most
regulatory arbitrage can probably be placed in the first category. See Merton, supra note 386.
389 The remarkable acceleration of the pace of financial innovation in the past thirty years
appears to be the product of a number of factors, aside from regulatory and tax arbitrage. One
commentator has suggested that the increase in global economic activity has created a focus on
financial innovation that was absent in more troubled times. See Merton, ibi at 17. In addition, a
variety of new sources of financial risk have increased the returns from financial innovation. These
include the abandonment of fixed exchange rates, accelerated and less predictable rates of inflation,
wide differences in national inflation rates, and the increased volatility of interest rates and
commodity prices. These increased risks have raised the demand for new financial products in
order to facilitate risk management. See C.W. Smithson & D.H. Chew, "The Uses of Hybrid Debt
in Managing Corporate Risk" (1992) 4:4 J. Applied Corp. Fin. 79 at 81. The growing
internationalization of business has added to the demand for protection against exchange and
interest rate risks, while deregulation has facilitated the offering of novel productj. See Kalymon,
supra note 383 at 1-18. Yet another factor that has given a boost to financial innovation has been
the evolution of sophisticated methods for valuing complex securities, like the famous Black-Scholes
option pricing model.
3 90 An example would be an institutional investor that wishes to alter portfolio risk. Prior to
the invention of financial derivatives, the fund might have had to buy and sell many securities to
accomplish its goal; now, the ability to buy or sell a market index allows it to achieve the same result
at much lower cost. See Kalymon, supra note 383 at 7. Yet another example is the liquid yield
option note (LYON), which was initially designed to appeal to a specific investment strategy in the
retail market. The origins of the LYON are discussed in JJ. McConnell & E.S. Schwartz, "The Origin
of Lyons: A Case Study in Financial Innovation" (1992) 4:4 . Applied Corp. Fin. 40.
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covenants designed to reduce the incentives of managers and
shareholders to act opportunistically towards debt holders.3 91
These developments are significant to the future path of
securities regulation. Futures, options, and other derivatives allow both
investors and corporate issuers to manage risk more effectively.
Examples include the hedging of risks arising from fluctuations in
foreign exchange rates, interest rates, or commodity prices. As Merton
Miller has observed:
Efficient risk-sharing is what much of the futures and options revolution has been all
about ... The combined set of futures and options contracts and the markets, formal and
informal, in which they are transferred has thus been likened to a gigantic insurance
company--and rightly so0t92
Securities regulation also has much to do with managing risk.
Mandated disclosure aims at ensuring that investors are aware of various
risks associated with the purchase of an investment. Merit regulation
goes further and effectively forbids the creation of certain risks.
However, if significant classes of risk can be managed by investors
themselves through various risk hedging, sharing, and pooling strategies,
391 Merton, supra note 386; J.D. Finnerty, "An Overview of Corporate Securities Innovation"
(1992) 4:4 Applied J. Corp. Fin. 23 at 26; and Smithson & Chew, supra note 389 at 85-87.
For a pessimistic but rigorous review of the current state of the managerial remuneration
market, see M.C. Jensen & K.J. Murphy, "Performance Pay and Top Management Incentives"
(1990) 98 J. Pol. Econ. 225. Jensen and Murphy suggest that both regulatory and non-regulatory
constraints have limited the effectiveness of managerial contracting in aligning manager and
shareholder interests. Nonetheless, it would appear that there has been an increasing sensitivity in
the business community to the importance of incentive-based compensation. See, for example,
symposium articles on executive compensation in (1992) 5 J. Applied Corp. Fin. 99 et seq.
For a description of some recent advances in financial contracting designed to reduce the
agency costs of debt, see K. Lehn & A. Poulsen, "Contractual Resolution of Bondholder-
Stockholder Conflicts in Leveraged Buyouts" (1991) 34 J. Law & Econ. 645.
The increasing sophistication of financial contracting in mitigating agency cost problems has a
direct impact on corporate regulation, particularly in the area of fiduciary standards of conduct.
For example, the evolution of market means of taming the agency costs of debt (see Lehn &
Poulsen, ibid.) belies recent calls like those of McDaniel for an extension of fiduciary duties to
creditors. See M.W. McDaniel, "Bondholders and Corporate Governance" (1986) 41 Bus. Law. 413;
and M.W. McDaniel, "Bondholders and Stockholders" (1988) 13 J. Corp. Law 205. Canadian
courts arguably have already created a fiduciary duty towards creditors under the statutory
oppression remedy. See J.S. Ziegel, "Creditors as Corporate Stakeholders: The Quiet
Revolution-an Anglo-Canadian Perspective" (1993) 43 U.T.LJ. 511. In my view, this is a mistake.
392 M.H. Miller, "Financial Innovation: Achievements and Prospects" (1992) 4:4 J. Applied
Corp. Fin. 4 at 7.
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then the need for mandated disclosure, merit regulation, and other
forms of regulatory intervention is likely to decline.
393
Diversification-one of the oldest forms of risk
management-furnishes an example. By purchasing a reasonably large,
well-diversified selection of securities, virtually all of the "unsystematic"
risk can be eliminated from an investor's portfolio. This sharply reduces
the benefits of mandated disclosure of unsystematic risk factors in the
prospectus 39 4 In an economy in which investors did not have the ability
to diversify their investment portfolios, a much greater premium would
be placed on information concerning company-specific risk factors.395
One can take diversification a step further: the strategy of
assembling an international portfolio of securities can result in lower
systematic risk than investing in a single market, since movements in
national economies are far from perfectly correlated. 3 96 The increasing
popularity of international investment portfolios reduces the benefit that
many investors will derive from disclosure of systematic risk factors.
There are other ways of reducing systematic risk, such as
purchasing put options written on market indices,397 buying "portfolio
insurance," or investing in a futures mutual fund.3 98 The future holds
yet more promise; the development of "macro" swaps and options will
393 The reverse side of the coin is that many of the new financial instruments are extremely
risky, particularly when misunderstood or not properly hedged, increasing the potential costs of
financial mismanagement. See, for example, Hazel v. London Borough Councg [1989] 2 W.L.R.
372 (H.L), in which borough councillors racked up ruinous losses on poorly conceived swap
transactions. In my view, these risks are adequately addressed in the case of institutional investors
by prudent person investment standards (although it might be well to forbid some institutional
investors, like municipal councils, from purchasing derivatives at all--the result effectively achieved
by the Hazer holding), and, in the case of retail investors, by regulation of professional providers of
investment advice. See text below.
394 Mandated disclosure enthusiasts might argue that factors that are relevant to unsystematic
risks are also frequently relevant to systematic risks, and this is undoubtedly true. However, there
are likely to be unsystematic risk factors that do not tell investors much about systematic risks; for
example, disclosure bearing on the quality or character of management personnel (although the
latter will also bear on expected returns as well as risks).
395 The fact that investors value the information does not by itself, however, justify the
imposition of a scheme of mandatory disclosure. See MacIntosh, supra note 65.
396 R.R. Grauer & N.H. Khakansson, "Gains from International Diversification: 1968-85
Returns on Portfolios of Stocks and Bonds" (1987) 42 J. Fin. 721; and Speidell, supra note 305 at
84-86.
397 See P. Potvin, "Applications of Equity and Commodity Derivatives," in Rupert, ed., supra
note 46,153 at 157-159 (describing the Trilon "Toronto 35 Put Warrant").
398 For a cautionary view, see "Futures Shock: Mutual Funds that Invest in Futures and
Options Sound Attractive. Beware" The Economist (8 August 1992) at 69.
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further increase the ability of both issuers and investors to shield
themselves from systematic risks.399
The decline of the retail sector and the rise of financial
intermediation helps to spread the benefits of these new technologies of
risk management. This is due to the fact that institutional investors are
much more likely than retail investors to be aware of, and to employ,
sophisticated risk management techniques.0  By this means, the
institutionalization of the market offers a further reason for shedding
few tears about the decline of the retail sector. Indeed, it supplies an
added reason for re-examining the current regulatory burden of
mandated disclosure imposed in both primary and secondary markets.
The development of derivatives markets has also contributed to
the efficiency of the stock markets. Because market prices for
derivatives are more sensitive to new information than their underlying
interests, the existence of derivatives markets tends to speed up the
reaction of stock prices to new information. 0
For all of these reasons, the further development of Canadian
derivatives markets should be seen as an important regulatory
priority.40 2 This is particularly true given that financial innovation has
proceeded at a slower pace in Canada than in the U.S., and derivatives
markets are still at an embryonic stage.403 To some extent, this is a
product of the small size of the Canadian market; the critical mass of
trading necessary to generate the liquidity demanded by many
399 See J.F. Marshall & V.K. Bansal, "Hedging Business Cycle Risk with Macro Swaps and
Options" (1992) 4:4 . Applied Corp. Fin. 103. Macro swaps and options are based on indicators of
general economic performance. For example, a company whose profits are correlated with an index
of consumer confidence might purchase a swap under which it would pay the swap dealer if
consumer confidence is higher than expected, and be paid by the dealer if consumer confidence is
lower than expected, thereby hedging its systematic risk. bU
400 Some of the techniques employed by institutional investors are reviewed in Finnerty, supra
note 391.
401 See Froot, Perold & Stein, supra note 94 at 47.
402 Accord, A New Frontie. Globalization and Canada's Financial Markets, supra note 1 at 41-
45 (recommending that financial institution legislation be modified, where necessary, to allow
explicitly for the purchase of derivative securities; that both federal and provincial crown
corporations play an informational role in the development of financial innovation; that the Federal
Business Development Bank directly assist in the development of a market for securitized business
loans; and that provincial crown corporations that lend to businesses actively assist in the
development of a market for securitized business loans).
403 See Kalymon, supra note 383; Potvin, supra note 397; Kirzner, supra note 279; J.S. Ballard
"The Public Derivatives Market-Exchange Listed Products" Insight (31 March 1992); and P.K.
Hendrick, "Recent New Issue Financing Vehicles: rs, PMacs, LYONs" Insight (31 March 1992).
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institutional investors has been lacking.404 Added to the, liquidity
problem is the inevitable inertia of institutional money managers in
adapting investment strategies to embrace new and often complicated
derivative products. 405 Legal constraints have also played a role,
however, in inhibiting the development of derivatives markets. For
example, the legality of institutional purchases of derivative products
remains unclear under legal-for-life statutes, particularly where such
statutes endow regulated institutions with limited capacity.40 6 While the
new federal legislation, as well as some of the provincial legislation, has
jettisoned legal-for-life lists in favour of the prudent person approach, 40 7
it remains to be seen whether the courts will interpret the prudent
person standard as supporting the purchase of derivative securities.
40
Recently proposed National Policy Statement No. 46 (NP46),
which reflects current regulatory policy,40 9 regulates public prospectus
offerings of derivative securities by a variety of techniques, including:
mandated primary and secondary market disclosure; merit regulation;
broker registration; requirements that issuers maintain liquidity in
derivative securities, as well as minimum working capital and net assets;
and investor eligibility criteria.410 Space limitations forbid a discussion
of specific features of the proposed policy. However, while clarification
of the regulatory requirements applicable to derivatives will add to
market certainty, many features of the policy are questionable. Even
404 Securities trading creates liquidity that begets further trading, producing a sort of trading
chain-reaction. However, absent a critical mass of trading, this chain reaction may never get started.
See, for example, Kirzner, ibid at 77.
405 Institutional trading cultures become deeply imbedded and change only slowly,
particularly given that new trading strategies require new forms of expertise that might not be
immediately available. This is a key reason why many institutional traders, like private pension
funds, have not yet made a serious attempt (or indeed any attempt) to enter markets for derivative
securities. This obviously will change over time.
406 See P.M. Moore, "Derivative Products-Legal Powers and Investment Authority" Insight
(28 March 1991); and P.M. Moore, "Derivative Products-Legal Powers and Investment Authority
Update" Insight (31 March 1992). At the very least, legal-for-life statutes put a ceiling on the
quantity of derivative products in institutional portfolios. See Part II(K)(4).
4 0 7 See Part II(K)(4).
4 0 8 See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
409 "Draft National Policy Statement No.46: Index and Commodity Warrants" (1992), 15
O.S.C.B. 949, Introduction, para. (v).
4 1 0 The policy does not cover all derivative products. See ibid. at Introduction, para. (ii).
See generally J.A. Riley & R.P. Wildeboer, "The Regulation of Derivative Products-Derivative
Securities in Ontario: Rationalizing the Regulatory Framework" Insight (31 March 1992); C.D.
Penny-Cook, J.-P. Bisnaire & A.A.L Blair, "Draft National Policy No. 46 on Derivative Products"
Insight (31 March 1992).
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more than the non-derivative primary market, the market for derivatives
is an institutional market.4 1 With rare exceptions, derivative securities
are tailored for and marketed to institutional investors. Institutional
investors thus play a pivotal role in pricing derivative products-even
when such products are offered to the public by prospectus-and retail
investors are able to free-ride on the institutional investors' self-
protective efforts. Given the ability of institutional investors to protect
their own interests (and, indirectly, that of retail investors), the value
added by many features of the proposed policy, including mandatory
disclosure and merit regulation, is not readily apparent. 412
Indeed, even where derivative products are specifically designed
for, and marketed to, retail investors,413 most retail investors rely on the
advice of a broker in making their purchase decisions. Brokers are no
less capable than institutional money managers of gauging the quality of
derivative offerings, and they have a potent incentive to recommend only
good buys to their retail clients.414 Broker registration requirements,
investor suitability rules, and "know-your-client" rules thus appear to be
perfectly adequate to protect retail investors.
Thus, it is not clear what constituency is served by N,46. In
particular, given the often short market windows in which derivative
products must be marketed (or abandoned), and the delays and direct
costs occasioned by regulatory compliance, it would be better to take a
hands-off approach and leave the development of derivative products to
the market.415
411 The only exception is exchange-traded options on individual securities, which in Canada
are cleared through the Trans-Canada Options Clearing Corporation (and are exempted from
NP46).
412 See supra note 326 (most important prospectus exemptions are based on assumption that
institutional investors are able to protect own interests).
413 The LYON, or liquid yield option note, is an example. See supra note 390.
414 Few retail investors deal in derivative products through discount brokers, other than
exchange-traded options on individual corporations (which are excluded from NP46) since it is
mainly through brokers that retail clients become aware of derivative securities. Even where retail
clients do use discount brokers and do not have direct access to professional advice, they still free-
ride on the investigative efforts of brokers and investment analysts, whose reaction to new issues will
be pivotal in pricing such issues.
415 Broadly similar (but more elaborated) views are expressed in Riley & Wildeboer, supra
note 410, especially at 39-44. A recent step in the right direction is the liberalization of rules relating
to purchases of derivative securities by mutual funds. See "National Policy Statement No. 39:
Restated to Expand the Permitted Uses of Derivatives by Mutual Funds" (1992), 15 O.S.C.B. 5645.
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XII. CONCLUSION
The rapid growth of institutional investing, the decline of the
retail investor, and the internationalization of securities markets are
among the most significant recent developments in securities markets. I
have argued that these developments have important implications for
the structure of corporate and securities law in Canada.
In particular, the rise of the institutional investor is likely to
improve monitoring of corporate managers, although the extent to which
this will occur is highly dependent upon the extent to which policy
makers recognize the salutary role that can be played by institutional
investors and take appropriate steps to accommodate this role. I have
recommended a number of legal changes that would facilitate more
active institutional monitoring.
In addition, market institutionalization is likely to increase the
efficiency and liquidity of both primary and secondary trading markets
and to diminish the size of the institutionally neglected sector of the
market. It will also enhance the ability of retail investors to free ride on
the self-protective efforts of institutional buyers in both primary and
secondary markets. These developments will create less need for
regulation of securities markets through mandated disclosure and other
means.
International competition between jurisdictions to attract
securities business has grown tremendously in the past decade and will
continue to grow into the foreseeable future. This puts an important
brake on the degree to which domestic policy makers can regulate the
activities of securities market actors without motivating them to do
business elsewhere. It is also likely to enhance the efficacy of corporate
control markets in disciplining corporate managers.
Another brake on the activities of the regulators is the increasing
degree to which issuers have sought to raise funds in private, rather than
public, markets. Because private and public markets are substitutes,
increasing the cost of raising funds in public markets relative to that of
private markets will only succeed in causing yet further expansion of the
latter. Attempts to head off this development by further regulating the
exempt market are likely to fail because of the international competition
for securities business noted above. Indeed, I have argued that there is
little reason for regulatory concern about the expanding exempt market.
Exempt market purchasers are relatively sophisticated institutional
investors, who are able to protect their own interests, and expansion of
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the private markets is associated with a shrinking in the sphere of
potential advantage-taking by corporate issuers.
The development of markets for derivative securities will assist
corporate issuers and institutional investors in managing risk and will
.improve the efficiency of securities markets. However, there is a distinct
danger that over-zealous regulation will inhibit the development of these
markets. In recognition of the fact that derivative securities are
primarily sold to institutional buyers who are able to protect themselves,
regulators should take a hands-off approach.
